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Abstract
Trust and Reputation in Multi-Agent Systems
Babak Khosravifar
Multi-Agent systems (MAS) are artiﬁcial societies populated with distributed autonomous
agents that are intelligent and rational. These self-independent agents are capable of indepen-
dent decision making towards their predeﬁned goals. These goals might be common between
agents or unique for an agent. Agents may cooperate with one another to facilitate their pro-
gresses. One of the fundamental challenges in such settings is that agents do not have a full
knowledge over the environment and regarding their decision making processes, they might
need to request other agents for a piece of information or service. The crucial issues are then
how to rely on the information provided by other agents, how to consider the collected data,
and how to select appropriate agents to ask for the required information. There are some pro-
posals addressing how an agent can rely on other agents and how an agent can compute the
overall opinion about a particular agent. In this context, the trust value reﬂects the extent to
which agents can rely on other agents and the reputation value represents public opinion about
a particular agent. Existing approaches for reliable information propagation fail to capture the
dynamic relationships between agents and their inﬂuence on further decision making process.
Therefore, these models fail to adapt agents to frequent environment changes. In general, a
well-founded trust and reputation system that prevents malicious acts that are emerged by self-
ish agents is required for multi-agent systems. We propose a trust mechanism that measures
and analyzes the reliability of agents cooperating with one another. This mechanism concen-
trates on the key attributes of the related agents and their relationships. We also measure and
analyze the public reputation of agents in large-scale environments utilizing a sound reputation
mechanism. In this mechanism, we aim at maintaining a public reputation assessment in which
the public actions of agents are accurately under analysis. On top of the theoretical analysis,
iii
we experimentally validate our trust and reputation approaches through different simulations.
Our preliminary results show that our approach outperforms current frameworks in providing
accurate credibility measurements and maintaining accurate trust and reputation mechanisms.
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1.1 Context and Motivation
Artiﬁcial Intelligence has become one of the most fundamental research areas in computer sci-
ence. One line of research in artiﬁcial intelligence is associated with coordination of intelligent
agents [6,7,9,10,17]. Coordination takes place in multi-agent systems [9,31,44,87] where dis-
tributed agents have limited knowledge about their surrounding environment; therefore, they
continuously ask other agents to obtain required information. They could also require services
provided by other (reliable and well-reputed) agents. In general, the growing popularity of
agents requires systematic coordination management that enables agents to decide about their
interacting partners and overall acting attitude. This is a main reason behind the emergence of
trust and reputation-based frameworks that facilitate agents’ coordination in multi-agent sys-
tems. Considered as agents’ beliefs about one another, reputation is highly signiﬁcant in such
settings. Thus, a carefully designed mechanism is required to maintain the accuracy of this
parameter.
In this chapter, we introduce the context of our research, which is mainly about trust and
reputation in multi-agent systems. We identify the motivations, problems, and research ques-




Agent is an intelligent entity that is programmed and equipped with variety of methods and
techniques, observes its surrounding environment, and acts according to the decisions that are
made in its control system [13,22]. A particular agent uses the built-in capabilities to decide
about the most appropriate real-time action(s). It applies reasoning techniques to analyze the
outcome of its action, acts autonomous to achieve its predeﬁned objectives, and could cooperate
with other agents, which share some goals. In general, agents react to the environment using
their reasoning capabilities, analyze the obtained data, and react towards achieving their goals
[42]. Overall, agents are reactive, proactive and follow social interactions. They have limited
capabilities, which constrain them to coordinate with other agents to accomplish complex tasks.
1.1.2 Multi-Agent Systems
A multi-agent system is composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents [13,19,21]. Multi-
agent systems are widely used in distributed environments [11, 67]. They are also used as an
alternative to centralized problem solving, either because problems are themselves distributed,
or because the distribution of these problems between different agents reveals itself to be a more
efﬁcient way to organize the process of problem solving. Multi-agent systems give us the possi-
bility to build artiﬁcial universes that are small laboratories for testing theories about individual
and group behaviors. These artiﬁcial universes can be used to describe speciﬁc interaction
mechanisms and analyze their impact at a global level. The entities that are represented are
usually called animates, since they are mainly inspired by animal behaviors (hunting, searching
or gathering habits).
The aim of research in multi-agent systems is to have societies of agents that are very ﬂex-
ible and autonomous (for example, when agent-based robots are sent within an expedition and
they are required to be very independent from the instructions they could receive). Multi-agent
approach can be used for the coordination of different mobile robots in a common space. This
approach can also be seen as an efﬁcient and modular way of programming as agents could be
3designed and programmed with different abilities, behaviors and intentions. To this end, ana-
lyzing multi-agent systems is like analyzing human or animal behaviors in the sense that they
are self-independent and their selﬁsh actions may affect the environment in any unpredictable
way. Multi-agent systems are designed mainly with the objective of ﬁnding best social situation
for all the involving intelligent components. The main feature obtained by developing multi-
agent systems is ﬂexibility in proactive environments. These systems also tend to be rapidly
self-recovering and failure proof, usually due to self managed features.
In multi-agent systems, a class of computational models for simulating the actions and in-
teractions of autonomous agents is developed. In such systems, game theory [3,51,65,80–82],
and evolutionary programming [21, 85, 94] are used. These techniques are important because
of random distribution of agents in multi-agent systems and their independent decision making
processes. In fact, rational agents aim at reaching their predeﬁned goals and accordingly choose
their acting strategies using their limited knowledge and capabilities. This limitation encour-
ages agents to coordinate their actions. There are different research directions that address as-
pects of coordination in multi-agent environments such as coalition formation [10,66,87,90,95]
and clustering [27, 60, 78, 104]. To investigate the rationality behind these coordinations and
how agents are involved in, we need to thoroughly address the problems of agents reliability
and how this reliability is established among agents.
1.1.3 Trust Establishment and Reputation Formation
The unpredictable behavior of multi-agent systems raises different important questions. Two
interesting issues that we are mainly interested in are the concepts of trust and reputation that
have crucial impacts on agents’ strategic decision-making. Trust has long been recognized
as a vital concept in open multi-agent systems, where agents are self-interested, diverse and
deceptive. Trust is the parameter that reﬂects agents’ risk level when they want to rely on the
provided information or service of other agents for the fulﬁlment of their own goals. Trust
is established in a mutual way between agents. It is deﬁned with variety of meanings, but as
in [67], we denote trust as a belief an agent has that the other particular agent would accomplish
4what it promises. To this end, we deﬁne the trust as a peer-to-peer reliability estimation in which
different components are involved and might change over time and during different interaction
experiences.
Reputation is a parameter that reﬂects agents public reliability level in the multi-agent net-
work. Reputation is then a combination of different trust ratings which form a public opinion
about a particular agent. To this end, an agent that wants to evaluate the reliability of a particular
agent with no previous interaction can use the the agent’s reputation as a reasonable reliability
rating. As a matter of fact, in any environment populated with multiple (self-interested) com-
ponents that act independently and follow self-dedicated goals, trust and reputation assessment
becomes important in the sense that the inter-correlation of components is inﬂuenced by the
level of trust that components manage to have in a mutual way. Furthermore, in large-scale
environments (and mostly in market-based societies), reputation becomes an important param-
eter that reﬂects the image of a component (i.e. an agent) regarding other components in the
system. Reputation provides a form of social control, which encourages honesty in cooperative
environments. Since agents are acting in a cooperative network with dynamic behaviors, there
would be diverse opinions about a particular agent raised from different perspectives. The rep-
utation aggregates various impressions reﬂecting the public opinion about a particular agent.
Obviously, this value would be more accurate when there is a small diversity of opinions about
a particular agent.
The Trust Model
In the literature, the term ’trust’ has been used with different meanings. But in the context of
multi-agent systems, trust is mostly referred to as the expected reliability of a particular agent
in cooperative networks [14]. In many agent-based frameworks, interactions take place when
agents trust each other. The ﬁrst attempt in computing the trust associated to agents is made by
Marsh [53]. Since then, there has been a number of other models that advance the trust com-
puting in different aspects. We mainly concentrate on the frameworks that consider multi-agent
environments [17, 40, 61]. In most of these models, intelligent agents [4, 25] are equipped with
5reasoning capabilities which inﬂuence their interacting strategies. However, these models are
not adaptable for open multi-agent systems where agents freely join or leave the network. In
ubiquitous multi-agent environment, we require more advanced trust frameworks that speciﬁ-
cally tackle the trust evaluation problem with respect to continuous environment changes. In
this context, there have been a number of models [32, 33, 83] that to some extent address the
trust evaluation problem [84, 89, 96, 98]. We explore the characteristics of each one of these
models in detail in Chapter 2. However, all these models have one common missing aspect
which has not been addressed in any of them: the concept of effective trust adjustment after
trust evaluation. This means agents do not reconsider trust evaluation process to analyze their
evaluation accuracy. In multi-agent environments with random distribution of agents and dy-
namic changes of behaviors, trust adjustment is crucial for agents to adapt with environment
characteristics. The belief set adjustment should be fast enough to avoid agents’ misleading
in interactive environments. This issue is the main distinguishing point that advances our pro-
posed framework compared to the existing trust-based frameworks.
To this end, we characterize a well-founded trust framework (called ”ideal trust framework”
in this thesis) that is applicable to multi-agent systems to hold the following properties:
• Accuracy: The trust framework is accurate once two requirements are fulﬁlled:
(a) the collected data should be relevant to the trust evaluation process; and (b)
the necessary amount of data should be collected to facilitate trust evaluation.
• Rationality: Intelligent agents are supposed to be rational and an ideal trust frame-
work establishes the trust in such a way that agents utilize the framework based
on some reasoning techniques. For example, a new agent runs the trust evalua-
tion system more frequently than the one that has a consistent belief set about the
environment. However, these agents also periodically utilize the trust framework
and update their belief sets.
Rationality is considered in common agent-based architectures and therefore, all
the models that we consider in our related work develop rational behavior. But
still we highlight it as a characteristic for an ideal trust framework.
6• Adaptability: Agents require to update their belief sets with respect to environ-
mental changes to adapt with new network characteristics. This property is cru-
cial in systems that maintain business interactions. In such systems, agents need
to adapt with new changes to keep their efﬁciency high. For example, in business
interactive networks with diversity of behaviors, an agent might form a belief
regarding a particular service provider agent by trusting it as an optimal choice
to provide a given service. The adaptable agent should be able to recognize the
change in service provider’s attitude if it is altered. Otherwise, the selﬁsh service
provider could increase the service fee and decrease the service quality while has
no doubt that the agent still follows the same belief about its interactive network.
• Agileness: Beyond adaptability, a trust framework is required to effectively up-
grade the belief set to the most recent information captured from the environment
such that agents are always holding the information that refer to the most recent
collected data and reﬂect the most recent environment changes. Such a frame-
work is more effective in decision making process regarding acting strategies of
agents.
1.1.4 Trust versus Reputation
Since we mainly focus on trust and reputation modelling in multi-agent systems, it is worth
clarifying their roles in agent-based interactions. The trust is a parameter that is mutually
established between components and imposes impact on their one to one cooperation. Trust
represents the level of reliability that agents have regarding the type and quality of information
or service that is provided by other agents [54]. Although the measured trust might not reﬂect
the actual credibility of agents, agents still need to evaluate this parameter to make decisions
[44, 53]. Moreover, agents utilize trust-oriented learning strategies [84] that take into account
past interactive experiences.
The reputation parameter is a factor that an agent holds as a means to attract other agents
7in order to communicate and coordinate with them. Reputation represents the level of pop-
ularity that an agent has and this value is obtained with respect to the agents truthful actions
regarding other agents in the environment [97]. Similar to trust, the obtained reputation might
not accurately reﬂect the real reputation of an agent in the system, but that is a valuable source
of information that agents use to make decisions. This is the reason behind the need to en-
hance the quality of the trust and reputation assessments and provide sound trust and reputation
mechanisms. As it is deduced from the deﬁnitions, we consider the reputation as the extended
form of trust in group-wise decision making process. In fact, when we analyze the reputation
evaluation and gather individuals’ ratings, we skip the details of the provided rating evaluation.
These ratings could be the trust values that agents have regarding a particulars agent. We still
consider the four factors representing an ideal trust model in any reputation mechanism that
collects the data and computes a reputation value associated to a particular agent. However,
we mainly concentrate on the public aspects of such computation and study the conditions un-




In multi-agent environments, intelligent agents get involved in continuous interactions to achieve
their goals. In an effort to realize their deﬁned goals, agents need to make the best decisions in
their moves and apply selective strategies to facilitate their progresses. Therefore, these agents
should be equipped with a strong trust assessment protocol that is capable of estimating the
trust level of other agents. The trust level should be accurate enough that allows each agent to
identify the most reliable agents in its surrounding environment.
The trust assessment protocol should be complete to gather all the relevant factors which
inﬂuence the trust that an agent has about other agents. Failure to gather those factors would
8lead to compute a non-accurate trust value, which could explicitly inﬂuence agent’s outcome.
For instance, the incomplete trust evaluation process would miss the reliable interactive agents
and bring relatively low outcome for the agent that is looking for accurate information or high
quality of service. In systems where agents are capable of learning other’s attitudes, selﬁsh
service provider agents could easily recognize such incomplete trust assessment procedure and
could mislead the evaluating agents to interact with them at high price but with low service
quality. Moreover, the protocol should dynamically update the agents’ belief sets to capture
new characteristics of the environment.
1.2.2 Reputation Formation
In a large-scale multi-agent system, a sound reputation mechanism is required to reﬂect the
public reputation of agents. This mechanism should be ﬂexible enough to regularly get updated
and provide accurate reputation ratings. Also it should be strong enough not to get violated and
the represented data turn out to be inaccurate. This means that selﬁsh agents may try to violate
the reputation mechanism to take advantage of the faked data that support self reputation. This
action is expected in open multi-agent networks within which the reputation plays an important
role in agents interactions.
Moreover, in interactive multi-agent environments, reputation is highly competitive be-
cause agents resort to this value as a means of ranking their interactive parties. In fact, the
obtained information regarding ones’ reputation would highly inﬂuence the decision making
process of agents that are looking for high quality of service or accurate information. To this
end, a sound reputation mechanism has to act rigorously against any sort of violation in the
collected data. Furthermore, like trust frameworks, this mechanism has to be agile in updating
the computed values to represent an accurate image of the environment.
91.3 Objectives
The goal of this thesis is to develop and maintain strong trust and reputation assessment pro-
cedures that optimally function in multi-agent systems with dynamic changes of environment
attributes such as agent goals, credibilities, and population. The main objectives are categorized
as follows:
• Designing and developing a ﬂexible trust-based framework to accurately consider
the involved factors and provide an optimum (in computation and accuracy) trust
estimation process. Moreover, the agile adaptation of agents’ goals and beliefs
should be considered in this framework as the system is supposed to be highly
dynamic.
• Proposing a sound reputation mechanism to discourage malicious actions of the
agents trying to increase self-reputation level and take advantage of open multi-
agent system environment.
• Proposing a mechanism that investigates the parameters yielding optimal perfor-
mance for agents. We aim to study the cases where selﬁsh agents could obtain
best payoffs using their decision making procedure.
1.4 Basic Assumption
In this thesis, we consider trust and reputation in different chapters and analyze their details
within different simulated environments. However, trust and reputation are strongly connected
in the sense that reputation is based on collected ratings and the provided ratings could be
considered as direct trust that agents have regarding a particular agent [6,8,9]. Therefore in this
thesis, we start the discussions by proposing a trust framework and continue by generalizing it
to a reputation system.
In the trust-based framework, we mainly focus on the details of mutual agent relationships.
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The parameters that are involved in this framework reﬂect the type and strength of the rela-
tionship between two speciﬁc agents (the evaluating agent and the agent being evaluated). We
carefully investigate the data related to the previous interactions between these speciﬁc agents.
At some point, we also consider the collected data in the form of consulting reports. But overall,
the main concentration is the reliability analysis, which is maintained by the evaluators.
In the reputation mechanism, we mainly focus on the details of global reputation value
that agents hold and use as a means to represent self-status. This is a crucial factor that is
being used in enterprize environments to attract consumers. To this end, we consider a special
and concrete multi-agent system where the agents evolve as a structure hosting (web) services,
which are abstracted by intelligent agents. In this environment, agents are categorized into
consumers and providers of services. We analyze the reputation of these agents (also called
agent-based (web) services) and investigate their attitudes in representing truthful actions in
the system. The motivation behind using this speciﬁc case of multi-agent system is the need to
use speciﬁc and concrete parameters when evaluating the reputation of the system, which are
(web) services in my case. In this environment, the reputation value associated to a particular
agent is in fact the (weighted) mean value of ratings from different agents that might have
variety of impressions about this particular agent. Therefore, unlike trust, the reputation is not
from an agent’s point of view but is more general as it reﬂects public opinion. This value could
be used by new agents that do not have previous interactions with a particular agent.
1.5 Thesis Overview
The organization of this thesis is represented in the following. Moreover, Figure 1.1 illustrates
the sequence of chapters and their prerequisites for convenient reading.
 In Chapter 2, we present relevant literature review and related work. We split the related
work into two sections, one for trust-based frameworks and one for reputation mecha-
nisms. A discussion about these frameworks is included in this chapter. Reputation is
the context of (web) service ends the chapter.
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 In Chapter 3, we introduce our trust-based framework and discuss the algorithms to
maintain the optimal trust assessment procedure. We also discuss the implemented sys-
tem to observe the framework functionality. The proposed model is fully described and
analyzed with respect to the ideal characteristics deﬁned in the current chapter. Further-
more, we study the effectiveness of the proposed model against conventional systems
in different environments. The objective is to clarify the cases where the accurate trust-
based model could effectively function.
 In Chapter 4, we introduce a reputation mechanism to compute general reputation value
with respect to different involving parameters. We consider a typical multi-agent system
hosting agent-based (web) services and we deﬁne communities of (web) services as
groups of (web) services with common functionalities. I consider community of (web)
services because these entities form an enterprize system where continuous interactions
are crucial for their survival in the environment. Therefore, we put the system under
a competitive reputation mechanism within which rational agents aim to achieve their
predeﬁned goals. The objective of that is to maintain an accurate reputation system that
reﬂects the most recent image of agents’ opinions about service provider agents. We
implement the proposed mechanism and investigate its accuracy in a variety of settings.
 In Chapter 5, we continue the discussions about the reputation model with a different
perspective. In this chapter, we mainly concentrate on the sound reputation mechanism
and the conditions under which the malbehavior of rational agents is minimized. We
apply game-theoretic payoff analysis to increase the expected payoff as a result of truth-
ful actions. The objective is to maximize accuracy and prevent collusion, which could
temporarily increase ones reputation. We study in details the scenarios and consider
different parameters that inﬂuence agents’ reputation and identify constraints where the
malicious acts are minimized.
 In Chapter 6, we introduce an application in context of (web) services where the pro-
posed reputation mechanism could be utilized. In general, we use reputation as a means
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to enhance decision making process of the (web) service agents to maximize their per-
formance over long time interactions. We implement a multi-agent environment where
agents interact based on the proposed reputation mechanism (Chapter 4) and seek for
maximizing their payoffs. We study long-term performance of such agents where set-
tings alter according to agents’ actions and movements. We apply reputation mechanism
in this model and enhance agents’ capabilities to maintain long-term high performance.
 In Chapter 7, conclusions and future work are discussed and the contributions of this
thesis are summarized.
13




In multi-agent context, trust and reputation are very close concepts in the sense that most of the
proposed frameworks analyze them both and in many cases without clear distinction. But in this
thesis, we clarify our point of view in the following. Considering a multi-agent environment
hosting rational agents, trust refers to peer-to-peer reliable interactions between two agents that
are called the evaluating agent and the agent being evaluated. Different frameworks consider
diverse approaches to address the trust evaluation problem. On the other hand, the reputation
refers to public opinion about particular agent’s reliability. The public opinion could be restored
in a central unit and disclosed to agents upon requests. But there is no guarantee on the accuracy
of the information. The obtained reputation value could be used as the expected trust value if
an agent initiates the interaction with a particular agent with disclosed reputation value.
In this chapter, we discuss different frameworks and categorize them into two sections
related to trust and reputation. Some of the reputation models consider trust assessment in their
approaches, but for representing public opinion. According to our classiﬁcations, those models
will be discussed in the reputation section.
2.2 Trust-based Frameworks
During the past few years, agent communication languages and protocols have been of much
interest in multi-agent systems. Agents are distributed in large scale networks and mutually
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interact to collaborate, coordinate and share services and resources with other agents. There-
fore, trust is essential to ensure effective interactions within open multi-agent networks. In the
Oxford dictionary, trust is deﬁned as ”conﬁdence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a
person or thing”. In multi-agent context, an agent’s trust is a measure of the agent’s willingness
to actually do what it agrees to do. In fact, trust is a measurement of the complement of risk
level that an agent can take when it wants to interact with another agent. The trust value is used
as a means to estimate the reliability of the interactive party. This value could refer to different
aspects such as accuracy, responsibility, or honesty. The estimated value might be wrong which
misleads agents in interactive settings. Overall, trust represents the extend to which an agent
relies on another agent.
In the literature, there are different proposed frameworks that consider variety of approaches
to address the trust establishment problem in multi-agent systems. These models are aimed
at developing trust-based models to enforce reliability in multi-agent environments. To sur-
vey these models, we need to categorize them into groups that have similar assumptions. We
explore the details of these models in the rest and compare their characteristics against our
proposed idealistic trust model using the four aforementioned characteristics in Chapter 1: ac-
curacy, rationality, adaptability, and agileness.
The ﬁrst group is based on direct interaction of two agents [71, 72, 88, 91]. In the frame-
works belonging to this group, the trust is only computed by information obtained from direct
interaction experience of two agents. The main idea of these frameworks is to explore details
of previous interactions and obtain required information to compute the reliability of the agents
being evaluated. The second group includes frameworks that consider the type of interaction as
a means to estimate the reliability of agents [31, 32, 73]. These models consider the interaction
domain and distinguish agents with respect to their capabilities in different domains. The third
group includes frameworks that collect information from external parties to maintain the trust
evaluation process [32,33,83]. Direct interactions (if any) are still used as a part of the process.
The proposed model in this thesis (proposed in Chapter 3) is highly relevant to the models of
this group. To this end, we explore more details about these frameworks and compare their
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capabilities in different perspectives.
We continue our discussion with detailed analysis of the relevant models that include
FIRE [32], REGRET [71], BRS [33] and Travos [83] that our model will be compared against
in Chapter 3. We implement these models in our simulated environment to compare their per-
formances with respect to different aspects. We mainly highlight their differences with respect
to the ideal trust framework’s characteristics explained in Chapter 1. For example, the BRS
system ﬁlters out outlier ratings that are provided by other agents. This leads to the model’s
low accuracy in models where malicious agents collude to broadcast misleading information.
In a setting where probability density functions are used to estimate the reputation of a selling
agent, propagating ratings provided by multiple advisors requires careful analysis. This process
of ﬁltering and propagating ratings does not satisfy the adaptability and agileness factors of the
ideal trust framework since a group of agents could collude and propagate some misleading
ratings that distract the trust evaluation process. The Travos system uses the approach of dis-
counting the ratings provided by less trustworthy advisors. We will show that this model also
does not satisfy the agileness factor of the ideal trust framework. We highlight the advantages
and disadvantages of these frameworks and clarify the motivation of the proposed framework.
We also introduce a categorization of various features that have been introduced to make trust
models robust, and discuss the types of systems in which they have been used. The catego-
rization of different approaches provides a valuable perspective on the key challenges faced in
designing an effective trust-based system that makes use of advice from other agents.
2.2.1 Beta Distribution Model (BRS)
One of the most complete trust frameworks that we survey in this chapter is the beta reputa-
tion system [33]. This framework is among witness trust models and computes the trust value
of interactive agents trough a probabilistic model. In this probabilistic model, events occur
with respect to beta probability distribution, which is parameterized by α and β. In the prob-
ability theory, beta distribution is a type of continuous distribution which is deﬁned on the
interval [0, 1]. Variable x denotes the probability (x ∈ [0, 1]). The probability density function
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In [33], authors compute the reliability of an agent by collecting information provided
by some other agents. The collected information represent other agents’ impressions about
the reliability of the agent in question. These ratings fall into discrete choices of 0 (negative
impression) and 1 (positive impression). The collected data are counted in terms of number
of positive ratings (m) and negative ones (n). In the beta distribution model used in [33],
α = m + 1 and β = n + 1 to ensure positive parameters. Therefore, the reliability of a
particular agent is considered as the expected value μ ( αα+β ), which reﬂects the most likely
frequency value. In general, BRS satisﬁes the accuracy and rationality factors of the ideal trust
model. The reason for accuracy is the approach to aggregate positive and negative impressions.
Using BRS, an agent estimates the trustworthiness of another agent by relying on the obtained
ratings. This model together with other trust frameworks are rational since they are used by
intelligent agents that we assume rational. However, there could be some irrational models that
are not agent-based and they are out of scope of our related work.
Although BRS considers accumulated ratings in terms of suggestions from other active
agents, this approach is accurate when a certain portion of ratings points out the actual reliability
of the agent to be evaluated. However, the model fails to accurately update the trust values once
dramatic changes are applied in the system. This might occur when a group of malicious agents
collude to distribute misleading ratings. Therefore, this model does not satisfy the adaptability
and agileness factors of the ideal trust model. For example, the expected value μ could fail to
represent the reliability due to misleading ratings collected from other agents, which might not
have correct impression of the agent or provide fake information for purpose.
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2.2.2 Travos
Travos [83] is another trust model that falls into witness trust category. This approach advances
the beta distribution model in the sense that it attempts to discard the inaccurate ratings. Doing
this, Travos is a sequence of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, the reliability of the witness agent
is computed via the direct experience of interaction between the evaluating agent and witness
agent. This value is used to consider the accuracy of the provided rating in terms of witness
report. In this model, n equal subintervals between 0 and 1 are considered. This is used to
compare previous witness reports provided by the same witness agents to ﬁnd out the similar
ratings. Therefore, the current rating is accurate following the beta probability density function
that is parameterized by the number of successful and unsuccessful ratings regarding previous
reports. The Travos model mainly concentrates on the consulting reports and best ways to
aggregate them for an accurate trust value. This model satisﬁes accuracy and rationality factors
of the proposed ideal trust model.
The second part of Travos is to update the report data set to discard inaccurate ratings. The
objective is also to rate the inaccurate witness agents in order to avoid collecting information
from them in future. Following this approach, Travos outperforms the BRS model and also
satisﬁes the adaptability factor. But, this model fails to recognize stochastic behavior of agents.
A rational reliable agent may change its behavior to follow its goals and therefore act selﬁshly.
The report provided by the witness agent inﬂuences the trustworthiness value of other agents.
Therefore, the witness agent can easily mislead the evaluator agent by providing inaccurate re-
ports. According to the system settings, it takes certain time for the evaluator agent to recognize
the inaccuracy of the provided reports from the previously trusted witness agents. Moreover,
the reliable witness agents might not have enough information to provide accurate ratings. But
in Travos, the collected data is still used for trust computation. Consequently, the Travos model
does not satisfy the agileness factor of the ideal trust model.
The BRS and Travos models are the main ones that our personalized model will be com-
pared to in Chapter 3 because all the three approaches use the beta probability density function.
In the rest of this chapter, we also introduce other related models. The categorization of these
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approaches will provide a valuable perspective on the key challenges faced when designing an
effective approach to cope with the problem of unfair ratings. All the remaining trust models
studied in the rest of this chapter do not satisfy the agileness factor of the ideal trust model.
They do not quickly capture environmental changes. Some of them also fail to adapt with new
agents’ attitudes and therefore do not satisfy the adaptability criteria as well. But all the se-
lected trust models are aimed at computing an accurate trust value and rational agents could
use them to estimate the reliability of the interacting agents.
2.2.3 FIRE
The FIRE model [32] is a witness-based trust model that collects the required information
from other agents in the form of advisors. The collected data is used by the evaluator agent to
compute the trustworthiness of a particular agent. The computed trust is used as a means for
further interactions with the agent. Overall, the FIRE trust framework is simple and satisﬁes the
accuracy criteria. However, there are a number of missing details, which leads to weak results
in some cases. For instance, the data collection process, advisor selection, and the belief set
update and its inﬂuence on advisor set management could simply fail to accurately function in
highly dynamic multi-agent systems. All these operations inﬂuence the integrity of the model
in developing a sound trust-based framework that is applicable to multi-agent environments.
In a model based on witnesses, there is a possibility for witnesses to refuse sharing their
experiences. Therefore, the authors in [32] propose a method called certiﬁed reputation. This
method consists in adding an additional factor for deﬁning the trustworthy of referee agents
which are introduced by the target agent. The most important aspect of this method is that an
agent quickly evaluates the target agent’s trust value, because of the small number of interac-
tions needed while it does not create the trust graph. In some cases, target agents propose some
colluding referee agents to mislead the evaluating agent. Thus, in these cases the ﬁnal trust rate
would be affected by non-reliable information about the target agent. Essentially, the agents
beliefs about the target agent will not be true, therefore the evaluating agent has to evaluate the
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referee agents, although it will cost an extra computational overhead for the method. Consider-
ing the characteristics of the FIRE model, equipped agents are rational and adaptable, but they
fail to be accurate and agile in all situations. In our implemented environment explained in
Section 3.6 (Chapter 3), we compare the FIRE model along with other models that take similar
approach against the proposed trust framework.
2.2.4 Reinforcement Learning Model (RL)
The reinforcement learning model [84] is a trust model based on the reinforcement learning
technique. This model falls into the interactive trust category, which is based on information
collected from past direct experiences. This method of learning is used to select best interac-
tive party in the multi-agent environment. From service consumer agent’s perspective, the RL
model enhances the obtained proﬁt in terms of service quality, whereas from service provider
agent’s perspective, the RL model enhances the efﬁciency in balancing the service fee and
quality that yield best outcome. The trust update procedure used in the RL model is inspired
by a trust framework proposed in [100]. The update process is maintained after comparing
the obtained information about the reliability of a particular service provider agent against the
obtained service quality from the same agent. In the RL method, there are some certain thresh-
olds set to categorize service provider agents to trustworthy and untrustworthy agents. The
service consumer agents do not interact with the untrustworthy agents and among the trustwor-
thy ones, agents with the highest values are selected as interaction option. The problem with
this approach is that a particular service consumer agent can easily lose the trust in a partic-
ular service provider agent and avoid interacting with it afterwards. In the RL model, agents
attempt to use the collected information at best to compute the trust values, but do not quickly
recognize the environment changes and adapt with new settings. Moreover, the information is
based on consumer agent’s personal interaction experience, so the new entry agent has lack of
knowledge about different service provider agents. To this end, the agents equipped with the
RL model only satisfy the rationality characteristic of the ideal trust framework. This model
is extended in [68] to include information exchange between evaluating agents. The collected
21
data is also categorized into trustworthy and untrustworthy using the same learning process.
Another framework that uses reinforcement learning is the work done in [38]. In this paper,
authors propose a model to identify the trustworthy agents. The model enhances the decision
making performance of the agents so that the agents equipped with this model can selectively
interact with the others. The novel approach in this framework is modelling trustworthy agents
based on their outcomes from taking different actions while they interact with other agents.
This is done instead of tracking different properties regarding prior interactions. Authors claim
that the system accurately functions when agent’s actions are clearly identiﬁed. But the preci-
sion metric that is built in this framework could be misplayed by colluding agents and deviate
from the primary concern of trustworthy selections.
2.2.5 Other Conventional Trust Computation Models
In multi-agent networks, the trust is generally compared based on collected information either
from past experience or from other agents. Most of the proposed frameworks have similarity
in the approach they use to address the question. For instance SPORAS [101] is a trust-based
system, which performs simple rating. This system suffers from rating noise because it treats
all ratings equally. In addition, SPORAS is a centralized approach so it is not suitable for open
systems. This system fails to consider the adaptability and agileness factors of the ideal trust
system.
Yu and Singh [97] by applying social network concepts in multi-agent systems have pro-
posed a trust model called Referral. In this framework, witness agents use message passing
method for transmitting information. Doing so, they retrieve ratings through social networks.
This aspect of the referral model is similar to the role of links that search engines use to obtain
a web page while approaching another source of information.
The idea of witness reputation has been used by Sabater who has proposed a decentralized
trust model called REGRET [71]. REGRET uses the reports from the witnesses in addition to
the technique based on direct interaction experience. This work is sensitive to noise and thus
vulnerable to fake information known as distractions made by some malicious agents. In [88],
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Wang and Singh have developed an algebraic method for aggregating trust over graphs under-
stood as webs of trust. They state that current approaches based upon combining trust reports
tend to involve ad hoc formulas. In their work, they have developed a principled evidential
trust model that would underlie any multi-agent system, where trust reports are gathered from
multiple sources. Regarding ad hoc formulation, a work similar to Wang and Singh’s one has
been done by Velleso and his colleagues who assign trust levels in ad hoc networks [86]. The
key aspect of their work is its reference to human concept of trust. They also use the recom-
mendations by trustworthy agents in addition to self direct experience. They tried to balance
the recommendations regarding recency relevance and relationship maturity. However, agents
in this framework do not have reasoning capabilities. Moreover, they do not have policies for
dealing with malicious agents.
2.2.6 Trust Model with Statistical Foundation (TMSF)
In the work done by Shi et al. [79], a trust model has been introduced to assist agents’ deci-
sion making in order to predict the likely future behavior by analyzing the past behavior. The
authors have mostly worked on the environment characteristics, for example the space of pos-
sible outcomes has been studied. They state that it is crucial to identify the space of possible
outcomes, which determines the nature of the associated trust model. The notion of discrete
categories used in this model gives more ﬂexibility to the ratings as feedback in order to get
more accurate direct interaction estimation. However, they have not taken into account the
measurements, which would unbalance the trust estimation and decision making that are solely
based on the previous interactions. Therefore, agents equipped with TMSF trust model only
satisfy the rationality criteria.
2.2.7 Discussion on Trust Frameworks
In Chapter 1, we categorized four criteria that represent an ideal trust framework: accuracy, ra-
tionality, adaptability, and agileness. In this chapter, we surveyed a number of trust frameworks
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that are developed in the context of multi-agent systems. We discussed their methodologies,
highlighted their advantages, and criticized their weaknesses with respect to presented ideal
trust framework’s characteristics. For example, the FIRE model [32] is an accurate and ratio-
nal framework, but it fails to be adaptable and agile in highly dynamic environments. This is
due to the model’s approach in computing trust and the aggregation technique. In FIRE, the
recent dramatic changes do not impose big affect on the computed trust values and therefore,
the equipped agent continues relying on an agent that has recently changed its goal and is not
reliable anymore. This model recognizes the changes fairly late and the equipped agent un-
dergoes a number of interactions with unreliable agents to update its belief set. Adversely, the
REGRET model [71] is adaptable, but not accurate to some acceptable extent. The REGRET
model satisﬁes the adaptability criteria thanks to the approach that the method takes by de-
veloping images that reﬂect agents’ impression about other agents’ attitudes. The images are
transferred to the other agents and therefore, recent changes in the environment are recognized
and properly broadcasted. However, this approach fails to accurately compute the trust values
because the aggregation function does not consider all relevant data. In this model, the trust-
worthy agents that are not well-connected with other agents (because they are new comers) do
not succeed to interact with many agents and therefore it takes relatively long time for them to
become well-known. Adversely, agents that are well-connected with other agents can collude
to propagate uniﬁed images regarding their reliability and stay well-known in the system.
Among the aforementioned trust frameworks, the Travos model [83] outperforms the other
models since it accurately computes the trust values and the equipped agents rationally use the
model. Moreover, this model attempts to adapt agents’ belief sets with recent changes of the
environment. The Travos model is relatively complete and considers all related parameters that
inﬂuence the trust values of the agents. However, the model fails to recognize dramatic changes
in the environment. For instance, consider a trusted service provider agent in a system. Due to
some changes in the surrounding environment of the service provider agent, this agent is not
able to provide the service with the same quality as before whereas the agent is still considered
as a trusted service provider. Consequently, the agent can change its goal and based on its prior
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Table 2.1: Trust models classiﬁcations with respect to characteristics of the ideal trust
framework.

















trust impression that it has among other agents collects a high number of service fees and leaves
the environment. This dramatic change of the agent is not recognized with other agents. In fact,
the reluctance of the service provider agent in service response could be recognized by some
interacting agents and they could consequently warn other agents about this particular agent’s
suspicious action.
Table 2.1 classiﬁes the aforementioned trust models with respect to the ideal trust frame-
work’s criteria. As it is clear from the table, there is no any trust framework that satisﬁes all the
criteria. That means there is no such a comprehensive framework that can accurately compute
the trust, and adapt with the environment as well as quickly take actions towards updating the
belief sets to keep most reliable impressions about the multi-agent environment. Consequently,
there is a need to have a system that accurately functions in multi-agent system with dynamic
changes in agents’ goals. A robust system needs to be designed that can manage the trust com-
putation of such environments in long term interactions. To achieve this objective, we propose a
trust framework in Chapter 3 that is aimed at satisfying all the criteria and overcome the already
mentioned problems.
2.3 Reputation-based Frameworks
In the literature, the reputation mechanisms are mostly applied to large scale multi-agent sys-
tems, which host numerous interactive agents that seek to ﬁnd the highly reputed agents to
interact with. As mentioned before, the trust and reputation are very close concepts in the sense
25
that in most frameworks both concepts are analyzed and addressed without a clear separation
line. In general, the reputation refers to public opinion about a particular agent and the trust is
a reliability that is measured by an agent regarding others. In the following, we continue the
survey by presenting different models that compute agents’ reputation values. Since the data
aggregation processes are very similar, we do not repeat the same analysis in this chapter, but
we investigate the system integrity and accuracy in long-term interactive networks. We mainly
concentrate on the techniques that guarantee long-term effective reputation management sys-
tem.
Unlike trust frameworks, we do not categorize the reputation models against ideal repu-
tation system characteristics. The reason is simply because the same set of criteria that we
mentioned for trust frameworks could be applied to reputation assessment systems. Our con-
cern in reputation systems is mainly establishing a sound and long-term secure mechanism
allowing active agents in a dynamic multi-agent environment to achieve their goals. We gener-
ally aim at advancing the reputation mechanisms to function accurately and safe in long term
interactions. We go beyond the computation problem, which was our main concern in trust
frameworks. We would like to maintain a sound and secure reputation system within which the
accuracy is achieved via provided incentives to the interacting agents. This point of view is new
and does not overlap with the target of the related works that concentrate on addressing the rep-
utation mechanism. Consequently, we discuss different reputation frameworks as well as their
characteristics. We continue with highlighting the needs of an efﬁcient reputation mechanism
that last long enough in a multi-agent system with dynamic behaviors.
2.3.1 Bayesian Network Model
The Bayesian network model [89] is an interactive/witness reputation model in which service
provider’s behavior is analyzed in different aspects such as download speed, quality, and type.
In this model, a naı¨ve Bayesian network represents conditional dependencies between the relia-
bility of the service provider and the analyzed aspects. Therefore, each service consumer agent
constructs a naı¨ve Bayesian network regarding each service provider agent. The user might
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get access to the naı¨ve Bayesian network constructed by other agents in case it does not have
enough information about the particular service provider. In this case, the evaluating agent con-
siders the reliability of the recommender in its decision-making process. The reputation values
are continuously updated using RL model’s formulation [38].
The Bayesian network model is constructed based on the similarity of the service consumer
and provider agents and their preferences in interactions. This approach in unsuitable in the
cases where the preferences of the recommender and evaluator agents do not perfectly match
and the collected information does not accurately represent the trustworthiness of the service
provider agent. In fact, this model fails to accurately combine the obtained data when the
recommenders had weak interacting relationship with the particular agent under study.
2.3.2 Weighted Majority Algorithm (WMA)
The weighted majority algorithm is a discrete algebraic method [98] that uses Dempster-Shafer
theory [15, 76] to compute the trust value of agents. This approach falls into witness report
category. The method is based on three parameters: belief (b), disbelief (d), and uncertainty
(u) that sum up to 1. An orthogonal sum function is deﬁned in this method that aggregates the
parameters to combine impressions of different witness ratings. In WMA, there are assigned
values for witness agents which reﬂect their reliability from evaluator agent’s point of view.
These weights are assigned by the evaluator agent and updated due to reliability changes of the
witness agents.
In [97], the weights are increased and decreased based on their positive or negative in-
ﬂuence in correct reputation evaluation maintained by the evaluator agent. This algorithm is
inadequate since the evaluator agent might unfairly decrease the weights when it does not have
enough information about the provider agent. There is no methodology deﬁned to ﬁx the mis-
taken weight updates. Additionally, the witness agent would not get the chance to increase its
associated weight once been decreased. The method does not characterize a realistic multi-
agent environment where agents dynamically change their acting strategies.
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2.3.3 Cluster Filtering Approach
Cluster ﬁltering approach [20] is another witness trust-based mechanism that mainly concen-
trates on discarding inaccurate ratings to compute a general overview regarding a particular
agent’s reputation. In this model, a collaborative ﬁltering technique [1] is used to recognize the
most trustworthy agents for the evaluating agent. Using cluster ﬁltering approach, a particu-
lar evaluating agent divides its surrounding agents into high and low rating clusters. The high
rating cluster represents reports with relatively high inaccuracy and therefore are discarded.
This approach also considers most recent reports to avoid confusion in clustering. This model
addresses the agileness of the reputation computation, but the whole technique does not accu-
rately function in some situations where multi-agent network hosts agents with rapid change of
behavior.
In [20], the author concludes that by controlling anonymity, the inaccurate witness reports
cannot be minimized because of collusion that could be established between the agent to be
evaluated and the witness agent. Moreover, this framework works with higher efﬁciency in
large networks where agents’ relocation is not highly considered. The concept of collusion
emerges when agents act in an open environment and individuals by default do not have full
knowledge about their surrounding environment and agents might expect better outcome by
colluding with other agents. This issue of collusion is fully analyzed in Chapter 5.
2.3.4 Robust Reputation System forMobile Ad-hoc Networks (RRS-
MAN)
In [11], authors propose a robust reputation system for mobile Ad-hoc networks. This system is
based on distributed individuals and the objective is to handle false disseminated information.
In this model, agents have a belief set regarding the reliability and public reputation of other
agents. The reliability is used as the probability that the agent will provide truthful information.
The reputation reﬂects agent’s inﬂuence in decision making maintained by the agent that holds
this information. This model associates different ratings for the collected data and therefore,
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categorizes the surrounding agents in its belief set. To handle false information provided by
other agents, RRSMAN updates the reputation ratings with respect to their accuracy in com-
parison with other random trusted advisers. The collected data from an agent is considered
accurate if the difference with the held reputation is less than a deviation threshold. In the
RRSMAN model, the collected data are investigated in the order they are received. This could
decrease the accuracy of the model in cases where a high load of non-relevant data needs to be
analyzed where an important evidence of environment changes is reported. Furthermore, the
time discount factor is not considered in this model and therefore, old information are treated
the same as new ones. In open multi-agent environments with dynamic behavior changes, this
approach quickly fails since the used approach in collecting data fails in stochastic environ-
ments that host agents with different ranges of behaviors.
2.3.5 Discussion on Reputation Frameworks
In this section, we categorized some reputation frameworks that mainly focus on reputation
computation and the ways to keep it accurate. The attempts to compute such a value is similar
to the ones we discussed in trust frameworks. This is the reason we do not go into further
details about comparing different approaches of aggregating some collected data. We would
like to highlight the fact that in multi-agent systems there are rational agents that by default
follow their goals and they could take actions that beneﬁt themselves whereas others undergo
some payoff loss. For example, in an environment where agents exchange services based on
some fees, the goal of the service provider agent could be to charge as many agents as possible.
To achieve this goal, the agent needs to maintain a high reputation value to absorb other agents’
attentions. In such a system, if there is a way to claim high reputation, the rational service
provider agent would resort to any way to maintain it. Consequently, the reputation should
be competitive and the reputation mechanism should be robust against malbehavior of agents
to mislead the environment with fake reputation values. Moreover, the reputation mechanism
should last long and this is fulﬁlled when such a mechanism can update itself with respect to
dynamic change of environment.
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Considering the related work, we feel the need of a robust mechanism that imposes in-
centives in such a way that malicious behavior of agents are minimized. In general, we need a
mechanism to maintain accuracy of the reputation system by preparing a situation within which
agents seek maximum payoff by acting truthfully and compete for high reputation rather than
colluding for fake reputation values to temporary increase their reputations. Chapter 4 is asso-
ciated to propose such a reputation mechanism that its objective is to tackle the incentive-based
reputation assessment problem. Chapter 5 and 6 are also about a robust reputation mechanism
which is claimed to be sound and secure in long term interactive interval. The combination
of these three chapters develop a complete reputation model that could be implemented in
multi-agent environments where there is a need to cope with malicious agents and constrain the
accuracy of the network and safety of the interacting agents’ transactions. The structure used in
these chapters is the network of web services that could be also grouped together as community
of web services. The rational behind the use of this structure is the enterprise system of web
services and their rational activities while exchanging services between one another. Moreover,
web services (that are attached to agents as web service agents) compete to serve their services
and obtain utilities that could be in the form of service fee or any other sort of payoff. We
explore more details about this structure in the following section.
2.4 Web Service Applications and Discussions
Networks of web service agents are typical examples of multi-agent environments that run
continuous business interactions through service exchange. In this context, the reputation man-
agement has been intensively stressed [35,41,54,91] aiming to facilitate and automate the good
service selection. In [77], the authors have developed a framework aiming to select web ser-
vices based on the trust policies expressed by the users. The framework allows the users to
select a web service matching their needs and expectations. In [52], the authors proposed to
compute the reputation of a web service according to the personal evaluation of the previous
users. In general, the common characteristic of these approaches is that the reputation of the
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web service is measured by a combination of data collected from users. To this end, the credi-
bility of the user that provides this data should be taken into account. There should be a mech-
anism that recognizes the biased rates provided from the users and accordingly updates their
credibilities. If the user tries to provide a fake rating, then its credibility will be decreased and
the rating of this user will have less importance in the reputation of the web service. In [57],
authors have designed a multi-agent framework based on an ontology for Quality of Service
(QoS). The ontology provides a basis that allows the providers to advertise their offerings, the
users to express their preferences, and the ratings of services to be gathered and shared. The
users’ ratings according to the different qualities are used to compute the reputation of the web
service. In [74, 75], authors believe that selection process should be consumer-oriented and
context-dependent. But to avoid misleading from diversity in context and satisfaction criteria,
authors propose a model that captures subtle details using ontology. Furthermore, liars could
be detected by investigating their prior experiences and getting ﬁltered during service selection
process. In [35], service-level agreements are discussed in order to set the penalties over the
lack of QoS for the web services. In general, in all the mentioned models, web services are
considered to act individually and not in collaboration with other web services. In such sys-
tems, the service selection process is very complicated due to the relatively high number of
services in the network. Furthermore, web services can easily rig the system by leaving and
joining the network when they have incentives to do so. For example, when their reputation is
fall off for some reason, which is a rational incentive for such web services that manage to start
as new once they have shown a low efﬁciency. Meanwhile, it is hard to manage the huge num-
ber of data in web services settings. Considering these inefﬁciencies, authors in [49] highlight
the concept of gathering web services together into communities. Communities are in general
formed to get stronger and more publicized in the system, so they do not resign and register
as new. In such a methodology, users interconnect with the community as the service provider
and there would be a web service assigned through the community.
Regarding the aforementioned issues, there have been some proposals that try to gather web
services and propose the concept of community-based multi-agent systems (CWSs) [16,26,42].
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In [16], authors propose a reputation-based architecture for CWSs and classify the involved
metrics that affect the reputation of a community. They derive the involved metrics by process-
ing some historical performance data recorded in a run-time logging system. The purpose is
to be able to analyze the reputation in different points of views, such as users to CWSs, CWSs
to web services, and web services to CWSs. The authors discuss the effect of different factors
while diverse reputation directions are analyzed. However, they do not derive the overall rep-
utation of a CWS from the proposed metrics. Failing to assess the general reputation for the
community leads to failure in efﬁcient service selection. Moreover, authors assume that the
run-time logging mechanism (the logging ﬁle, which holds the feedback submitted by the ser-
vice consumers) is an accurate source of information. In general, in open reputation-feedback
mechanisms, always the feedback ﬁle is subject to be the target by selﬁsh entities. To this end,
the feedback mechanism should be supervised and its precise assessment should be guaran-
teed. In [42], authors have proposed a framework that explores the possibilities that the active
communities act truthfully and provide their actual information upon request. This method is
related to the ideas proposed in this thesis in the sense that the communities are provided with
the incentives that push them to act truthfully. In [26], a layered reputation assessment system
is proposed mainly addressing the issue of anonymity. In this work, the focus is on the layered
policies that are applied to measure the reputation of different types of agents, specially the new
comers. Although, the proposed work is interesting in terms of anonymous reputation assess-
ment, the layered structure, because of its rigid hierarchical organization, does not optimally
organize a community-based environment that gathers autonomous web services. Moreover, as




As discussed in previous chapters, the trust issue is application-dependent. In most of multi-
agent environments, there are numerous agents that continuously interact with one another with
respect to the trust they have regarding each other. Although in repeated interactions, agents
form a history of interactions that helps them address the trust evaluation problem (interactive
trust category), in many cases agents lack enough information required to compute the trust
value of others (witness trust category). We consider a comprehensive approach that is mixed
of both cases (where agents have or lack the required information to compute trust value of other
agents) in the sense that we carefully analyze the history feedback and collect the required data
from environment in the form of witness reports. So we address the trust estimation problem
with a combination of direct and indirect trust evaluations.
The proposed trust framework is based on collected information from inside (belief set and
the interaction history) and outside (witness agents), which is mostly the core of the witness
trust category in the literature. We implement a comprehensive trust assessment mechanism,
which effectively aggregates the collected data and produces the most efﬁcient results. More-
over, we apply a maintenance mechanism to reconstruct the belief set based on the obtained
experiences. The maintenance part is new in trust models in the sense that it accounts for quick
changes and modiﬁes the belief set according to the obtained experiences via direct interactions.





We motivate our approach with an example. Consider two agents Aga and Agb that are active
in the environment. These agents have already interacted with each other in the past. These
interactions could be named as information or service exchanges. After each interaction, agents
obtain a feeling on the quality of the interaction. For example, if the provided information by
Agb was useful,Aga obtains a positive view regardingAgb. Likewise, if the provided service by
Agb was not as promised,Aga obtains a negative view regardingAgb. Over time and continuous
interactions,Aga rates the credibility ofAgb with respect to the direct experience thatAga have
had with Agb. There is a similar process for Agb and any other agent.
Trust models using direct experience need long term of interaction to reach a stage that
agents can evaluate trust level of others. To this end, if agent Aga thinks its previous interac-
tions could not be the perfect source of information to make a decision aboutAgb’s trust level, it
might request some other agents to reveal their credibility rate (or estimated trust value) regard-
ing Agb. This is done by moving to the second level of evaluation process [6, 32], asking other
agents that are known to be trustworthy (these agents are called trustworthy agents). However,
there is a problem if these trustworthy agents are not able to report on the agent being evaluated
(Agb). Therefore, in our proposed framework, we use trustworthy agents together with referee
agents that are proposed by the agent Agb. Figure 3.1 illustrates this situation by using agents
in different groups. The consulting agents are either known by Aga to be trustworthy (we call
these agents trustworthy agents) or known by Agb and have been introduced by this agent to
report on its trust level based on their past experience (we call these agents referee agents).
Consequently, we distinguish the community of trustworthy agents from the community of
referee agents.
In the proposed framework, the consulting agents are supposed to reveal the trust value of
the agent Agb with their own evaluation perspective. Although the provided information by
the consulting agent Agc helps Aga analyze the trust value of the Agb, this is considered as an
interaction done between agent Aga and the consulting agent Agc. In this case, Aga can obtain
an overview on the credibility and accuracy of the consulting agent. In fact, this would help
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Figure 3.1: Overall trustworthy and referee agents network topology.
Aga to also stay updated on the credibility of its surrounding agents.
In our approach, we propose a maintenance algorithm that helps Aga update its belief set
regarding the credibility of the consulting agents that provide information for some different
reasons. In the maintenance process, the suggestions provided by other agents are compared
with the actual behavior of the new agent in direct interaction.
3.1.2 Application Discussions on the Proposed Approach
Several trust-based architectures exist in the literature. In the context of service computing, a
consumer agent maintains trust only based on its history, even there might be no interaction
recorded. Using this model, the consumer agent selects some providers that look trustworthy.
However, this can negatively affect the decision that the agent can make. Next, the consumer
interacts with the provider agent and evaluates the actual quality of the provided service and ac-
cordingly records the evaluation ratings in its history. In an alternative scenario, the consumer
consults with some other agents and evaluates the credibility of the evaluated agents by com-
bining the collected information from consulting agents. In this case, the consumer requires
applying learning methods to update the model it is maintaining for the trust evaluation. Our
approach handles both of these scenarios.
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3.2 Direct Trust Evaluation
During the past couple of years, agent communication languages and protocols have been of
much interest in multi-agent systems, where agents are distributed in large scale networks and
interact to collaborate, coordinate and share services and resources. Trust is then essential to
make such interactions within open multi-agent systems effective [16, 77, 96]. An agent’s trust
is a measurement of the agent’s possibility to actually do what it agrees to do. Attempting
to maintain a trust-based approach, different frameworks have been proposed to represent and
assess the trust agents have in one another. As discussed in Chapter 2, the most recent research
proposals in trust models for multi-agent systems are as follows: (a) interaction trust, based on
the direct interactions of two parties [88, 91]; (b) trust based on the type of prior interactions
[31,32,73]; (c) witness reputation based on certiﬁed (and encrypted) references obtained by the
agent to be evaluated after interacting with other agents. These references are then made public
to any other agent that wants to interact with this agent [31, 33, 49, 71, 83]; and (d) certiﬁed
reputation, based on references from other agents detailing a particular agent’s behavior [6, 31,
32].
The proposed frameworks objectively focus on collecting some parameters that may con-
tribute in the trust assessment procedure. The aim is to collect reliable information leading to
an accurate trust assessment process. Since agents might be selﬁsh, receiving fake information
by particular agent(s) is always possible. This problem does exist even when a certiﬁed repu-
tation [31] is provided by the agent to be evaluated. In this case, the ﬁnal trust rate would be
affected by non-reliable information and eventually the agents’ perception of their surrounding
environment will not be accurate. Generally, these frameworks are not suitable when the en-
vironment changes dynamically because they fail to quickly recognize the recent improvement
or degradation of agents’ capabilities as in dynamic environments these agents tend to change
their goals and behaviors. To overcome this problem, some methods have been proposed to
capture the recent changes in the environment [49]. In these frameworks, a retrospect trust ad-
justment mechanism is proposed to reconsider the trust evaluations that have been performed
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in the past to learn how to select better witness agents. Although the mechanism is novel in
this domain, its complexity is a considerable issue. Moreover, the applicability of the proposed
framework is vague in the sense that the retrospect mechanism does not follow a systematic
execution process that enhances the agents’ accuracy.
The framework we propose is built upon a model in which a set of trust meta-data is intro-
duced to deﬁne the trust level of contributing agents [6,8,16,49]. The objective is to overcome
the aforementioned limitations by proposing a comprehensive framework called CRM [46]
(Comprehensive Reputation Model). The CRM model is aimed at satisfying the four criteria
we mentioned in Chapter 1 to maintain a complete trust framework to be used in multi-agent
environments. In this framework, agents interact and rate each other based on previous inter-
actions (either satisfactory or dissatisfactory). The obtained ratings are collected to assess the
trustworthiness of a particular agent. To be self-contained, we also consider how agents com-
municate to exchange ratings. Inter-agent communication is regulated by protocols (shared
amongst agents and thus made public) and determined by strategies (internal to agents and thus
private). Using this framework, agents are capable of evaluating the trust level of other agents
that are not known (or not very well-known) by collecting some relative information, either
from their interaction history or from consulting other agents that can provide their sugges-
tions in the form of ratings. To express the efﬁciency of the proposed framework with respect
to our aforementioned ideal trust framework’s characteristics, we discuss in more details the
performance of the CRM considering accuracy, scalability and applicability. We analyze the
scalability of the system because CRM is capable of handling the large scale systems. But this
cannot be considered as an ideal trust model’s characteristics in the sense that a model could be
highly efﬁcient in an environment where scale is not a point of interest. Moreover, we explore
more details about the applicability of the CRM model to highlight its strengthen as a trust
model. More details about CRM’s ability to satisfy ideal trust model’s criteria are discussed in
the implemented environment in Section 3.6.
CRM’s Accuracy: In general, CRM is based on collecting information before making
decisions. The idea of consulting other agents originates from the fact that in social networks,
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agents assess diverse trust levels for other agents depending on their different experiences of
direct and indirect interactions, and thus, an evaluator agent can balance the trust assessment
process by considering different factors. In this model, the evaluator agent is referred to as the
trustor agent and the agent to be evaluated is referred to as the trustee agent. In the evaluation
process, the trustor may ask some other agents to report on the trustee. These interfering agents
are basically divided into two groups: (1) well-known agents by the trustor agent (so-called
trustworthy agents); and (2) those introduced by the trustee agent (so-called referee agents).
CRM reaches acceptable accuracy because it collects the information from the agents that are
considered the most appropriate sources. The potential aim is on updating the consulting agents
to only keep the most accurate ones (i.e. the most trustful). The structure of information update
approaches a stable situation wherein the trustor agent received accurate information from the
surrounding agents and continuously updates its surrounding environment with respect to the
changes in agents behaviors and goals.
CRM’s Scalability: In general, a system is considered scalable when over the population
expansion, the complexity does not affect accordingly. In the structure that deﬁnes the CRM
framework, the scalability is considered at best. This is claimed due to the fact that enlarging
the network does not affect the fact that the trustor agent uses a limited number of consulting
agents. Agents use their historical information and do not initiate a new process of information
search upon every request. Therefore, in case of increasing the agents to hundreds or thousands,
the process of evaluation does not change. But the knowledge over the environment is reduced
which makes the agents to maintain interactions with new agents more rapidly. The trustor
agent in this system considers its history of interactions and accordingly rates the importance
of the information provided by the consulting agents. Moreover, the extendable social network
would increase the accuracy of agents by since the new source of information are needed.
CRM’s Applicability: It is worthy to discuss the applicability of the proposed model. In
fact, in distributed multi-agent system (for example distributed agent-based web services and
trading agents in e-commerce settings) the proposed framework is applicable. However, what
makes the proposed model essential in these environments is its sensitivity to obtain accurate
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information and its capability to survive in dynamic environments. In fact, all the systems
that involve multiple components, which require to exchange information need to establish a
comprehensive and adaptable trust framework to guarantee the safety of information retrieval.
The off-line evaluation adjustment made by the trustor after a period of direct interaction
with the trustee is the main contribution of our proposed framework. The trustor does this in
order to adjust the accuracy of the consulting agents (i.e. trustworthy and referee agents). In the
off-line process, the suggestions provided by other agents are compared with the actual behavior
of the trustee through direct interaction. The trustor will update its beliefs about the consulting
agent with respect to the accuracy and usefulness of the provided information through different
trust evaluation procedures. By doing this, more accurate ratings about the other agents will
be gradually propagated throughout the environment, which provides a better trust assessment
in the CRM model. In off-line process, the maintenance mechanism is designed such that it
prevents collusion performed between the trustee and the referee community. In the off-line the
consulting agents encounter the trustor agent and for not being accurate are getting penalized.
Therefore, to attract the trustor agent, they need to provide their accurate information. We have
analyzed the impact of the off-line process from different points of view and compared the
system’s efﬁciency with some other models.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we present the spec-
iﬁcation of agents interaction system together with the trust computing mechanism. Section
3.4 focuses on the propagation of trust through a social network and deﬁnes our framework
that combines trustworthy and referee agents as reporters. Afterwards, we describe and discuss
the details of computing the trust in our combined framework. In Section 3.5, we perform the
maintenance that typical agent makes after a period of time since the interactions have been ini-
tiated. In Section 3.6, we outline the properties of our model in the experimental environment,
present the testbed and compare the simulation results of the CRM model with the results of
other well-known trust models in terms of efﬁciency in reputation assessments. We also dis-
cuss the features of the CRM model and its efﬁciency, particularly in dynamically changing
environments. Finally Section 5.9 concludes the comprehensive trust framework.
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3.3 Trust Evaluation Environment
3.3.1 Interaction System Structure
In this section, we deﬁne the communication messages the agents exchange during the trust
evaluation process along with the corresponding dialogue game rules.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A communication message is a tuple 〈CType, CV alue,Agx, Agy,M, t〉, where
CType (CType ∈ {Request, Reply}) indicates whether it is a request or reply commu-
nication message; CV alue (CV alue ∈ {Information,Refuse,Not Have}) represents
the type of the message as requesting information in case of initiating the communication
(Information), refusing to reveal information (Refuse), or not having the information in
case of replying to a request message (Not Have); agents Agx and Agy are respectively the
sender and receiver of the message; M is the content of the message and ﬁnally t is the time at
which the message is sent.
Let TAga be the set of all Aga’s trustworthy agents and T sAgbAga ⊆ TAga be the selected
trustworthy agents Aga (the trustor) uses to evaluate Agb (the trustee). The selection of trust-
worthy agents is upon need and thus would differ from evaluation to another with respect to
the interaction history between the trustor and trustee. In general, the most trustworthy agents
could be a reasonable idea (ranking the trustworthy agents and selecting the ﬁrst 3 in case Aga
would like to consider 3 in each consulting agents). The set of selected trustworthy agents is
subject to continuous update with respect to environment changes. This issue is discussed in
more details later in this section. To request information, Aga uses the communication mes-
sage 〈Request, Information,Aga, Agt1, T rust(Agb), t0〉, which meansAga at time t0 sends
to the trustworthy agent Agt1 (Agt1 ∈ T sAgbAga), a request for information (Information) re-
lated to Agb’s trust. Consequently Agt1 replies to the message by one of the following choices:
1) 〈Reply, Information,Agt1, Aga, Information(Agb), t1〉;
2) 〈Reply,Not Have,Agt1, Aga, ∗, t1〉; or
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3) 〈Reply,Refuse,Agt1, Aga, ∗, t1〉
where t1 > t0. In the ﬁrst choice, Agt1 replies by sending to Aga the relative information (trust
rating and the number of direct interactions between Agt1 and Agb) about the credibility of
Agb. In the second choice, Agt1 informs Aga that it does not have any information regarding
the credibility of Agb (∗ represents empty message). Finally, in the third choice, Agt1 refuses
to reveal the requested information to Aga. There is a chance that Agt1 replies with Not Have
reply type in order to hide its refusal of providing information. Such cases are among the sit-
uations that Aga would consider while adjusting its beliefs about the accuracy of the provided
information. Consequently, the non-accurate agents would be penalized in the sense that a trust-
worthy agent for Aga may not be considered in TAga anymore. These details are out of scope
of this framework and here we only focus on recognizing and thus avoiding the non-accurate
agents. The sequence of these request and reply messages represents a dialogue game that we
formalize by the following rule, where ⇒ is the implication symbol:
〈Request, Information,Aga, Agt1, T rust(Agb), t0〉 ⇒
〈Reply, Information,Agt1, Aga, Information(Agb), t1〉
∨ 〈Reply,Not Have,Agt1, Aga, ∗, t1〉
∨ 〈Reply,Refuse,Agt1, Aga, ∗, t1〉
Meanwhile,Aga uses the 〈Request, Referee, Aga, Agb, Referee(NUM), t0〉 com-
munication message, which means Aga at time t0 sends to Agb a request to introduce
some referees (Referee). The content message Referee(NUM) indicates the num-
ber of referee agents (NUM ) that can recommend Agb. Agb is supposed to introduce
the referee agents that support him in the trust evaluation done by Aga. Agb would
rely on his best trustworthy agents in this exercise. Let RAgb be the set of Agb’s ref-
eree agents. Then, Agb after receiving the request communication message, chooses
the appropriate referee agents from RAgb . The selected subset, which is introduced to
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Aga at time t2 (t2 > t0), is denoted by RsAgaAgb , where |RsAgaAgb | = NUM . This issue is
formalized by the dialogue game represented by the following rule:
〈Request, Referee, Aga, Agb, Referee(NUM), t0〉 ⇒
〈Reply, Referee, Agb, Aga,RsAgaAgb , t2〉
After obtaining the set of referee agents from Agb, Aga continues with requesting
information from each introduced referee agent at time t3. At t4 (t4 > t3), the requested
referee agent has three possible answers: replying by giving the relative information
about the credibility of Agb; replying with no information; or refusing to reveal the
information regarding the credibility of Agb. Let Agr1 be a selected referee agent
(Agr1 ∈ RsAgaAgb ), the following dialogue game rule speciﬁes the exchanged messages:
〈Request, Information,Aga, Agr1, T rust(Agb), t3〉 ⇒
〈Reply, Information,Agr1, Aga, Information(Agb), t4〉
∨ 〈Reply,Not Have, Agr1, Aga, ∗, t4〉
∨ 〈Reply, Refuse, Agr1, Aga, ∗, t4〉
It is rare that the referee agent does not have information regarding the trust level of
Agb. This is because the referee has been chosen by Agb based on previous direct inter-
actions. But this does not guarantee a positive rating regarding Agb’s credibility. The
chosen referee agent is in fact facing the trustor Aga and since there would be after
interaction off-line mechanism, the referee agent would be penalized if provides inac-
curate information. Therefore, if the referee agent is not satisﬁed with Agb’s behavior,
it is better to retrieve the correct information (bad rating) rather than hiding it (replying
”Not Have”). To this end, in case Agb has changed its behavior, the referee would
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rationally retrieve its accurate information to obtain better rate from the trustor agent.
3.3.2 Trust Computing Mechanism
To compute trust (i.e. credibility) in our model, we ﬁrst introduce the trust function as
follows:
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let A be a set of agents, D a set of domains or topics, and T a set of
time points. The trust function Tr associates two agents from A, a domain from D,
and a time point from T with a trust value between 0 and 1:
Tr : A×A×D × T −→ [0, 1]
Given some concrete agentsAga (the trustor) andAgb (the trustee) inA, some concrete
domain D, and a time point t, Tr(Aga, Agb, D, t) stands for “the trust value associated
to the trustee agent Agb in domain D at time t by the trustor agent Aga”. To simplify
the notation, in the remainder we will omit the domain and time from all the formulas.
Given agents Aga and Agb in A, we will represent Tr(Aga, Agb) in short as TrAgbAga .
The reason behind this simpliﬁcation is that our main contribution in this framework
is to equip the agents to efﬁciently evaluate the trust and get adapted with continuous
environment changes. Although the domain is important in trust evaluation (as mainly
considered in some trust-based frameworks [13]), but in this framework we only focus
on the adaptation of agents with dynamically changing environment and on how agile
the agent is while acting where the trust evaluation is crucial. Furthermore, although
the time is omitted from the formulation, it is implicitly represented as the trust function
is continuous over T .
43
We propose a probabilistic method by investigating the distribution of the random
variable X representing the trustworthiness of the trustee agent Agb. Let us ﬁrst con-
sider the case where X takes only two values: 0 (the agent is not trustworthy) or 1
(the agent is trustworthy). Therefore, the variable X follows a Bernoulli distribution
β(1, p) so that E(X) = p where E(X) is the expectation of the variableX and p is the
probability that the agent is trustworthy.
f(k; p) = pk(1− p)1−k for k ∈ {0, 1}
E(X) = p; var(X) = p(1− p)
Here, p is the probability we are looking for. Therefore, it is enough to evaluate the
expectation E(X) to ﬁnd TrAgbAga . However, when X is a continuous variable, this ex-
pectation is a theoretical mean that we must estimate. To this end, we can use the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem (CLT) and the law of large numbers. The CLT states that whenever
a sample of size n (X1, . . . , Xn) is taken from any distribution with mean μ, then the
sample mean (X1+ · · ·+Xn)/n will be approximately normally distributed with mean
μ. As an application of this theorem, the arithmetic mean (average) (X1+ · · ·+Xn)/n
approaches a normal distribution of mean μ and standard deviation σ/
√
n. Generally,
and according to the law of large numbers, the expectation can be estimated by the
weighted arithmetic mean.
Our random variable X is the weighted average of n independent variables Xi that
correspond to Agb’s trust level according to the point of view of trustworthy agents
T sAgbAga and referee agents RsAgaAgb . These variables follow then the same distribution.
They are also independent because the probability that Agb is trustworthy according
to an agent Agt1 is independent of the probability that this agent (Agb) is trustworthy
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according to another agent Agt2. Consequently, the variable X follows a normal dis-
tribution whose average is the weighted average of the expectations of the independent
variables Xi. In our model deﬁned in depth in the following sections, the mathemati-
cal estimation of the expectation E(X) is computed in two steps, on-line and off-line
estimation. In the on-line estimation four main components are considered: direct
trust, rates from referee and trustworthy agents, interaction strength and interaction re-
cency. The off-line estimation, performed after the on-line process, is ﬁnalized. The
estimation is formulated to modify the trust values of the agents that have provided
information in the on-line process. We refer to this process as maintenance, which will
be addressed in Section 3.5.
3.4 On-line Trust Estimation
In this section, we discuss the on-line evaluation process in which the trustor collects
some information and combines them to assess the credibility of a trustee. Two ap-
proaches can be distinguished in this process. In the former one, the evaluator only
relies on what it has from previous interactions with the trustee. In the later, the trustor
prefers using the information provided by some other agents to get a more accurate
assessment. In fact, the direct interaction assessment is combined with the suggested
ratings by the consulting agents.
3.4.1 Direct Trust Evaluation
Agents can compute the trust value of each other using their interaction histories. This
would generate real numbers, which fall in the range [0,1] and thus, instead of just
integer ratings (scores) 0 and 1, we would have more ﬂexible real ratings representing
the satisfaction or dissatisfaction degree of the interaction’s outcome. In the general
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case, agents can evaluate their interactions according to a scale of n types numbered
from 1 (the most successful interaction) to n (the less successful interaction), such that
the ﬁrst m interaction types (m < n) are successful. Let NIi
Agb
Aga
be the number of in-
teractions of type i between Aga and Agb. Then, Tr
Agb
Aga
can be computed by Equation
1. This type of trust evaluation is not novel as seen in literature [13, 30]. In this Equa-
tion, the ratio of the “number of successful outcomes” to the “total number of possible
outcomes” is computed, where wi is the weight associated to the interaction type i to
represent its importance and vij is the value of the interaction, which is particularly
important in transactional settings to avoid two transactions with different values being




considered here as a mean to evaluate the strength of the connection between the agents
Aga and Agb. In our approach, we do not consider the details of these interactions as it










In fact, there are two issues in weighting an interaction: 1) the importance of the
interaction type (e.g., in some cases fair as an interaction’s outcome is enough for the
interaction to be counted as important, but in other cases, maybe very good is manda-
tory as an outcome type for the interaction to be counted as important enough); and
2) transaction importance (e.g, two transactions of the same type (say good) may have
different values in terms of their actual entity). Let us consider the following exam-
ple of two dissatisfactory transactions (e.g., outcome is bad) that have been weighted
for wi = 3. Basically the value 3 reﬂects the importance of this kind of transactions
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(i.e., the weight of bad transactions), which could hold different values. vij is used to
represent this value. For example, the ﬁrst transaction has as value (vi1 = 20000$ and
the second has as value vi2 = 200$). In this example, vij would reﬂect the extent to
which the damage has been occurred. This idea will protect the model from attacks
like reputation squeeze [19] in which one agent would obtain some positive ratings and
make a bad interaction that actually makes a large damage.
Another factor should be considered to reﬂect the timely relevance of transmit-
ted information. This is because the agent’s environment is dynamic and may change
quickly. The idea is to promote recent information and to deal with out-of-date infor-
mation with less emphasis. The timely relevance could be represented as a coefﬁcient
when computing the agent’s trust. In literature, there are similar approaches addressing
this issue. For example, in [13], authors discuss about the limitations that are used in
the freshness of the data to be evaluated. In our model, we assess this factor denoted
by TiR(ΔtAgbAga)ij by using the function deﬁned in Equation 2 and we do not make the
system so sensitive to the past data as it might bring up more confusion to the trustor
agent. However, as later discussed in this chapter, we equip the CRM agent with an
off-line mechanism that overcome this sensitivity. We call this function: the Timely
Relevance function.
T iR(ΔtAgbAga)ij = e
−λ ln(ΔtAgbAga )ij λ ≥ 0 (2)
The variable λ is application-dependent and (ΔtAgbAga)ij is the time difference be-
tween the current time and time at which interaction j of type i took place. The in-
tuition behind this formula is to use a function decreasing with the time difference.
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Figure 3.2: The timely relevance function with respect to different λ values.
Consequently, recent information makes the timely relevance coefﬁcient higher. The
graph of T iR(ΔtAgbAga)ij using different λ values is shown in Figure 3.2. In some ap-
plications, recent interactions are more desirable to be considered when evaluating the
trustee. In that case, the trustor uses a higher value for λ. In some other applications,
even the old interactions are still valuable sources of information. In that case, the
trustor assigns a smaller value to λ. Considering the involved issues, we recompute
the direct trust in Equation 3. In fact, Aga rates each previous interaction with Agb
in terms of its freshness, which privileges recent interactions because they are more





j=1 vij × T iR(ΔtAgbAga)ij)∑n
i=1(wi
∑NIiAgbAga
j=1 vij × T iR(ΔtAgbAga)ij)
(3)
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3.4.2 Consulting Reports: Indirect Trust Estimation
The other approach in trust estimation of the trustee consists of collecting some infor-
mation in terms of suggestions from some other agents. As described before, consult-
ing agents are divided into two groups: (1) trustworthy agents the trustor Aga can rely
on to request information; and (2) referee agents introduced by the trustee Agb as rec-
ommenders. In this section, we address the selection process of the consulting agents
and how to deal with the information they provide to support Agb.
As mentioned before, T sAgbAga is the set of trustworthy agents selected by Aga for
consultation. Another set to be involved in the evaluation process is the set of referee
agents, which are introduced byAgb. Upon request fromAga, Agb replies by providing
a list of the referee agents it knows. Aga consequently asks (some of) the referees to
report on the credibility of Agb (RsAgbAga) and those referees reply according to their past
experiences of direct interaction with Agb.
Assume there is a particular referee agent Agr that Aga does not know. In this
case, Aga does not consider its suggestion about Agb, but it saves it anyway in order
to compare it with the real behavior Agb performs after starting interacting with Aga.
Thus, the referee is known by Aga from now on and its trust level is calculated by the
adjustment of the Agb’s real behavior and the referee’s suggestion.
Let n be the total number of interaction types (see Equation 1) and NIAgyAgx be the












In this equation, MV , ﬁxed by the system designer, is the maximum value that NIAgyAgx
can reach after a ﬁnite number of interactions. When the number of interactions goes
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beyond MV , the old interactions are simply not counted, so that only the MV most
recent interactions are considered. This restriction makes the model suitable for a large
amount of real scenarios where agents have limited resources and computing capabil-
ities. It is worthy to mention that the total number of interactions between Agt as a
trustworthy agent (resp. Agr as a referee agent) and Agb, NI
Agb
Agt
(resp. NIAgbAgr ) is an
important factor because it promotes information coming from agents knowing more
about Agb. The agents that had high number of interactions with Agb are considered
as good sources of information about its trustworthiness in the sense that they are sup-
posed to know Agb from relatively longer history of interactions. Considering this
factor, Aga would penalize the agents with high interactions harder in the maintenance
process.
Regarding the importance of the information provided by a consulting agent, we
consider another factor, which reﬂects the conﬁdence (in the range of [0, 1]) of the
consulting agent on truthfulness of the provided information (CfAgbAgt for the typical
trustworthy agent and CfAgbAgr for the typical referee agent). This factor has a twofold
aim. First, the consulting agent would let the trustor agentAga to have a better decision
on the extent to which it can take this information into account. Second, the consulting
agent would clarify the extent to which it can take the risk on contributing in the trust
estimation process initiated by Aga. In the simulations, the conﬁdence is randomly
generated for each consulting agent using a Gaussian distribution with mean 0.5 and
variance 0.2.
The trust equation TrAgbAga we are interested in should take into account the afore-
mentioned relevant factors: (1) the trustworthiness of trustworthy/referee agents ac-
cording to the trustor Aga (Tr
Agt
Aga
and TrAgrAga); (2) the trustee Agb’s trustworthiness
according to the trustworthy/referee agents (TrAgbAgt and Tr
Agb
Agr
); (3) the total number of
interactions between these trustworthy/referee agents and Agb (NI
Agt
Agb
and NIAgrAgb ), as
50
communicated by Agt/Agr to Aga following the dialogue games previously indicated
in Section 3.3.1; and (4) the conﬁdence of trustworthy/referee agents about the pro-
vided information (CfAgbAgt and Cf
Agb
Agr
∈ [0, 1]). Before deﬁning this equation, let us
discuss its desired properties. Some of these properties are inspired by [42].
Property 1 Assuming that the trustee is known in the system by some agents, TrAgbAga is
continuous.
This property says that at each moment the trustor Aga can evaluate the trustee Agb.
This does not mean that agents are interacting every moment of time, but at every
moment, the trustor can get the needed information to assess the trust value of the
trustee.
Property 2 Assuming that the trustee is known in the system by some agents, TrAgbAga is




This property says that the trust value of the trustee increases if it performs well in
this environment. Consequently, agents always have incentives to do better to get their
overall trust increased.
Property 3 Assuming that the trustee is known in the system by some agents, TrAgbAga











This property says that the trust values of trustworthy agents and trustee are not nec-
essarily correlated. The reason is that some of these agents support the trustee, but
some of them do not. The same property holds for referee agents and for the number
of interactions and conﬁdence. Thus, for instance, by increasing the number of its in-
teractions with some agents, the trustee cannot guarantee a growth of its trust value,
because these agents are may not be supportive.
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Property 4 Assuming that the trustee is known in the system by some agents, TrAgbAga







, and CfAgbAgr iff all Agt and Agr agents support Agb.
This property gives the condition on the trustworthy and referee agents, so that increas-
ing their trust value, number of interactions, and conﬁdence will make the trust value
of the trustee increasing. The opposite is given by the following property:
Property 5 Assuming that the trustee is known in the system by some agents, TrAgbAga







, and CfAgbAgr iff all Agt and Agr agents do not support Agb.
Property 6 Let X be the set of all pieces of information that Aga uses to assess
Agb, and Y the set of all pieces of information that Aga uses to evaluate another
trustee Agc, i.e. X = {TrAgtAga , T rAgbAgt , NIAgbAgt , CfAgbAgt |Agt ∈ T sAgbAga ∪ RsAgbAga} and
Y = {TrAgt′Aga , T rAgcAgt′ , NI
Agc
Agt′
, CfAgcAgt′ |Agt′ ∈ T s
Agc
Aga
∪ RsAgcAga}. Suppose that there is
an injective function f : X → Y such that for all x ∈ X , f(x) is at least as good for
Agc as x is good for Agb; then, Tr
Agc
Aga
is at least as great as TrAgbAga .
Let us now deﬁne the trust equation TrAgbAga (Equation 5) and then prove it satis-
ﬁes the aforementioned properties. This equation is composed of two different terms
representing the values obtained from two different consulting communities involved
in trust evaluation. The functions ΩT and ΨR are deﬁned as the combination of the
trust values estimated by the trustworthy and referee agents together with their related
trustworthiness from Aga’s point of view, timely relevance, conﬁdence and number of
interactions between the trustworthy and referee agents and the trustee Agb.
TrAgbAga =
ΩT (T sAgbAga) + ΨR(RsAgbAga)




































We notice that TrAgtAga = 0 ∀Agt ∈ T sAgbAga and Agb is known for at least one Agt, which
means NIAgbAgt , Cf
Agb
Agt
= 0, so Ω′T (T sAgbAga) = 0.
We now show that Equation 5 satisﬁes Properties 1 to 6. To simplify the notation,






are non-zero continuous functions on time, and TrAgbAgt is continuous on time, so by
considering NIAgbAgt as a coefﬁcient for Tr
Agb
Agt
for each Agt, we conclude that ΩT and
Ω′T are non-zero continuous functions. Similarly, ΨR and Ψ
′
R are continuous, so the
trust function is continuous. To show that Property 2 is satisﬁed, we need to prove that
the partial derivative of the trust function with respect to TrAgbAgt is greater than zero,
and the same thing with respect to TrAgbAgr . To simplify the proof, but without loss of
generality, let us consider a speciﬁc agentAgt1, then the same procedure can be applied












The same proof can be used for a speciﬁc referee agent Agr1, thus the satisfaction
of Property 2. To show that Property 3 is satisﬁed, we need to show that the partial
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derivative of the trust function with respect to the factors mentioned in this property is
not always positive and not always negative. Here we only show the proof for the case
TrAgtAga and the same proof can be used for Cf
Agb
Agt
×NIAgbAgt (the number of interactions
is considered as a coefﬁcient) and for the other factors. As we did for Property 2, we
















The sign of this partial derivative depends then on the sign of the numerator, which
could be positive or negative. Thus, to prove that Properties 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, we















iff TrAgbAgt1 > Tr
Agb
Aga
Thus, the partial derivative is strictly positive iff Agt1 is supportive (Property 4), and
it is strictly negative iff Agt1 is not supportive (Property 5). If it is equal to zero, the
function is simply constant. Finally, to prove that Property 6 is satisﬁed, we deﬁne the
injective function f as follows: f(TrAgtAga) = Tr
Agt′
Aga
; f(TrAgbAgt ) = Tr
Agc
Agt′
; f(NIAgbAgt ) =
NIAgcAgt′ ; and f(Cf
Agb
Agt
) = CfAgcAgt′ . So, for all x ∈ X , f(x) is at least as good for
Agc as x is good for Agb iff f(x) ≥ x. Consequently, from Property 4, we obtain
TrAgcAga ≥ TrAgbAga , which is the result we want to prove.
Equation 5 is used by the initial trustor Aga to evaluate the trustee Agb where each
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consulting agent is supposed to forward its own estimation (together with its conﬁdence
level) for this trustee. Following the ideology thatAga could, to a certain extent, rely on
its own history of interactions with Agb (direct trust evaluation approach) and partially
use the second approach (indirect approaches),Aga gives a 100% trustworthy rate to his
history and considers himself as a member of its trustworthy community. This aggre-
gation method takes into account the proportional relevance of each approach, rather
than treating the two approaches separately. Basically, the contribution percentage of
each approach in the ﬁnal evaluation of TrAgbAga is deﬁned regarding how informative the
history is in terms of the number of direct interactions between Aga and Agb and their
time recency. Therefore, consulting other agents is considered with less importance if
the history represents a lower uncertainty. Doing so, the indirect evaluation approach
is combined with the direct approach to end up with an accurate trust estimation of the
trustorAga for the trusteeAgb. To be more precise, we aim to analyze the quality of the
interactions of the trustee considering what is expected (ﬁnal trust evaluation TrAgbAga)
and what is actually performed. To this end, we have a retrospect trust evaluation,
which is represented in Section 3.5.
3.5 Off-line Trust Estimation
To avoid exposing the reputation framework to dishonest ratings, two types of agents
should be considered: (a) bad mouthers: agents that exaggerate by giving negative
ratings; and (b) ballot stuffers: agents that exaggerate by giving positive ratings. Mini-
mizing the effects caused by these two types of consulting agents is an important aspect
in trust evaluation. Although the ratio of relationship strength can be certainly inserted
as a measure of trust to increase the accuracy of referee agent’s credibility, this tech-
nique is not generic as it depends on how this relationship strength is represented and
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measured. To tackle this problem, we propose other parameters. First, we consider the
number and time recency of interactions as factors that reﬂects the trustor’s expectation
of receiving accurate information. Second, we consider the conﬁdence level provided
by consulting agents as a mean to enable the trustor to update its friend list. To this
end, we split the off-line trust estimation into two parts: Off-line Interaction Inspection
and Maintenance.
3.5.1 Off-line Interaction Inspection
After each interaction, the trustor Aga performs an off-line interaction inspection pro-
cess regarding each of the consulting agents role in the trust evaluation process. In
this procedure, Aga considers the given rate provided by the consulting agent Agc ∈
(T sAgbAga
⋃RsAgbAga), the number and recency of interactions done by the trustee agent
Agb. The objective of this process is to assign a ﬂag (useful/useless) for each involved
consulting agent.
Since the off-line interaction inspection is a process performed after the interac-
tion, Aga has a self opinion regarding the credibility of Aga. Therefore, we refer to
OTRAgbAga as the actual credibility observed by the trustor Aga. This value is compared
to the given rate provided by each consulting agent. Figure 3.3 is the off-line inter-
action inspector algorithm that takes the observed trust value (OTRAgbAga), given rate of
each one of the consulting agent Agc (Tr
Agb
Agc
), their corresponding number of inter-
actions (NIAgbAgc ) and the provided information time recency (T iR
Agb
Agc
) as input. This
algorithm provides an array (called ﬂag) of binary numbers about the usefulness of the
information provided by each one of the involved consulting agents.
In this algorithm, ﬁrst the average of the differences between the provided trust
and observed one of all the consulting agents is evaluated. The rational behind this is
explained by the fact that the public opinion affects the threshold of the accuracy of
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credibility rating. This means if the average difference is relatively high, the trustor
agent Aga would doubt that the trustee agent Agb is a consistent reliable agent, oth-
erwise the public opinion about this agent would not achieve that divergency. Once
the average difference is obtained, the consulting agents are checked one by one to be
tagged either as useful or useless. The agents who provided relatively accurate ratings
with an acceptable conﬁdence level CfAgbAgc > ν (ν is application-dependant and in the
simulations we assume that ν = 0.5) are not all tagged as useful. They are all good
except the ones who do not have high number of interactions or time relevance (strong
connection or holding fresh information). This is due to the fact that in credibility
assessment, the ratings that are submitted at random (by chance) could not be consid-
ered as a means to evaluate the truthfulness of a consulting agent. In this algorithm,
the number of interactions and time relevance of the consulting agents are compared
with the ones about the trustor and trustee agents’ connection. To this end, there is
higher priority assigned to consulting agents that hold stronger relationship. This par-
tition of consulting agents based on useful and useless ﬂags is an operational way of
obtaining the partition of agents as reliable and doubtful as proposed in the TRSIM
framework [12].
3.5.2 Maintenance
The maintenance procedure is a periodic process initiated to update the information
that the trustor agent Aga has about its surrounding environment. Before performing
this process there are two questions that have to be addressed: (1) when does the trustor
agent need to initiate the maintenance?; and (2) which agents have to be cleared in the
maintenance? In the rest of this section, we answer these questions in more details.
(1) When to initiate the maintenance procedure?
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D = 0; D = 0
for all Agc ∈ T sAgbAga
⋃RsAgbAga




D = D +DAgc ;
D = D|T sAgbAga
⋃RsAgbAga |
;
for all Agc ∈ T sAgbAga
⋃RsAgbAga
if DAgc < D










Figure 3.3: After interaction inspection algorithm for assigning usefulness ﬂags to
each involved consulting agent
There are three answers for this question:
• Bad Performance: When the performance of correctly evaluating agents
is decreased below a predeﬁned threshold (1 − TrAga). TrAga is in fact
the reputation value that Aga has in the system as estimated by himself of
its interactions with other agents. This value does not have to be known
publicly as it is used by Aga to perform a type of internal maintenance. In
the case of bad performance, the trustor agent realizes that its performance
Pt(Aga) in trust evaluations (regarding time t) is decreasing in almost a
continuous manner. The performance in evaluation is always calculated
since the most recent maintenance and is aggregated (in average) over the
time elapse. Equation 6 computes the current performance (Pt(Aga)) of
the trustor agent Aga that is regarding the current time period (t) and does
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not include the agent’s performance in trust evaluations that have already








The trustee agent Agb is selected from the set of trustee agents of Aga
(S(t)) which keeps all the trustee agents since the last maintenance. We
assume in this set, we keep different references for the same trustee agent
with a number of interactions. This would allow us to evaluate all the in-
teractions since last maintenance. In this process, if Pt(Aga) > 1−TrAga ,
the trustor agent Aga realizes that is the time to apply a new maintenance
process.
• Huge Difference: This is the case where Aga is disappointed with a no-
ticeable low quality trust evaluation that is recently done. In this case, Aga
realizes that the provided information is not satisfactory to the extent to
which Aga can rely on to continue its upcoming evaluations. Therefore if
the following inequality holds, the trustor agent will decide to run a new
maintenance process as an exceptional case to update its belief set. The
value z depends on how picky the evaluator is. In our simulations we as-
sume z = 0.5. For instance, picky agents can consider 0.2 < z ≤ 0.5 and
very picky agents can consider 0 < z ≤ 0.2.
|TrAgbAga −OTRAgbAga | > z
• After Certain Period of Time: If during the evaluation process there was
no problem that caused initiation of a maintenance procedure, the off-line
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trust estimation system would run after a certain period of time the main-
tenance process to update the belief set. This would help to have a better
adaptation in case of rapid changes in surrounding agents’ behavior.
(2) Which agents have to be cleared in the maintenance?
In the maintenance process, Aga selects some agents so that applying the maintenance
on them would enhance the adaptation of Aga with its surrounding environment. In
fact, if in the process of trust evaluation, since the most recent maintenance, Aga’s
belief set has not been changed, Aga would consult with the same set of trustworthy
agents. All these agents are then included in the maintenance process. Besides these
agents, some referee agents probably were involved in some trust evaluations. Aga
selects the referees that did provide the asked information (regarding different trustee
agents) with relatively high conﬁdence (say ν, which is set by Aga). The reason behind
this is that the process of indirect trust evaluation is in fact a twofold aimed process.
Besides obtaining accurate information, Aga would like to get to know new agents
and to better know the previously known agents. Therefore, the truthfulness of the
agents regarding the provided information could be considered as a mean to get their
credibilities updated. However, Aga would not consider any type of referee agent. In
the maintenance process, Aga only considers the referee agents with high conﬁdence
on their provided information. This would letAga to apply the update in a more serious
and reliable manner.
Let UF t1,t2Agm and UL
t1,t2
Agm
be the set of useful and useless ﬂags associated with a
trustworthy or referee agent Agm from his interactions during the interval [t1, t2] as
computed by the algorithm given in Figure 3.3. Equation 7 gives the rate illustrating the
performance ofAgm at time t2 considering t1 as a point of reference. This performance
is computed in terms of the number of useful and useless ﬂags during [t1, t2], where
−1 reﬂects the worst performance (all the ﬂags are useless), 0 the average performance
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(the numbers of useful and useless ﬂags are equal), and 1 the best performance (all the




illustrated by Equation 8. This update satisﬁes the properties that 1) if the performance







the performance is the worst, then TrAgmAga (t2) = 0; and 3) if the performance is very





|UF t1,t2Agm | − |ULt1,t2Agm |





1 if TrAgmAga (t1).(1+αAgm(t2)) > 1










Figure 3.4 shows the pseudo-code of the maintenance process that computes TrAgmAga (t2).
Aga initiates this process with respect to any of the three discussed answers to question
1. In this pseudo-code, MAga is the set of agents that are going to be selected for the
maintenance and as mentioned before, all the trustworthy agents TAga are included. For
all the interactions since the latest maintenance, the trustee is considered. For all the
referees of the trustee in question, the selected ones are those who showed high conﬁ-
dence. Finally, with respect to their ﬂags (useful +UF and useless −UL), their update
rates (αAgm) are computed as shown in Equation 7 (with a notational simpliﬁcation).
Then the updated trust value is computed as illustrated in Equation 8.
Since between the variable maintenance periods the trustworthy agents of a partic-
ular trustor agent Aga are the same, there is a ﬁxed number of agents that are involved
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function maintenance(Aga,S(t))
MAga := TAga ;
for all Age ∈ S(t)
for all Agc ∈ RsAgeAga





for all Agm ∈ MAga




if TrAgmAga = 0
X := TrAgmAga × (1 + αAgm)
if X > 1
TrAgmAga := 1
else TrAgmAga := X
end if
else
if αAgm ≥ 0
TrAgmAga := αAgm





Figure 3.4: The maintenance algorithm for updating trust rating performed by the
trustor Aga
in the maintenance process. Moreover, there are some referee agents that are con-
sidered in this process and might be different with respect to different trustee agents.
Because the number of involved agents in such a process is not high, the corresponding
computations regarding their trust value update is negligible in the off-line trust esti-
mation mechanism. Besides this, the trustor agent Aga takes the advantage of updating
his trust values with respect to the referee agents that might not have high number of
interactions. Furthermore, the maintenance algorithm is linear with both the number
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of agents and the number of interactions (i.e. O(|TAga | +
∏
Age∈S(t) |RsAgaAge |)) where
|S(t)| is the number of interactions with different trustee agents (sayAge as a particular
trustee agent), |TAga | is the number of trustworthy agents, and |RsAgaAge | is the number
of referee agents for a given trustee agent Age. We notice that we need to compute
all the interactions with referee agents even if some of them are common to different
trustee agents, which justiﬁes the product over those trustee agents S(t). The linear
complexity of the proposed maintenance process makes it computationally efﬁcient.
3.6 Analysis and Experimental Simulation
3.6.1 Implemented Testbed
In this section, we assess the CRMmodel efﬁciency and describe the implementation of
the tested. We also compare our model with three well known models as benchmarks:
FIRE [31, 32], Referral [97, 99], SPORAS [101], Travos [83] and BRS [33]. All these
models are explained in details and discussed in the related work chapter (Chapter
2). In the implemented testbed, agents are implemented as Jadex c©TM agents, i.e.
they inherit from the basic class Jadex−Simulator c©TM Agent. The agent reasoning
capabilities are implemented as Java modules using logic programming techniques. As
Java classes, agents have private data called Belief Data. The different dialogue games
(presented in Section 3.3.1) are given by a data structure and implemented using tables
and the different actions expected by an agent in the context of a particular dialogue
game are given by a table called data representative manager. The different agents’
reputation values that an agent has about other agents are recorded in a data structure
called data reputation. Each agent also has a knowledge base about the reputation
of other agents, called table reputation. Such a knowledge base has the following
structure: Agent− name, Agent− reputation, Total − interaction− number and
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Recent − interaction − time. The visited agents during the evaluation process and
the agents added in the reputation graph are recorded in two Jadex c©TM beliefsets
called: table visited agents and table graph reputation.
The testbed environment (represented in Table 3.1) is populated with 200 agents
categorized by two agent types: (1) service provider agents that are supposed to pro-
vide services (for simplicity, we assume that only one type of service is provided and
therefore consumed); and (2) service consumer agents (equipped with the different
trust models) that are looking for service providers to interact with and consume the
provided service. As in FIRE and Travos, in the rest of this section we use the gained
utility as a measurement for the quality of obtained service (QoS) in terms of satisfac-
tion, response time, price, etc. Thus, the gained utility depends on the performance
of service provider. We consider two service consumer groups to compare with our
model CRM: (1) group1 (FIRE, Referral and SPORAS); and (2) group2 (Travos and
BRS). The criterion used in this separation is the degree of sensitivity of the models
to the environment and changes of behavior of the service providers. Group1 does not
consider the continuous change of agents behaviors. The agents in this group tend to
accurately maintain the trust process rather than putting effort on updating trust regard-
ing the environment changes. Group2 takes action in response to such changes more
rapidly. Generally, service providers are different and thus provide diverse range of
service qualities. Furthermore, the consumer agents using these services obtain differ-
ent gained utilities. In CRM, service agreements and generally intercation details such
as expectations and contexts are abstracted. The focus is mainly on the numerical evlu-
ation of trust. But this model could be completed using the proposed model in [75] as
the context and satisfaction criteria are taken into account. The objective is to capture
subtle details regarding consumer-oriented selection process.
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Each agent (either service provider or consumer) is located randomly in the envi-
ronment and has been centralized and known by all other agents that are in its network
of activity. The ordinary agents are given more populated network because they act
normal, so in realistic environment they are more comparing to good providers or bad
providers. The ﬁckle agents are given the most populated network in order to distribute
them in the environment to catch the capabilities of different trust models in treating
them. In the network of agents, those that are close enough, have beliefs about each
other. However, this does not exclude the fact that agents extend their activity areas
and gradually get acquainted with other agents that are not in their activity areas. This
allows agents to evaluate some other agents to interact with and update their belief sets
based on the interaction output. The agents’ belief sets are built and updated upon
internal (previous history) and external (using consulting agents) information.
The simulation consists of a number of consequent runs in which agents are acti-
vated and build their private knowledge, keep interacting with one another, gain utility
and enhance their overall knowledge about the environment. The more an agent knows
the environment, the better it can choose service providers and thus, the more utility it
gains. Agents are free to ask others for their beliefs about the service provider to be se-
lected. Finally, each agent requests the service from the most trustworthy and reliable
provider according to him. Table 3.1 represents the four types of service providers we
consider in our simulation: good, ordinary, bad and ﬁckle. The ﬁrst three provide ser-
vices according to the assigned mean value of quality with a small range of deviation.
However, ﬁckle providers are more ﬂexible as their range of quality covers all possible
outcomes. To put the system in a more tight situation, we use a high number of ﬁckle
agents.
Since the major difference between the considered models is the trust mechanism
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Table 3.1: Testbed environment
Service
Provider
Agents ( S.P. ) 
S.P. Agent Type Density in theS.P. Community 
Provided Utility at Each RUN Radius of
ActivityRange Standard Deviation
Good 15.0% ]+5, +10] 1.0 25
Ordinary 30.0% ]-5, +5] 2.0 28
Bad 15.0% ]-10, -5] 2.0 25
Fickle 40.0% [-10, +10] - 30
Service
Consumer
Agents ( S.C. ) 
Group1
S.C. Agent Type Density in theS.C. Community 




CRM 25.0% 6 35
FIRE 25.0% 6 35
REFERRAL 25.0% 6 35
SPORAS 25.0% 6 35
Service
Consumer
Agents ( S.C. ) 
Group2
S.C. Agent Type Density in theS.C. Community 




CRM 33.3% 10 35
Travos 33.3% 10 35
BRS 33.3% 10 35
they employ for credibility assessment, the utility gained by each model is consid-
ered as its efﬁciency in selecting reliable service providers. Doing so, we compare
CRM with other models in two perspectives, honest (Section 3.6.2) and biased (Sec-
tion 3.6.3) environments. In honest environments, agents are supposed be honest in
the sense they reveal their beliefs with full accuracy. However, in biased environments,
agents can reveal inaccurate information. Comparison is done ﬁrst between CRM,
FIRE [31] (a successful trust model with high performance), SPORAS [101] (a cen-
tralized approach), and Referral [97] (following the concept of reference in an honest
environment). Travos [83] and BRS [33] are two other models that we compared CRM
with in terms of how they survive in such biased environment where agents constantly
change their behaviors. Like CRM, Travos and BRS are designed to take actions while
agents are not fully trustworthy. These models differ from CRM in the trust assessment
mechanism and analysis they perform in order to choose the best possible provider.
In such an environment where agents have an intermittent attitude, a successful trust
model is the one that adapts itself to new situations.
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3.6.2 Honest Environment
Figure 3.5 depicts the overall comparison of different models. The testbed consists of
a number of runs represented as the horizontal axis, and the ranking mean value for the
utility gained of each group is represented in the vertical axis. As the runs are elapsing,
each service consumer is using a particular model to ﬁnd the most trustworthy service
provider and thus, gain the most utility. First, the mean value of the gained utility by
agents using the same trust model is computed. Then, the mean values obtained from
different trust models are compared with each other using two sample t-test with 95%
of conﬁdence level to show the overall outperforming of CRM and FIRE compared to
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of CRM with FIRE, Referral and Sporas in terms of mean
utility gained at each run in an honest environment
Groups reﬂect the performance of four different trust models we considered for
comparison. SPORAS model evaluates the trust based on very recent interactions of
each agent. Moreover, in this model, the credibility of highly interacted agents un-
dergo a minor change compared to one with low number of interactions. Since SPO-
RAS (generally used as benchmark in the literature) is a centralized model, it suffers
from inconsistency of the trust values associated to agents while they register upon en-
trance in the system. Thus, this model would not perform well in situations when the
good service providers are new to the system and remain unknown for a longer time
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compared to others. Moreover, we still observe the problem of fake advertising to the
central agent to get more beneﬁt. Therefore, SPORAS performs weak in selecting the
best service providers. Referral agents directly consider how to place trust in others
and emphasize the key properties that affect the trust assessment. However, they do
not restrict the suggestions of other agents, which lead them to assess the credibility
of an unknown or partially known service provider. This may impact the selection of
good providers from the beginning of simulation. FIRE agents [31] regulate the prob-
lem of collecting the required information by the evaluator to assess the trust of its
partner. In addition, they apply certiﬁed reputation introduced by the trustee agent. As
results of t-test illustrated in Figure 3.5, the commutative utility gained over the 500
elapsed runs by the FIRE and CRM agents are culminated to be the highest as both
methods select good service providers, and therefore gain the highest possible utility
(for space reasons, only the ﬁrst 180 runs are shown in the ﬁgure). In this environment,
the agents are considered honest and they reveal their beliefs with full accuracy. In the
next section, we carry on comparison in the biased environment in which agents would
not necessarily reveal their beliefs with 100% accuracy. As a result, the trustor can get
confused in the trust assessment. Objectively, we discuss how the CRM agents cope
with such a problem.
3.6.3 Biased Environment
Being more realistic, we exposed the same agents in a very biased environment in
which agents, serving some certain goals, may reveal much less accurate information.
Each agent employs its corresponding trust model to accumulate the utility gained
through interactions. In general, the agents with more adaptable trust framework would
be able to express more efﬁcient performance and thus, obtain higher utility from the
environment.
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To prove the applicability of the proposed framework, we discuss the features al-
lowing the CRM model to perform higher over the FIRE, Travos and BRS models in
terms of efﬁciency. This discussion considers two perspectives. The former is in terms
of balancing the trust assessment process by considering different involved agents. This
comparison is done between FIRE and CRM, which is also highlighted with a detailed
scenario. The latter discussion focuses on how agents are sensitive to the environment
inconsistency and how it would be possible to gain more from diverse types of service
providers. The CRM model is compared with the Travos and BRS models to show how
these dynamic models act in an extensive intermittent environment. Our main objective
is to investigate different models’ abilities in satisfying the ideal trust model’s criteria.
FIRE is a successful trust-certiﬁed reputation model, which addresses the problem
of lack of direct history. Agents evaluate the trust of other agents as decentralized ser-
vices. However, the FIRE agents do not recognize the agents that have got the good
ratings and performed bad either in terms of inaccurate ratings provided for some others
or the bad obtained utility. The CRM agents are equipped with a maintenance mecha-
nism, which enables them to recognize change of behavior of others and respectively
adjust their beliefs regarding the trust of some particular consulting agents. This mech-
anism is also effective in recognizing collusion behavior, by which agents intentionally
reveal inaccurate information, aiming to gain more beneﬁt at the end. This change of
behavior should be recognized and the beneﬁt of other agents should get adjusted. This
process helps in quickly recognizing the ﬁckle agents that may provide any quality of
service.
Figure 3.6 shows a graph plotting ﬁckle selection percentage versus number of runs.
The graph highlights the difference of having and missing the maintenance regarding
the behavior of the CRM and FIRE agents. In the ﬁrst 80 runs, we observe that the
CRM agents are reducing the selection of ﬁckle agents as the time goes on. This is
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because the CRM agents perform maintenance on the behavior of the ﬁckle agents that
provide a bad utility after the interaction and deduce their beliefs about them, which
leads to less selection afterwards. The performance of the FIRE agents remain almost
the same as they do not recognize the ﬂuctuated behavior of the ﬁckle agents. The picks
of the CRM graph (P1 and P2) are simply because of a selection of few number of the
CRM agents at each run, and therefore, the maintenance they perform generally has
low effect on the consequent run until they are selected or distribute their ratings about
the typical ﬁckle agent they have done maintenance for. Hence, the curve goes down
in a ﬂuctuated manner until all the ﬁckle agents lose their credibilities and never get
selected, which happens in P3. In a similar way, Figure 3.7 illustrates the good agent
selection percentage versus the number of runs. This graph is the complementary of
the one shown in Figure 3.6 as the less ﬁckle providers are selected, the more good
providers are recognized. As a result of maintenance, the CRM agents would then



























Figure 3.6: Comparison of CRM and FIRE in terms of selecting ﬁckle service
providers along the elapsing runs in a biased environment
In this section, we also analyze the CRM behavior compared with BRS and Travos,
which are similar to CRM in the sense that they do consider other agents’ sugges-
tions while evaluating the trust of some speciﬁc agents (service providers) and discard

























Figure 3.7: Comparison of CRM and FIRE in terms of selecting good service providers
along the elapsing runs in a biased environment
attitude. In BRS, the trustor agent evaluates the recommender agents’ suggestions us-
ing the beta distribution method and ignores the suggestions that deviate the most from
the majority of ratings. BRS is in fact a relatively static trust method, which causes
a low-efﬁcient performance in very dynamic, open and biased environments. Cumu-
lative gained utility vs. number of runs is shown in Figure 3.8. In this graph, all the
agents consider the history of interactions in their selections. The BRS model is not
sensitive to an agile behavior change. This means if a BRS agent decides to evaluate
a new agent, it considers the majority of ratings, which are supposed to be truthfully
revealed about the trustee agent. In the case where the trustee agent has just changed
its strategy, the trustor agent would lose in trust assessment and does not maintain any
action to verify the accuracy of the gained information. It may take as much time that
other agents perform a number of direct interactions to start rating the spurious trustee
agent. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 3.10, the BRS agents would have a higher per-
centage of ﬁckle providers selection and a relatively less percentage of good providers
selection (illustrated in Figure 3.9). The peaks in Figure 3.10 are again as a result of
rational agents learning the credibilities of their surrounding agents in the environment.
It takes some while for the active agents to enhance the accuracy of their belief sets.
Generally, it would take more time for the BRS agents to adapt themselves to the new
71
environment conditions. The simulation results outlined in this section are all based on
50% agent activation rate.
Figure 3.8: Comparison of CRM, Travos and BRS in terms of cumulative utility gained
along the elapsing runs in a very biased environment
Figure 3.9: Comparison of CRM, Travos and BRS in terms of good provider selection
percentage along the elapsing runs with 50% activation rate in a very biased environ-
ment
Travos [83] has a method similar to BRS. It also uses beta distribution to esti-
mate the trustworthiness of an agent based on the previous interaction experience. The
Travos model also does not have a partial rating. It gives the trustor agent the authority
to merge its own experience with recommendations from other agents. However, un-
like BRS, Travos ﬁlters the surrounding agents that are ﬂuctuating in their reports about
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of CRM, Travos and BRS in terms of ﬁckle provider se-
lection percentage along the elapsing runs with 50% activation rate in a very biased
environment
Figure 3.11: Comparison of CRM, Travos and BRS in terms of ﬁckle gained utility
along the elapsing runs with 50% activation rate in a very biased environment
a speciﬁc trustee agent. To some extent, this feature would implement a partial sugges-
tion consideration and thus, the Travos agents would learn faster compared to the BRS
agents. Ratings concerning the good and ﬁckle selection percentage shown in Figures
3.9 and 3.10 reﬂect higher efﬁciency of Travos compared to BRS. The Travos agents
are capable of preventing the concept of fake reputation in which a group of agents
artiﬁcially increase their reputation by their collusive behaviors. However, the Travos
model considers that agents do not change their behaviors during runs. This unreal-
istic assumption affects the accuracy of trust estimation in a very biased environment.
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On the other hand, lack of agile learning ability for agents will weaken the protection
against collusion and fake behaviors. This is the case when a surrounding agent is
being discarded because of providing diverse reports about a particular trustee agent.
In this case, the deviation would be ﬁltered by mistake if the reports are reﬂecting the
ﬁckle attitude of that particular provider.
The Travos and BRS trust models enable agents to sense the environment and up-
grade their beliefs along the elapsing time. Compared to the performance of FIRE, the
Travos and BRS agents attempt to improve their best agent selection. However, these
models have some aforementioned limitations that cause wrong direction to accurate
trust estimation. In CRM, the aim is to improve the trust mechanism to deal with these
limitations by enabling agents to adapt themselves while the environment is strictly
intermittent. The CRM agents are equipped with the maintenance procedure by which
they update their beliefs about the service providers together with the accuracy of the
ratings provided by the neighbor agents in support or against a speciﬁc provider. Con-
sidering all the involved parameters, the agent that is doing maintenance balances its
beliefs to be more accurate in terms of knowing the best provider and the best neighbors
that can be consulted. Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.8, the CRM agents would gain
more utility compared to the other two models. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 reﬂect the CRM
agile reaction to increase its good selection percentage very fast, and thus, decrease
the maximum possible its ﬁckle selection percentage. To better analyze the affect of
the ﬁckle agents that we concern not to select them, we have shown the gained utility
from ﬁckle agents in each run in Figure 3.11. This ﬁgure elaborates the fact that the
gained utility from selecting ﬁckle agents is ideally minimized in the sense that there
is no guarantee about the provided utility after selecting a ﬁckle agent. Therefore the
high performance agents would not rely on this utility and thus, they accumulate the
obtained unitively from selecting the good providers.
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The detailed simulation environment with different settings concludes the fact that
CRM functions as a comprehensive trust framework that satisﬁes the aforementioned
ideal trust framework’s criteria (accuracy, rationality, adaptability and agileness repre-
sented in Chapter 1). This trust framework outperforms related work mainly because of
its agile reaction to change of behaviors and its ability to reconstruct the accurate belief
set. Considering the maintenance part of this model, a CRM agent is able to know its
surrounding environment relatively faster than the one using similar trust frameworks.
3.7 Conclusion
Our contribution in this chapter is the proposing a new probabilistic-based model to se-
cure multi-agent systems in which agents communicate with each other using dialogue
games. The trust assessment procedure is composed of on-line and off-line evaluation
processes. On-line framework is based upon trustworthy and referee agents as well as
several other features. Objectively, this allows enhancing the accuracy for agents to
make use of the information communicated to them by other agents. Off-line frame-
work considers the communicated information to judge the accuracy of the consulting
agents in the previous on-line trust assessment process.
Our model has the advantage of being comprehensive and taking into account four
important factors: (1) the trust (from the viewpoint of the trustor agents) of the trust-
worthy agents; (2) the trust value assigned to trustee agents according to the point
of view of trustworthy agents; (3) the number of interactions between trustworthy
agents and the trustee agents; and (4) the timely relevance of information transmit-
ted by trustworthy agents. Moreover, the original process of maintenance proposed in
this framework enables agents to dynamically adjust their beliefs and their trustworthy
community in a more efﬁcient manner. The resulting model allows us to produce a
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comprehensive assessment of the agents’ credibility in a software system even if the
environment is very biased. The proposed mechanism accuracy is compared with other
related models and discussed in details to prove the capabilities of our framework. In




Applied to Agent-based Communities of Web Services
4.1 Background
In the previous chapter, we proposed a trust framework that is used to rate agents’ re-
liability in interactive multi-agent system with dynamic environmental changes. The
trust is individual’s opinion regarding reliability of an entity. This could be generalized
to public opinion that we refer to as reputation. The reputation then reﬂects public
opinion regarding an entity’s reliability. In this chapter, we propose a new framework
to address reputation evaluation problem. This approach is built on the trust framework
that we proposed before. So we mainly concentrate on the public aspect of the relia-
bility computation. Moreover, we consider the network of web service agents as the
infrastructure of the proposed model because such a network of web service agents is
a suitable environment to discuss the public opinion regarding reliability of intelligent
agents.
The proposed reputation framework is based on some relevant parameters that are
inspired by the case study that we consider in this chapter. In literature, there are a
number of related works that aggregate the relevant parameters to compute the reputa-
tion of an agent. But we distinguish our proposed framework from others by stressing
the fact that the contribution of our framework in this chapter is to maintain truthful
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feedback submission system. Upon reliable feedback pool, we aggregate the param-
eters utilized to compute the reputation. Regarding the truthful feedback submission,
there are some relative models that encourage the feedback poster to act truthfully, but
in this chapter we focus on malicious feedback detection, and the ways to discard fake
feedback as well as penalizing the malicious poster agent. We generally investigate the
scenarios where rational agents estimate better results via truthful actions. This type of
reputation analysis is new and we have extended it into different directions in a number
of publications [49, 50].
As one of the recent technologies for developing loosely-coupled, cross-enterprize
business processes (usually referred to as B2B applications), a plethora of web services
exists on the web waiting to receive users’ requests for processing. Such requests are
usually competitive in a reputation-driven manner. As pointed out in Chapter 2, we
implement and apply our proposed reputation mechanism on the web services setting,
where web services are supposed to be associated with agents that act on their behalf.
One general way for such reputation assessment is collection of the after-interaction
feedback that users provide with respect to the quality of the received service. However,
in feedback-based reputation mechanisms, the precise reputation assessment needs to
be veriﬁed. Selﬁsh web services might manage to provide feedback that support them
in the reputation mechanism. In general, online reputation mechanism is always subject
to get violated with selﬁsh web services.
Another way to address the selection problems is to gather web services having
similar functionalities into a community. Community of web services (CWS) is a gath-
ering of single and functionally similar web services that are aggregated to perform as
one community while offering unique or variety of services [45,48]. The main property
of a CWS is to facilitate and improve the process of web service discovery and selection
and effectively regulate the process of user requests. There are underlying reasons for
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of reputation-based community of web services
this. In general, the individual web services fail to accept all the requests for them, and
thus refuse to accept a portion of their concurrent requests. This would decrease their
overall reputation in the environment and would lead to loose some users. In CWSs,
the community gathers a set of functionally homogeneous web services. Given that
some communities offer the same functionality (hotels booking, weather forecasting,
etc.), there is a competition between different communities. In this case, reputation is
considered as a differentiation driver of the communities. Moreover, reputation helps
users to select the most reputable community, which would provide the best QoS, and
helps providers to join the best community, which would bring them the most value.
Users assess the reputation of the community and upon that request a service. Although
the service selection process might be simpliﬁed, still communities might distract the
reputation mechanism to support themselves. To this end, the reputation mechanism is
needed to maintain a truthful service selection procedure.
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4.2 Architecture of Reputation-EmbeddedWeb Services
Communities
In this section, we represent the CWSs architecture [16], which is designed to maintain
the reputation of the communities. Here we assume that each web service is associated
with a community and do not function alone. If a web service is not registered in a
community, it could not be invoked by a user. Indeed, a web service can be registered
in one of many communities. In Figure 4.1, we represent different components of the
architecture, with their reputation and interactions. These components together with
their detailed performance are explained as follows:
User agent. It is a proxy between the user and other interacting parties such as the
extended UDDI, CWS and the reputation system.
Master agent. This agent is considered as the representative of the community in
the sense that it manages the community requests in selecting the proper web service.
Meanwhile, the master agent hires (or ﬁres) some web services to join (or leave) the
community. In general, the master of the community always tends to increase the com-
munity’s performance and consequently, its reputation level.
Provider agent. Like the user agent, it relates the provider with the extended UDDI,
CWS and reputation system.
Extended UDDI. The traditional UDDI XML schema is based on six types of infor-
mation, allowing people to have information in order to invoke the web services [62].
In the UDDI registry, we restrict the access of the agents in the sense that user and
provider agents only consult the list of masters, whereas the masters have access to the
list of the web services in the UDDI registry. By adding this new information concern-
ing the CWSs, we would clarify which CWS a web service belongs to.
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Reputation system. Considering the fact that the CWSs could offer the same service,
they always compete in order to obtain more requests. Therefore, evaluating CWSs
is unavoidable for the users and providers. To be able to compute the reputation of
these communities, the user and provider agents must gather operational data, reﬂect-
ing different performance metrics, about the interaction between the user, provider and
CWS. The user agents should intercept some logs like Submission log, Response Time
log, Invocation log, Success log, Failure log, Recovery log and so on. It is important
that the user and provider agents are independent parties in order to intercept trusted
run-time data about each web service interaction.
The reputation system is the core component in this architecture. Its ﬁrst function-
ality is to register the run-time logs; and the second functionality is to rank the commu-
nities based on their reputation by using a ranking algorithm. The ranking algorithm
would maintain a restrictive policy, avoiding the ranking violation, which could be
done by some malicious CWSs. The violation, which has not been considered in [16]
could be done by providing some fake logging data (by some colluding users) that
reﬂect positive feedback in support of the CWS, or by fake negative data that is regis-
tered against a particular community. To deal with this violation, we propose to assign
a controller agent Cg. The task of this agent is to update the CWS reputation rankings
in order to drop inaccurate registered data and thus enhance accuracy of the reputation
system. The detailed discussion of this issue is provided in Section 4.4.
Controller agent. Cg is the assigned agent that takes the logging ﬁle under surveil-
lance and updates the assigned reputations to the communities. Cg is mainly responsi-
ble to remove the cheated feedback that support particular communities. Investigating
the recent feedback, Cg recognizes the fake feedback and accordingly analyzes the
further actions of the community. In general, Cg may fail to accurately detect the fake
feedback or similarly may recognize normal feedback as fake. Therefore, malicious
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communities always consider this fake detection and analyze their chance of success-
ful cheating.
4.3 Reputation Model
For simpliﬁcation reasons, but without loss of generality, in the remainder of this
framework, we only consider the users point of view (rather than users and providers)
in reputation assessment. In order to assess the overall reputation of a CWS, the user
needs to take some correlated factors into account. In Section 4.3.1, we present the
involved metrics that a user may consider in this assessment. Consequently, in Section
4.3.2, we explain the methodology that the user uses to combine these metrics in order
to assess the reputation of a CWS.
4.3.1 Metrics
Responsiveness Metric: Let Ci be the community that is under consideration by user





time taken by the master of the community Ci to answer the request received at time t
(qst) by the user Uj . This time includes the time for selecting a web service from the
community and the time taken by that web service to provide the service for the user
Uj . When it is understood from the context, Ci will be removed from the notations.
Equation 1 computes the response time of the community Ci, computed with Uj during
the period of time [t1, t2] (ResUj ,[t1,t2]), where n is the number of requests received by







t × e−λ(t2−t) (1)
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Here the factor e−λ(t2−t), where λ ∈ [0, 1] is application-dependent and reﬂects the
time recency of the received requests so that we can give more emphasize to the recent
requests. If no request is received at a given time t, we suppose ResUj ,qst = 0.
InDemandMetric: It depicts the users’ interest for a community Ci in comparison







In this equation, Req[t1,t2] is deﬁned as the number of requests that Ci has received
during [t1, t2], and M represents the number of communities under consideration.
Satisfaction Metric: Let SatUj ,qst be a feedback rating value (which is supposed
to be between 0 and 1) representing the satisfaction of Uj with the service regarding its








t × e−λ(t2−t) (3)
4.3.2 Metrics Combination
In order to compute the reputation value of a CWS (which is between 0 and 1), it is
needed to combine these metrics in a particular way. Actually, the Responsiveness and
Satisfaction metrics are the direct evaluations of the interactions between a user and
a CWS whereas the inDemand metric is an assessment of a community in relation to
other communities. In the ﬁrst part, each user adds up its ratings of the Responsiveness
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and Satisfaction metrics for each interaction it has had with the CWS. Equation 4 com-
putes the reputation of the community Ci during the interval [t1, t2] from the user Uj’s
point of view. In this equation, ν represents the maximum possible response time, so
that if a community does not respond, we would have ResUj ,[t1,t2] = ν. In the second
part, the inDemand metric is added. Therefore, the overall reputation of Ci from the
users’ point of view is obtained in Equation 5.
RepUj ,[t1,t2] = η(1− Res
Uj ,[t1,t2]
ν









+ φ InD[t1,t2] (5)
Where η + κ = 1 and χ+ φ = 1.
In the rest of this chapter, we call Rep[t1,t2] as the reputation of the community Ci
computed with respect to interacting users’ points of views as well as the community’s
inDemand metric. But in next chapters, we discuss about the reputation of web service
agents computed by the central reputation system and refer to this parameter by Ri
reﬂecting web service i’s reputation value. In context, these two parameters are same,
but considering the time interval, we differently refer to the parameter in this chapter.
4.4 Feedback Logging Mechanism
Without loss of generality, in a network composed of CWSs, master agents (as repre-
sentatives of communities) are selﬁsh and may alter their intentions in order to obtain
more beneﬁts (in terms of popularity). This could happen by improving one’s reputa-
tion level or by degrading other’s reputation level. We respectively refer to these cases
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as fake positive/negative alteration. Violating the logging feedback (distracting the rep-
utation levels) could lead to system inconsistency in the sense that low quality CWSs
may obtain more users or high quality communities may loose some users. There-
fore, it is important to avoid such attacks and keep the logging mechanism accurate.
In the rest of this section, we explain how to perform fake positive/negative correction
(recognition and adjustment) and thus effectively maintain a reputation adjustment.
In the proposed architecture for the CWS, the reputation is computed based on the
information obtained from the logging system that over the elapsing time, users leave
their feedback. Thus, it is essential to keep such logging ﬁle accurate and discourage
malicious actions. It is the responsibility of the controller agent Cg to maintain an ac-
curate attack-resilient logging ﬁle. As a part of the UDDI system, Cg has the authority
to update information such as overall reputation level of any CWS. In this framework,
we assume that this agent is highly secured in order to avoid being compromised. How-
ever, if Cg gets compromised with a given community, then inconsistent actions of Cg
could be recognized by some other communities, given the fact that they are competing
with one another. But this issue is out of the scope of this chapter.
4.4.1 Fake Positive Correction
Fake positive recognition. One of the main responsibilities of the controller agent
Cg is to perform fake positive correction. To this end, initially Cg should recognize a
malicious behavior from one or a set of user agents (that could possibly collude with a
particular community). This recognition is done based on the recent observable change
in the reputation of a community. To this end, Cg would always check the recent feed-
back of the communities. So Cg would consider the reputation that is computed for
a speciﬁc period of time [t1 − , t1], where t1 is the current time. The value  is set
by the controller agent regarding to the system inconsistency in the sense that if the
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network is inconsistent, so Cg would need to check most recent feedback ( as rela-
tively small amount). Otherwise, Cg would take even older feedback into account (
as relatively large amount). Thus, Rep[t1−,t1] is the reputation of the community Ci
obtained from data measured from t1 −  to t1. Different values of  will be used in
the simulation to observe the effect of the considered period on the overall recognition.
Let U [t1−,t1] be the set of users that during this time interval have provided a feed-
back for the community Ci, and tb be the beginning time of collecting feedback. Cg
would consider the positive feedback to be suspicious if the reputation improvement
(Rep[t1−,t1]−Rep[tb,t1]) divided by the number of users that caused such improvement
is greater than the predeﬁned threshold ϑ, i.e:
Rep[t1−,t1] −Rep[tb,t1]
|U [t1−,t1]| > ϑ
The number of users (|U [t1−,t1]|) is bounded by two factors: 1) communities cannot
manage more than a maximum number of users by time unit considering their sizes
(i.e. the number of web services populating the communities); and 2) in case of a
malicious community, it is very unlikely that this community manages to collude with
more than a certain number of users. This will prevent malicious communities from
violating the feedback without being recognized by maximizing |U [t1−,t1]|. In that
case, it is assumed that community Ci had a drastic reputation increase in the recent 
time. The value  is set with respect to the controller agent’s success in fake feedback
detection. Interacting in the environment, Cg would update this value in the sense that
the most efﬁcient value is ﬁgured out. The detail algorithms on how to learn this value
is out of scope of this chapter.
Fake positive Adjustment. Exceeding the threshold ϑ, Cg would ﬁgure out that
a particular community is receiving consequent positives. Then Cg, in order to reload
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Figure 4.2: Fake positive correction cases
the previous and actual reputation level, would freeze the recent positive logs and no-
tiﬁes the corresponding community of such suspending. So, Cg would observe the
upcoming behavior (in terms of satisfaction and responsiveness) of the community in
order to match the actual efﬁciency with the suspended enhanced reputation level. Dur-
ing this period, the community is encouraged to behave in such a way that reﬂects the
suspended enhanced reputation level. As it is shown in Figure 4.2, the community’s
feedback is recognized as suspicious at time t1. Feedback from time t0 are freezed
to investigate the further behavior of the suspicious community Ci. At time t2 con-
troller agent Cg would decide whether to penalize community Ci or to redeem the
freezed feedback. If the community shows the real improved performance, the sus-
pended reputation level would be redeemed and considered for its reputation. But if
the community fails to do so, the previous reputation level will be decreased by some
applied penalties. In this case, the community would be in such a situation that either
has to outperform its past in order to improve the enhanced reputation level, or would
loose its current reputation, which is not wanted. Therefore, we form an incentive that
communities would not risk their current reputation level and thus they do not by any
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means (colluding with users or providers) provide fake positives in support of them-
selves. Let Evol[t1,t2] be the evolutionary reputation value for the community Ci that is
measured by the Cg during speciﬁed time interval [t1, t2] (investigation period). This
value is computed in Equation 6, where δ is a small value such that the reputation is





t2 − t1 (6)
Also, let Pnt be the general penalty value that is assigned by Cg to Ci at a speciﬁc time
t. Equation 7 computes the adjusted reputation level of Ci (R̂ep
[tb,t2]
). This equation
reﬂects the incentive we propose, so that CWSs in general would be able to analyze






αRep[tb,t1] + βEvol[t1,t2], if redeemed;
αRep[tb,t0] + βEvol[t1,t2] − Pnt2 if penalyzed.
(7)
where α + β = 1.
As discussed before, Cg will decide to redeem the community Ci if the evolutionary







. If Cg decides to redeem the community Ci, then the previous reputation
value (from time tb to investigation time at t1) would be considered together with the
evolutionary reputation value as a result of investigation during [t1, t2]. IfCg decides to
penalize the community Ci, then the previous reputation is considered regardless of the
improved reputation obtained in the period of [t0, t1]. In addition to the evolutionary
reputation, a penalty Pnt2 would also be assigned at time t2.
False alarm detection. It is worth to discuss more about alternatives of Cg’s fake
positives recognition. Consider the two cases that Cg falsely, and truly recognizes the
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Figure 4.3: Fake negative correction cases
fake positives. In the former case, the positives are real, therefore, they reﬂect the
actual performance of the community. Then even being suspended, the community can
easily prove the quality level as it continues as before and basically would not loose
anything. In the later case, the positives are fake, so the community needs to improve
its actual quality level to prove suspended enhanced reputation level. If the community
failed to fulﬁll such reputation, Cg would decrease its previous reputation level.
4.4.2 Fake Negative Correction
Similar to the fake positive case, there might be some fake negatives in order to de-
crease the reputation level of a particular community (see Figure 4.3). This could
happen when a community or a set of communities would like to weaken a particular
community (by dropping its reputation level) hoping not to compete with them. How-
ever, one unique case should not be excluded in which, a particular community would
mal-behave and after certain number of providing services and obtaining negative feed-
back, claims that the feedback were fake and do not reﬂect its actual reputation level.
To avoid such a situation, each community is responsible to recognize a change in its
reputation level and consequently report the case to Cg. Upon received report, Cg
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would decide whether the negative feedback were really as a result of the mal-behavior
of the community or as a result of some other parties fake negatives. If Cg initiates
the investigation at time t1, after a period of evolutionary time, Cg would decide for
the reputation adjustment at time t2. In case of redeeming the community Ci that was
suspected to have fake negative feedback, the negatives are discarded (Rep[t0,t1] is not
considered), and a reward Rwt2 is assigned at time t2. The reason is to discourage the
opponent communities not to cause a fake negative feedback for Ci and hope to de-
grade its reputation level. However, if after evolutionary investigation, Cg decides to
penalize Ci, then the negative feedback are also considered (by considering Rep[tb,t1]),
and a penalty Pnt2 is assigned to the community. Equation 8 computes the updated








αRep[tb,t0] + βEvol[t1,t2] +Rwt2 , if redeemed;
αRep[tb,t1] + βEvol[t1,t2] − Pnt2 if penalyzed.
(8)
There is also a case that a malicious community tries to mislead controller agentCg
with the fake feedback that it managed to provide for himself and tries to act better than
usual in the evolutionary time to get the reward Rwt2 . All such false detections reﬂect
diverse situations in which Cg needs to recognize the source of submitted feedback
(colluded users). For sake of simplicity, in this framework we do not talk about these
cases and consider such cases of false detection out os scope.
4.4.3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we will discuss in details the updates of reputation level when a par-
ticular community Ci causes fake feedback that is eventually beneﬁciary for itself. To
this end, we follow the steps over this reputation updates and elaborate Cg’s actions
on them. For simplicity reasons, we only analyze the case of self-positive feedback
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Figure 4.4: The tree of backward induction reasoning
penalizing a community is relative to the reputation improvement that community had
obtained. In this section, we use backward induction reasoning technique to show that
CWSs loose interest in doing malicious acts that cause extra (fake) positives for them-
selves or extra (fake) negatives for some others.
To better analyze the decisions the communities could take, we calculate the ex-
pected reputation value of a particular community in the case that the community acts
maliciously to provide fake positive feedback for itself and the case that the commu-
nity acts as normal and performs its actual capabilities. By comparing the two expected
values, the typical community Ci will decide either to act maliciously or as normal. As
discussed earlier, this decision is made based on the probability that Ci estimates to
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have a successful act. Being malicious, Ci always looks for the cases that could possi-
bly cheat to increase its current reputation. Let qt be the probability that the controller
agent Cg notices the real intention of the community Ci and take actions with penaliz-
ing Ci at time t. We compute the expected reputation of Ci as a result of a malicious
action in Equation 9 and as a result of normal action in Equation 10. In these equa-
tions, the expected value of the reputation for community Ci is measured under two
assumptions. In the case that Ci has faked the feedback (E(R̂ep
[tb,t2]|Ci faked)), the
community decides to fake at time t0 (therefore, the reputation till t0 is considered as
normal), the biased feedback are recognized by Cg at time t1, and the investigation is
ﬁnalized at time t2. To this end, by penalizing Ci, its previous reputation till t0 is con-
sidered together with the investigation period [t1, t2] with its penalty. If the controller
agent Cg does not recognize Ci’s malicious act, all the feedback are taken into account.
In this analysis, we consider a very low possibility thatCg warns false negatives, which
is the case that Cg falsely recognizes a malicious act. To this end, we assume that if
the community Ci acts as normal, the reputation value would be measured as normal.
E(R̂ep
[tb,t2]|Ci faked) =
qt2(αRep[tb,t0] + βEvol[t1,t2] − Pnt2)





|Ci notfaked) = Rep[tb,t2]Ci (10)
Figure 4.4 is the tree representing the backward induction reasoning through actions
of the community Ci and corresponding reactions made by the controller agent Cg in
two steps. In this Figure, IMP refers to the fact that the community’s reputation is
getting improved thanks to fake positives the community has provided. We also refer
in this Figure to PN as the state that the community’s fake action is detected and
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thus penalized by Cg. As it is illustrated, the community that provides fake positives,
obtains an improvement, which could be followed by a penalty. Here we state that the
probability of Cg’s detection given the fact that Ci has faked before is high. Therefore,
if Ci has been already penalized, it is so hard to retaliate and improve again. There is a
slight chance that Ci fakes and Cg ignores, which comes with a very small probability.
Thus, we compute the expected reputation level of both cases and compare them.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let Imp[tb,t2] be the difference between the adjusted reputation (in the
case where the community is under investigation) and normal reputation (in the oppo-





[tb,t2] −Rep[tb,t0], investigated by Cg;
Rep[tb,t2] −Rep[tb,t0], otherwise.
The following proposition gives the condition for the penalty to be used, so that the
communities will not act maliciously.
Proposition 4.2 If Pnt2 > 1
qt2
Imp[tb,t2] − αRep[t0,t1], then communities obtain less
reputation value if they act maliciously and provide fake feedback for themselves.
Proof: To prove the proposition, we should consider the condition true and prove
that E(R̂ep
[tb,t2]|Ci faked) < E(Rep[tb,t2]|Ci Not faked). By simple calculation we
get:





The obtained value is positive, so we are done.
In the previous proposition, we talked about the incentive that a rational community
has to avoid fake feedback. Now we would like to discuss the general incentive of a
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malicious act in multiple times to generalize the ultimate reputation adjustment of bad
communities that in general prefer to cheat on the logging system. To this end, we
extend our analysis by discussing about a particular community Ci that has previously
made malicious act (for the ﬁrst time action made at time tl1, detection made at time
tm1, and decision made at time tn1). In this analysis, we would like to investigate
the community’s further acts (made at general time tl) in distracting the logging ﬁle
and thus, its reputation treatment via the controller agent (detection at time tm and
decision at time tn such that tn > tm > tl > tn1). Basically, as a result of the previous
act, Ci could have been penalized (which means the community is less likely to act
maliciously again) or have gained a reward (which means the community is very likely
to act maliciously again). In the following, we study the penalty Pntn that should be
assigned to these types of communities to avoid their multiple malicious acts.
Assume that Ci has made its malicious act at time tl1. For the performed action,
there is a chance (qtn1) that the controller agent Cg noticed the act at time tn1 and thus,
penalized the community by Pntn1 . We also consider the chance (1 − qtn1) that the
controller agent ignores the act and thus, the community has obtained the improvement
Imp[tl1,tn1] through the feedback without any penalty from the controller agent. Con-
sidering the probabilities of different strategies that the controller agent may take, as we
discussed earlier, there is a small chance that Cg ignores the malicious act. This basi-
cally means the probability of notice (for the ﬁrst time) (qtn1) is normally high and that
is because the sensitivity of the controller agent in investigating the list of feedback for
each particular community. However, once recognized, the controller agent becomes
more sensitive to the recognized community’s further actions. Therefore, the probabil-
ity of missing the second fake action is less than the ﬁrst one and so on ((qtn2 > qtn1)).
Generally speaking, the community would be more interested to continue its malicious
behavior when it has never been recognized via Cg and thus penalized. However, there
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is always a high possibility for this community to be recognized later (for the ﬁrst time).
Considering the aforementioned cases, the expected reputation E(Rep[tb,tn]) for a
community that fakes the feedback again (for the second time or more) can be decom-
posed by the cases that Cg has previously (tnj) noticed the community’s malicious act
(Cg noticed|Ci faked) with the probability qtnj (nj < n) and Cg has previously ig-
nored such action (Cg ignored|Ci faked) with the probability 1− qtnj . We study each
case by analyzing the strategy that Cg has previously took in response to such fake
action.
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Ci fake again) =
(qtnj)E(Rep[tb,tlj ]|Cg noticed)+
(1− qtnj)E(Rep[tb,tlj ]|Cg ignored)
Consider the ﬁrst case that Cg notices the current fake behavior of Ci. We expand
this case to the cases thatCg noticedCi’s previous act and the case thatCg ignoredCi’s
previous malicious act. This basically inﬂuences the control of Cg over the feedback
of the community Ci since being recognized as malicious community.
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg noticed) =
(qtn)E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg noticed before)+
(1− qtn)E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg ignored before)
Basically the probability of notice for a community that has faked before is more
than ordinary community without previous fake action. To this end, qtn is higher than
qtnj such that qtn × α = qtnj . The value α is a generic value (0 < α < 1), but to be
consistent we always use this value in order to apply the degradations.
Considering the case thatCg ignored the current fake behavior of theCi, we expand
this case to the case that Cg noticed Ci’s previous malicious act and the case that Cg
ignored Ci’s previous malicious act. For simplicity, here we assume q′tn = 1 − qtn .
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This means that if the previous fake action is recognized, the current fake action would
be recognized as well with the probability of qtn . Likewise, if the previous fake action
is ignored, the current fake action is made with the probability of qtn .
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg ignored) =
(q′tn)E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg noticed before)+
(1− q′tn)E(Rep[tb,tn]|Cg ignored before)
The value q′tn would be a very small value in the sense that if Cg noticed the previous
act of Ci, now the possibility of ignore would be very small. In general, the controller
agent would become very sensitive to the acts of malicious communities. Consider-
ing the updates made by Cg over the reputation values of communities, the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 4.3 If communities fake again, they make a drastic degradation in their
reputation value.
Proof: Given the fact thatCg noticed previous fake action ofCi, it would be more
restrictive for Ci’s further performance, therefore, the probability of noticing the new
fake action is higher than before (qtn > qtnj ). In this case Cg increases the checking
accuracy for such community and we deﬁned this improvement by the factor of 1 + α,
which is multiplied to the previous notice probability value. Consequently, we rewrite
the expected value as following. In Equation 11, the ﬁrst line represents the case that
fake action has been noticed before and now (so there is two penalties applied and
no reward). Second line represents the case that fake action is noticed now but has
been ignored before (so there is a current penalty but previous reward). Third line
represents the case that fake action is ignored now but has been recognized before (so
there is current rewards but previous penalty). Last line represents the case that fake
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action been ignored in both previous and current time (so there are just rewards and
no penalties).
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Ci faked again) =
qtn(qtnj)(Rep[tb,tlj ] − Pntnj − Pntn)
+qtn(1− qtnj)(Rep[tb,tlj ] − Pntnj + Imp[tl,tn])
+(1− qtn)(qtnj)(Rep[tb,tlj ] − Pntnj + Imp[tlj ,tnj ])
+(1− qtn)(1− qtnj)(Rep[tb,tlj ] + Imp[tlj ,tnj ] + Imp[tl,tn])
(11)
Following the ideology that the expected value of faking again should be (strictly)
less than not faking, we simplify the obtained value in Equation 11 to the following:
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Ci fake again) <
E(Rep[tb,tn]|Ci not fake again) ⇒ 1−qtnqtn Imp[tl,tn] < Pntn
(12)
Generalizing the case 1−q
tn
qtn
Imp[tl,tn] < Pntn to be valid in all tn, it is shown that the
required amount for the penalty for time tn is less than the required amount for any





Therefore, the probability of faking again is decreasing over time, so we are done.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the implementation of a proof of concept prototype. In the
implemented prototype, CWSs are composed of distributed web services (Java c©TM
agents). The agent reasoning capabilities are implemented as Java modules. The
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Table 4.1: Simulation summarization over the obtained measurements.
CWS Type WS Density WS Type WS QoS
Ordinary [25.0%, 35.0%] Good [0.5, 1.0]
Faker [25.0%, 35.0%] Bad [0.0, 0.5]
Intermittent [25.0%, 35.0%] Fickle [0.2, 0.8]
testbed environment is populated with two agent types: (1) agent-based web services
that are gathered in a community (we assume only one type of service is provided
and therefore consumed); and (2) user agents that are seeking for the best service pro-
vided by a web service. In general, the simulation consists of a series of empirical
experiments tailored to show the adjustment of the CWS’s reputation level. Table 4.1
represents three types of CWSs we consider in our simulation: ordinary, faker and
intermittent. Ordinary community acts normal and reveals what it has, the faker com-
munity is the one that provides fake feedback in support of itself, and the intermittent
community is the one that alternatively changes its strategies over the time. As it is
shown in Table 4.1, the QoS value is divided into three ranges.
In each RUN, a number of users are selected to search for the best service. Strictly
speaking, users are only directed to ask CWSs for a service and thus, user would not
ﬁnd out about the web service that is assigned by the master of the community. In order
to ﬁnd the best community, the requesting user would evaluate the CWSs regarding
their reputation level. Some times, the users are in contact with some communities that
are very good for the user, so the users re-select them. The selected community might
be overloaded and consequently rejects the user requests. If the user agent is rejected
from the best selected community, it would ask the second best community in terms
of reputation level (and so on). After getting a response from a community, the user
agent would provide a feedback relative to the quality of the obtained service and the
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Figure 4.5: Communities overall quality of service vs. the number of simulation RUNs
is supervised by Cg. The accumulated feedback would affect the reputation level of
communities. In other words, the communities would loose their users if they receive
negative feedback, which will cause drop in their reputation level.
Considering the general incentive of CWSs to attract maximum possible users,
communities in general, compete to increase their reputation level. Cheating on rep-
utation level is done by colluding with a user (or a small group of users) to provide
consecutive positive feedback in support of the malicious (faker) community. In the
empirical experiment, we are interested observing the over-RUN reputation level of
different types of communities and how fast and efﬁcient the adjustment is performed
by Cg. Figure 4.5 illustrates the plot of reputation level for a faker community C8. The
upper plot represents the individual QoS for the community’s assigned web services. In
this plot the gray line deﬁnes the average QoS for the web services. The most promi-
nent feature of the plot is the comparison of the reputation level with the average of
the community web services QoS. The average value is assumed to be the actual QoS
99
for the community and thus, community’s reputation level. In general, there would be
convergence to such value if the community is acting in an ordinary manner (for C8
is 0.173). The lower plot illustrates the reputation level of this community over the
elapsing RUNs. Here we notify that the master of a community is responsible to assign
the web services to the user requests. To this end, normally the high quality web ser-
vices are assigned ﬁrst until they become unavailable, which forces the master agent to
assign other lower quality web services. Thus starting the RUNs, C8 gains reputation
value (up to 0.313), which is better than its individual average quality of service. In
Figure 4.5 the peek P1 deﬁnes the RUN in which the community C8 is out of high
quality web services. After passing this point, the reputation level of this community
is decreased.
Figure 4.6 illustrates community C8 reputation level in comparison with an ordi-
nary community C6. C8 at point P3 decides to provide fake positive feedback for
itself to increase self reputation level. For the interval of 30 RUNs, this community
gains higher reputation level up to the point P4. The controller agent Cg, periodi-
cally veriﬁes the feedback logs, in order to recognize the malicious actions. At P4 the
controller agent Cg notices the malicious act of C8 and freezes the obtained feedback
for investigation. Peek P2 is the point in which the community C8 is penalized in its
reputation level. After P2, a drastic decrease in reputation value is seen, which goes
underneath C8’s average quality of service (up to 0.112). There is also a continuing
but slower increase in the reputation of the faker community C8 that persists long after
the ﬁrst fake action recognition. There are then strong restriction effects, which cause
loosing the users by the faker communities. However, there is also an ongoing effect
of social inﬂuence, which leads users to have doubt in communities that have drastic
decrease in their reputation level.
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Figure 4.6: Communities overall quality of service vs. the number of simulation RUNs
Figure 4.7: Controller agent Cg’s accuracy in detection vs. the number of simulation
RUNs
agent’s performance and accuracy. One of the main factors in such a system is the
accuracy of the controller agent in fake detection. The controller agent is supposed to
investigate the feedback and recognize the malicious acts while the requesting users
provide their rates. However, there are two possibilities for Cg to fail to accurately
Figure 4.8: Communities’ tendency to fake vs. the number of simulation RUNs
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Figure 4.9: Controller agent’s characteristic analysis
detect such actions. The false detections are detecting a non-fake action as fake, and
ignoring a fake action as non-fake. The former case is called false positive (or α-error
in statistics), which is rejecting the null-hypothesis when it is true. The later case is
called false negative (or β-error), which is accepting the null-hypothesis when it is
actually false. The false positive is the case that the controller agent would ignore a
malicious act and thus, would not investigate it more closely. Since the controller agent
is not re-acting to the initially detected action, there is a chance to recover the initial
false alarm. Over the further investigation, the false negative (initially warned by Cg)
is most likely corrected once the investigation is done, but the other cases, which have
been ignored are not recognized as there is no further investigation over the detection.
To this end, one of the main objectives is to enhance the efﬁciency of the controller
agent to decrease the false alarm ratio and strength the logging feedback crawling algo-
rithm. Figure 4.7 shows the controller agent’s accuracy over the elapsing RUNs while
the recognized communities are penalized and thus, discouraged to redo the fake ac-
tions. As shown in this ﬁgure, the controller agent is relatively less accurate during
the initial RUNs. Basically, detection weakness would highly encourage the faker and
intermittent communities to perform fake actions. Mostly as a result of the reward
that they obtain without the penalty. Basically, the accuracy of Cg is increased while
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Cg acts successfully in detecting and thus, penalizing faker communities. Cg would
act better over the Runs since previously detected communities are investigated more
carefully and thus, the chance of failing to detect is decreasing.
In Figure 4.8 we discuss this issue as we observe the tendency of the communities
to provide fake feedback in support of themselves. In this ﬁgure, the vertical axes plot
the average percentage of the intermittent communities that might be encouraged to
fake and the horizontal axes plot the RUNs, which reﬂect the elapse of time. In this
ﬁgure, the average tendency to fake is decreasing as the number of intermittent agents
that are penalized are increasing.
We take a narrower analysis on the characteristics of the controller agent Cg and
their impacts that eventually inﬂuence the incentive of different communities to act
maliciously. To this end, we study the aforementioned issues towards the network con-
density and the extent to which the controller agent is crawling the feedback. In the
former study, the idea is to observe how dealing with different malicious communi-
ties make the controller agent sensitive to get suspicious while crawling the feedback.
Basically, the controller agent sets the threshold ϑ in Section 4.4.1 by observing the
number of malicious communities in the environment. This means the controller agent
tries to get more though when the number of malicious communities is increasing (see
Plot (a)). However, this harsh manner could not be kept on since Cg cannot keep
tracking all communities at the same time. On the other hand, by getting suspicious
for any community, the false positive ratio would be going up, which reﬂects the low
efﬁciency of Cg in terms of detection performance. Following the idea that Cg tries to
avoid the increase of the malicious communities, we observe that this agent increases
the average penalty value assigned to malicious communities while their number is in-
creasing. Plot (b) assigns a dot point to each community that gets penalized. The dot
points are getting more condense, which shows their high number.
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In the second part of the Figure 4.9, we study the efﬁciency of the controller agent
versus its sensitivity. Since we analyzed the threshold that is set to indicate Cg’s sensi-
tivity, here we study how well Cg can act with different thresholds. Plot (c) sketches
a graph that shows a parabola for the effectiveness of Cg. In this graph, there is a
tradeoff between the false positive and false negative errors. At a low sensitivity pe-
riod, there are high number of false negatives. This basically encourages the malicious
communities to highly redo their malicious acts as they distract in the logging ﬁle and
increase their reputation and do not get penalized afterwards. To this end, the observed
slope for the effectiveness is relatively small. There is a maximum point for the ef-
fectiveness, but this is not always true and may change depending on the environment
and surrounded communities. Therefore, we cannot ﬁnalize the controller agent’s efﬁ-
ciency to a speciﬁc value. Plot (d) is depicting the same problem from another point
of view. Indeed, in this plot we study the false alarm in spite of effectiveness. The false
alarm is computed as the sum of false positive and false negative ratios. In this plot,
the total false detections is minimized once the controller agent reaches its maximum




In the previous chapter, we proposed a reputation-based framework that is used to com-
pute agents’ reliability in interactive multi-agent systems according to public opinion.
The computed reputation value is accurate upon calculation but might lose its impor-
tance once the system has undergone dynamic changes of agents’ strategies. A sound
reputation mechanism is the one that maintains its accuracy over time and discards in-
accurate information. Following this claim, in this chapter we continue our analysis of
the proposed reputation mechanism and concentrate on its soundness in order to min-
imize the malicious strategies that might be adopted by selﬁsh agents. A part of this
chapter is dedicated to preliminaries that refer to the concepts that are already stated in
the reputation model proposed in the previous chapter, but there are some clear differ-
ences that we explore in the following. The previous reputation model was based on the
user agents and their points of views. The main concentration was on the aggregation
of relevant parameters and maintenance of accurate feedback pool. We computed repu-
tation of communities of web services (referred toRepi) using the aggregated feedback
as well as other relevant parameters. In that case, the reputation parameter was com-
puted within time intervals and was the value from consumer agents’ points of views.
But in this chapter we have a different point of view regarding this parameter and we
compute it considering some new parameters. Moreover, we discard the concept of
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interval and mainly focus on the way that this parameter is computed and updated.
Considering these changes, we refer to the reputation by Ri in the rest of this Thesis.
This parameter (Ri) represents the reputation associated to an entity i that could be a
web service agent or a community of web services. The reputation model proposed in
this chapter mainly concentrates on the soundness issue and how a reputation system
could constrain its accuracy while the interacting agents are free to choose any sort
of acting strategies. The reputation mechanism is aimed at imposing some incentives
in the multi-agent environment so that essentially truthful strategies are adopted by
majority of agents.
Regarding the related work, there are a number of reputation models that all aim
at maintaining accurate systems [35, 54, 89]. But the dynamism of the environment is
not well-studied yet. In this proposed model, we explore game-theoretical analysis of
the expected payoffs obtained via different acting strategies [23, 24]. In general, game
theory is a method of investigating different strategic decision making procedures that
intelligent agents maintain. More formally, it is ”the study of mathematical models
of conﬂict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers” [59]. We
use game theory to focus on agents’ preferences and the formation of their beliefs
to ﬁnd and develop tactics that impose our idealistic state (truthful environment) as a
common goal between agents. We provide incentives to rational agents to investigate
their risky alternative actions and estimate their expected outcomes. We investigate
the speciﬁc thresholds by which the controller system can approach sound reputation
system. Furthermore, we have implemented multi-agent environment systems with
ﬂexible parameters to observe impacts of the adopted strategies of the controller agent.
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5.2 Overview and Motivation
Web services are deployed to maintain continuous interactions between loosely cou-
pled applications. Abstracting web services using knowledge-empowered agents will
beneﬁt them from ﬂexible and intelligent interactions that those agents are able to
manage [28, 93]. However, because agents are autonomous and selﬁsh, a key issue
in agent-based environments is reputation, which is a signiﬁcant factor that regulates
the process of service selection. As discussed in Chapter 2, during recent years, there
have been extensive work addressing the reputation in multi-agent and service envi-
ronments [41], [52], [57], [35, 37]. Many of the proposed models are based on data
collected from different sources that are considered reliable. However, this might not
be the case in many concrete situations.
There is a different point of view in addressing the reputation mechanism, which
is maintaining an incentive-based sound reputation mechanism [102, 103]. In this per-
spective, the ideal case is the situation in which rational agents have incentives to act
such that ultimately the whole environment turns into a truthful network of agents.
Maintaining this mechanism requirers designing a reputation framework with some
deﬁned characteristics that establish incentives and penalties along the direction to-
wards a sound reputation mechanism. The concept of sound reputation assessment is
being considered in very few attempts. The reputation model we propose in this chapter
aims to advance the state-of-the-art by addressing this open issue (promoting truthful
actions).
The general idea of collusion-resistent reputation mechanism is inspired by a pre-
vious framework we proposed in [50], in which we developed a game-theoretic analy-
sis to maintain accurate reputation assessment mechanism for agent-based web service
systems. In this reputation assessment framework, web services are ranked using users’
feedback posted with respect to the quality and satisfaction of the received service. The
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goal is to investigate the payoffs obtained through different situations and propose so-
lutions that allow building collusion-resistent reputation mechanisms. In this chapter,
we extend this framework by expanding the reputation management, considering more
collusion scenarios, and providing more theoretical and simulation results and analysis.
Moreover, we discuss in detail the system implementation and simulation environment.
More details regarding the contributions of this proposed model are provided in the fol-
lowing subsection.
Contributions. In this model, we consider agent-based web services and address
the aforementioned problems by providing accurate reputation assessment in open en-
vironments in which web services are selﬁsh and utility maximizers. The reputation
is accurately assessed mainly as a result of incentives provided to participating agents
in order to act truthfully and avoid malicious actions. We aim to advance the-state-
of-the-art by analyzing the system’s parameters using game theory. We investigate the
incentives to cheat that malicious web services can have and incentives to act truthfully
while being aware of the possible penalties assigned by the controller agent (see Chap-
ter 4 for the deﬁnition of this agent). In fact, we theoretically and empirically analyze
the obtained payoffs according to the agent’s followed strategy (i.e. acting truthfully or
maliciously). In our simulations, we discuss the obtained results that enable us to elab-
orate on the outcome of different strategies that participants (or players) might choose.
We conclude with incentives for web services to act truthfully and identify the state
that is socially acceptable for all the participants.
5.3 Preliminaries
In Section 4.2 (Chapter 4), we pointed out the preliminaries related to the multi-agent
system hosting web services agent as service providers and service consumer agents.
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In this Section, we refer to these entities and highlight the most important concepts that
are used in this model.
Service consumers are intelligent agents that continuously seek for the services pro-
vided by some other agents. Each service consumer agent is equipped with a purchase
mechanism that facilitates its request initiation process. Moreover, this mechanism an-
alyzes the received quality of service (QoS) and generates the corresponding feedback.
Each service consumer c holds an acceptable quality threshold QTc that is compared
against the received QoS to decide about posting positive or negative feedback. Service
consumer agents rationally follow their predeﬁned goal, which is obtaining the most
satisfactory QoS over time. However, some of them could be encouraged by some web
services to temporarily support them by reporting false feedback, which could be tem-
porarily compatible with the goals of these service consumer agents. This issue will be
discussed in details later in this chapter.
Web services are agent-based services engaged in answering the service consumers’
requests. As mentioned before, web services might initiate some collusion with con-
sumers that might be beneﬁcial for both parties. Each web service agent i is equipped
with a selling mechanism that enables the agent to approach its predeﬁned goal. This
goal is to have a maximum reputation (which results in maximum market share). The
reputation Ri of the agent i is a value, which is computed as a result of feedback ag-
gregation kept in the feedback ﬁle, which is supervised by the controller agent (both
the feedback ﬁle and controller agent are explained later as preliminaries). Each web
service agent holds parameters of QoS Qi, and market share Mi that are used by the
selling mechanism to reach the predeﬁned goal. The market share Mi is a metric in-
spired by the inDemand metric represented in the previous chapter. In fact, here we use
Mi instead if inDemand because market share is partially declared by the web service
























Figure 5.1: Architecture of the proposed framework
Feedback ﬁle is used in the proposed system to gather the submitted feedback from
the service consumers. Consumers’ feedback are aggregated to reﬂect the total credi-
bility of web services. The feedback ﬁle is required to be supervised against malicious
actions maintained by some selﬁsh agents in the environment (selﬁsh consumer agents
and web services). Malicious actions mean violating the feedback ﬁle by posting some
false feedback, which results in falsely increasing the reputation of some web services.
As discussed in Chapter 4, controller agent Cg is the assigned agent that takes the
feedback ﬁle under surveillance. Cg is responsible of removing the false feedback that
support particular web services. Cg is equipped with an investigation mechanism that
enables this agent to investigate the recent feedback aggregated in the feedback ﬁle and
recognize the faked ones by investigating further actions of the beneﬁtted web service.
In general, Cg might fail to accurately detect the fake feedback (false negative error)
or similarly might recognize truthful feedback as fake (false positive error). Therefore,
Cg holds a parameter regarding its accuracy ACg.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the links among the different entities in the proposed frame-
work. Consumer agents take the initiative by looking for services using a service se-
lection mechanism. These agents might contact previously known web services (direct
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link in the ﬁgure) or refer to the controller agent to get updated with the most recent
reputation ranking of the web services (indirect link and discontinue arrows in the ﬁg-
ure). Once the web service is selected (i.e. the request is sent) and the corresponding
service is provided, the consumer agent posts a feedback to the feedback ﬁle through
the service selection mechanism. The controller agent updates the reputation ranking
by aggregating the accumulated feedback. In this process, active web services would
ask the controller agent for advertisement, which means they require to be considered
in the reputation rankings provided to the consumer agents.
5.4 Reputation Mechanism
To maximize the reputation accuracy, we advance the reputation mechanism proposed
in Chapter 4 by computing the reputation parameters in a different way and proposing
some new parameters. We therefore, maintain a sound reputation mechanism. This is
a mechanism that enables the service consumers to evaluate the credibility of the web
services they want to invoke. In this system, Cg updates its surveillance algorithm
and web services learn from their surrounding environment to make good decisions.
The main result of this model is that over time, agent-based web services will get
encouraged to act truthfully and discouraged to increase self reputation level with fake
feedback. In the assessment process, there are key factors that we need to measure
from the feedback. These factors, which reﬂect the health of a typical web service i
are: quality (Qi), and market share (Mi).
In the rest of this part, we explain each factor, then, we formalize the reputation of
a typical web service as aggregation of these factors.
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5.4.1 Reputation Parameters
Quality Qi is used to measure the mean rate that is given to the web service i repre-
senting its quality in handling the users’ requests in a timely fashion. Qi is computed by
collecting all the rates given to the web service to be evaluated. For simplicity reasons,
but without affecting the main results of this model, we consider discrete feedback
having the form (+) for positive and (−) for negative feedback. Let Pi be the set of
positive feedback a web service i has received and Ti be the set of all the feedback i
has received since published in the web. Thus, the acceptance factor would be simply




where |Pi| and |Ti| are the cardinality of Pi and Ti respectively.
Time Discount. In the trivial way of calculatingQi in Equation 1, only the number
of positive feedback is compared with the total number of feedback. This calculation
is not highly effective when the environment is equipped with selﬁsh agents that dy-
namically change their behaviors. We need then to consider the interactions history in
a more effective way by giving more importance to the recent information. This can
be done using a timely relevance function. In this model, we consider the following
function similar to the one used in [31] and [50]: e−λΔtk , where Δtk is the time differ-
ence between the current time t and feedback k submission time tk and λ (λ ∈ [0, 1])
is the recency scaling factor (i.e. scaling time values). Therefore, e−λΔtk is a weighted
feedback. Consequently, the quality factor Qi of web service i can be measured as











































Intuitively, this means when the number of (positive) feedback is huge, the quality
converges towards 1, which reﬂects the popularity of the concerned web service.
Market ShareMi is a parameter that indicates the extent to which the web service
is active in the providers’ network. This basically affects the popularity of the web
service in the sense that the high service load together with high provided quality bring
higher number of consumers (as a successful web service). We call this property the
popularity property. In the proposed reputation mechanism, a successful web service
is the one that receives high number of positive feedbacks while maintaining a good
response to its consumers, which reﬂects its high request number. Equation 3 deﬁnes
the market share for the web service i, which satisﬁes the popularity property. In
this equation, the numerator represents the total feedback received for i, whereas the
denominator is the integrated value for all recorded feedback (G) for all active web
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where G − Ti = ∅
5.4.2 Reputation Assessment
Taking the aforementioned parameters into account, we propose the estimated total
reputation for the web service i that is crucial for its selection process and over-
all survival in the environment. First, we weight each parameter with a coefﬁcient
(β1 + β2 = 1). The value of each coefﬁcient reﬂects the importance of the associated
parameter. Therefore, we obtain the estimated reputation value ri regarding the web
service i in Equation 4. The reputation value ri is only deduced from the feedback
posted on the feedback ﬁle. However, at some point this value might not be the one
that is publicly announced to the service consumers. These agents refer to the controller
agent for the most accurate information regarding web services’ reputation value and
use the obtained value as a measure of reliability.
ri = β1Qi + β2Mi (4)
In the proposed reputation mechanism, Cg is dedicated to manage the reputation
assessment and make it sound. Therefore, on top of the rates that a web service i
receives from collecting the consumers’ feedback (ri), Cg is eligible to offer a rate
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reﬂecting its own point of view regarding the web service’s reputation. The rate (Ci)
that is given by Cg affects the web service i’s total reputation. If Ci is so low (lower
than ri), that means the web service i has a bad-reputed history that might encourage
users to avoid him. If the rate is relatively high (higher than ri), the consumers rely
more on what they have evaluated from the ﬁles. Equation 5 gives the formula of
computing the total reputation Ri, which is deﬁned so that it satisﬁes the conservative
property. Such a property consists in giving higher weight to the lowest feedback. This
is achieved because if ri > Ci, then γ2 > γ1 where γ1 is the weight of ri and γ2 is the
weight of Ci.
Ri = γ1ri + γ2Ci such that:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ2 − γ1 = ri − Ci
γ1 + γ2 = 1
(5)
5.5 Reputation Alteration
5.5.1 Collusion (Web Service Perspective)
In an open environment populated with agents who are aimed to achieve their prede-
ﬁned goals, some agents may choose strategies that only beneﬁt some of them and
in general are not good strategies for the whole system. In a multi-agent system of
web services and service consumers, selﬁsh web services might desire to increase self
reputation to a level that have not been ranked to. The faked reputation level would
temporarily bring extra service requests towards the malicious web service. However,
the goal of the malicious web service is to keep the faked reputation as much as pos-
sible. A web service would collude with some consumer agents to provide continuous
positive feedback supporting him. These consumer agents have to be encouraged to
collaborate in the collusion by obtaining some privileges, such as low service fee, out-
standing QoS, etc.
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To discuss the collusion concept in more details, consider the web service i, which
aims at increasing its quality report Qi and market share Mi. In a collusion process,
the malicious web service i faces a major risk reﬂected by the rate Ci submitted by the
controller agent in the sense that if the malicious action is being detected, Ci would be
fairly small reﬂecting bad history of the web service. The submitted rate via the con-
troller agent affects the reputation value of the web service to some certain extent. In
case of acting truthfully, the web service would obtain a better reputation compared to
the case where its fake reputation is being recognized and thus, a low rate is submitted.
To this end, a malicious web service, that is aiming to increase self reputation level,
has a main challenge, which is the decision of acting maliciously. This means that even
though the web service is capable of colluding with some consumers, there might be
some reasons that prevent the agent from initiating such an action. Thus, to account for
the web service’s willingness to act maliciously, we introduce a willingness parameter
wi. In this case, the expected reputation values of acting 1) truthfully (Exp(Ri|Truth))
and 2) maliciously (Exp(Ri|Mal)) should be compared. A web service is willing to
act maliciously when the expected reputation value of colluding is more than the one
of acting truthfully. The parameter wi is set as follows:
wi = 1 if Exp(Ri|Mal) > Exp(Ri|Truth)
wi = 0 if Exp(Ri|Mal) ≤ Exp(Ri|Truth)
The expected values of reputation in different cases are computed in Equations 6
and 7. In Equation 6, q and 1 − q are respectively probabilities of being detected
and ignored by the controller agent. The parameter ri is the altered reputation as a
result of collusion and the parameter Ci is the rate the controller uses if the collusion
is detected. The value of ri is greater than ri thanks to the submitted faked feedback
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by the colluding consumers. Likewise, the value of Ci is less than Ci as long as the
controller agent would penalize more in case of collusion being detected.
Exp(Ri|Mal) = q(γ1ri + γ2Ci) + (1− q)(γ1ri + γ2Ci)
⇒ Exp(Ri|Mal) = γ1ri + γ2(qCi + (1− q)Ci) (6)
Exp(Ri|Truth) = γ1ri + γ2Ci (7)
In general, a normal web service that is acting truthfully, expects the actual repu-
tation level when there is nothing wrong in the feedback ﬁle. Later in this section, we
also consider the false positive cases where the truthful action also gets penalized and
thus, the expected reputation rank should be updated. The malicious web service also
has some other challenges, which are beyond the scope of this model: 1) when to act
maliciously; 2) who to collude with; and 3) how many fake feedback to provide. To be
focussed, in this model we only consider the malicious actions consisting of providing
positive feedback. The fact of providing negative feedback, for example a web service
can (indirectly) provide continuous negative feedback to a concurrent web service, is
also important to be considered in future work.
5.5.2 Collusion Scenario
The collusion scenario could be initiated by either the consumer agent or web service
agent. In this reputation model, we assume that this procedure is initiated by the ma-
licious web service that is already willing to collude. This means that for the web
service, the expected reputation rank with respect to collusion is more than the one
of following a truthful action. Before discussing the collusion scenario, we also need
to provide some insights regarding the consumer agent. In the proposed framework,
117
the consumer agents are aimed at obtaining the best service quality and therefore, they
need to seek for the best reputed web service. In order to ﬁnd the best web service, the
consumer agent is required to refer to the controller agent to obtain the most updated
web services’ ranks. Otherwise, the consumer has to consider its history of service se-
lection and accordingly, requests the most reliable web service. To this end, on top of
the eagerness of high quality service, the consumer agent requires from the controller
agent to be updated. Therefore, if the consumer agent accepts the malicious web ser-
vice’s invitation for collusion, the corresponding risk of reaction from the controller
agent needs to be taken into account. If the controller agent recognizes the collusion,
the recognized consumer would not beneﬁt from the controller agent’s services for
some certain time, which affects the consumer agent’s expected service quality. To be
focussed, in our collusion analysis, we skip the details of collusion willingness regard-
ing consumer’s point of view and mainly consider the collusion process initiated by the
web service and collaborated by the consumer agent. This limitation does not affect
the obtained results.
In the collusion scenario, the malicious web service and consumer agent agree on
a collusion that bring some beneﬁts to both colluding parties. The web service i gets
extra positive feedback that increase its reputation value out of the feedback ﬁle. The
enhanced reputation value ri is computed in Equation 8.
ri = β1Qi + β2Mi (8)
where Qi = Qi(1 + fQ) and Mi = Mi(1 + fM)
fQ = f(|Pi|, |Ti|, |Fi|) and fM = g(|Ti|, |G|, |Fi|)
In Equation 8, the factors fQ and fM respectively represent the update factor regard-
ing web service i’s quality and market share parameters. These factors are functions
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of current status of the web service i in the feedback ﬁle (|Pi| denotes the number of
positive feedback for i, |Ti| the number of all feedback for i, |Fi| the number of faked
submitted feedback for i, and |G| the number of all recorded feedback for all active
web services). The functions f and g are monotonically increasing with respect to |Pi|
and |Ti| respectively (note that Fi ⊆ Pi ⊆ Ti ⊆ T ). Overall, the evaluated rate of rep-
utation of web service i would be increased after collusion. The colluding consumer
obtains higher quality of service with low fees, which exceeds its expectations if it acts
truthfully. To this end, if the collusion is not recognized by the controller agent, the
web service gains higher reputation value and the colluding consumer obtains better
deal.
5.5.3 Detecting Malicious Actions
In the proposed framework, the controller agent serves as representative of the repu-
tation system. Therefore, this agent is aimed to seize malicious acts and maintain a
sound reputation system. In fact, Cg’s challenges are: 1) how cautious to be (how to
set the certainty parameter Ci explained earlier, which is proposed by the controller
agent to measure the conﬁdence this agent has on the web service i); 2) always be-
ing careful not to generate false alarms (detections); and 3) setting proper penalties
to avoid detection failures [84]. Failing to detect malicious acts leads to false alarms,
which are composed of two cases: the case of penalizing truthful agents (web service
and consumer) by mistake (false positive), and the case of ignoring malicious agents
by mistake (false negative). When a web service i is under investigation by Cg for a
possible malicious action, a reputation value during the investigation time is calculated
as shown in Equation 5 and denoted by μi. This means only the feedback received
during this period are considered.
119
In the penalizing scenario, the controller Cg applies a penalty that affects the pe-
nalized web s.ervice with respect to its reputation value. Also the colluding consumer
is penalized in the sense that it will not proﬁt from the controller’s services, for in-
stance in terms of getting updated regarding the most recent reputation ranking. To this
end, Cg analyzes the applied penalty to minimize malicious acts in the network. One
clue would be applying a relatively high penalty to maintain a strong control over the
feedback ﬁle. Such (harsh) manner does not necessarily imply a high performance for
Cg because penalizing truthful agents imposes negative inﬂuence on its accuracy level.
Therefore, Cg always looks for an optimum penalty value, which minimizes malicious
acts and maximizes self-performance level. To detect malicious actions, Cg is then re-
quired to be equipped with a mechanism to analyze the interactions of the web services
with the consumers. During the investigation, Cg aims to make the best decisions to
update its signiﬁcance level, which affects the accuracy of the rate Ci. Also, Cg needs
to learn from the current penalties the information that is used in further detections. In
our framework, we suggest using the t-statistic as a measurement of error and detec-
tion criteria that Cg uses to capture suspected behavior of the web services. Equation
9 shows this detection criteria where σi is the standard deviation of the reputation of
i during the investigation period. The threshold ν is set by the controller agent and is
application-dependant. The t-statistic is used because the mean and standard deviation
of a sample reﬂecting the investigation time are to be considered, instead of the param-
eters of the whole periods since the activation of the web service. In fact, this error
computes an estimate for the number of standard deviations the given sample (reﬂect-
ing the behavior of the web service i during the investigation time) is from the mean
reputation value of i.
|Ri − μi
σi
| > ν (9)
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5.5.4 Suspecting Phase
The controller agent initiates a secret suspecting phase about the web service i when
equation 9 is satisﬁed. In this stage, the behavior of the web service i is under closer
investigation. The controlled web service is better off doing its best not to get pe-
nalized. If the web service did not act according to the raise in its reputation level
(ΔRi = Ri − μi), Cg might penalize the agent for faked feedback. If not, Cg would
ignore the investigation and consider the raised reputation level as a normal improve-
ment.
AlthoughCg uses its history of investigations together with the learned information
collected from the environment, always there is a chance of mistake that would cause
wrong decision. In general there are four cases: (c1) the web service acts maliciously
and accordingly gets penalized by Cg; (c2) the web service acts maliciously, but gets
ignored by Cg; (c3) the web services acts truthfully, but gets penalized by Cg; and (c4)
the web service acts truthfully and Cg considers its action normal. Cases (c1) as true
positive and (c4) as true neutral represent the fair situations. However, cases (c2) as
false negative and (c3) as false positive are failures, which decrease Cg’s performance.
In the following, we analyze the scenario for each case and conclude with a general
payoff gained by each involved party.
The concept of reputation update is the fact about changing ones reputation level by
which social opinions could be inﬂuenced. Adversely, the reputation is updated once
Cg applies some penalties to detected malicious acts. In general, the feedback ﬁle
is subject to be modiﬁed by some non-authorized agents or an authorized controller
agent. The interaction between a selﬁsh web service and the controller agent can be
modelled as a repeated game over time. The game consists of actions (made by the
web service) and reactions (made by Cg). Here we consider the aforementioned four
cases and obtain the corresponding payoffs of each case. The obtained reputation value
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for web service i after web service i’s action together with Cg’s reaction (which could
be estimated by Exp(Ri|Mal) or Exp(Ri|Truth) that are computed in Equations 6
and 7) is denoted ORi. We use R′i to denote the actual (or fair) reputation that has to
be set for web service i. However the current set value (ORi) might be different from
R′i because of false positives or negatives. In the rest of this chapter, we consider the
effect of collusion and penalties on the reputation of web services.
According to the decision made by the controller agent, four outcomes are to be
considered and we categorize them as follows: false negative (FN ), false positive
(FP ), true positive (TP ), and true neutral (TN ). Hereafter, we explain and analyze
each one of them.
Malicious Act not Penalized (FN). This is the case where the web service i acts
maliciously for instance by colluding with some users and Cg does not recognize it.
Thus, web service i increases its reputation level. We refer to this improvement as
Impi. Impi is in fact the increased reputation that is obtained by increasing ri value.
We also refer to the assigned penalty value as Pni. This value is set by Cg considering
the past history of i and is updated through time elapse. Equation 10 gives the corre-
sponding values for the obtained reputation level ORi and the actual (fair) reputation
value R′i.
ORi = Ri + Impi; R
′
i = Ri − Pni (10)
ORi −R′i = Impi + Pni = ω (11)
The difference between the actual (fair) and current reputation values reﬂect the
payoff that we can use in our game-theoretic analysis (Equation 11). We use this dif-
ference to be able to compare the possible scenarios in terms of reputation level. For
simplicity, we set Impi + Pni to ω. The difference here is positive, which means the
web service gets beneﬁt of +ω.
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Truthful Act Penalized (FP). This is the case where the web service i acts normal,
but Cg decides to penalize him. In this case, i would lose its actual reputation value
as shown in Equation 12. Equation 13 shows the obtained payoff, which is a negative
value in this case. This reﬂects the fact that the web service i loses ω. This basically
affects Cg as well in the sense that a wrong decision is being made, so there is a
negative effect applied to its accuracy level.
ORi = Ri − Pni; R′i = Ri + Impi (12)
ORi −R′i = −ω (13)
Truthful Act not Penalized (TN). This is the ideal case where i acts normal and
Cg refuses to penalize. In this case the current reputation is the same as the actual
reputation (ORi = R′i). Thus, the payoff assigned to i is zero (ORi −R′i = ω = 0).
Malicious Act Penalized (TP). This is also the fair case where web service i acts
maliciously hoping to increase self reputation level. Cg detects the action and thus,
applies the penalty. In this case, i loses both the penalty and improvement (−Pni −
Impi = −ω).
In the cases considered here, we also need to discuss the obtained payoff for the
consumer and controller agents. However, in this reputation model we only focus on
the controller agent and skip the details of the penalizing procedure regarding consumer
agents. Nevertheless, we assume that the penalized user would not be able to get
the controller agent’s services, for instance receiving information about the reputation
ranking of web services. Therefore, the colluding consumer would be also inﬂuenced.
Regarding the controller agent’s payoff, one basic idea that we use in the rest of this
chapter is to consider the accuracy of Cg in detecting the malicious acts and according
to the performed reaction, we set the payoff. Therefore, in the ﬁrst two cases where
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the detections are wrong, Cg obtains a negative payoff (say −π), and in the second
two where the decisions are correct, Cg obtains the positive payoff (say +π). The
payoff is not received immediately after Cg’s reaction, but after a period of time. The
main question is then who is going to pay the controller agent and how? Different
scenarios can be applied and in this model we assume that web services and consumers
contribute together to the Cg’s payoff by paying a fee to the controller for making
the system secure and fairly competitive, which is of a great signiﬁcance for both the
consumers and web services. In such a setting, −π means less income for Cg because
some web services and users stop paying the fees. Here we analyze the different cases
according to the four outcomes discussed earlier.
Malicious Act not Penalized (FN). In this case, some bad web services get pro-
moted and ranked high. This can quickly be recognized by the competitors (web ser-
vices) and some users who had previous experiences with those bad web services.
Therefore, those competitors and users will refuse paying the controller as the system
is no more secure for the users and fairly competitive for honest web services.
Truthful Act Penalized (FP). In this case, some honest web services are unfairly
penalized, which make them stop paying the controller. Other honest competitors and
some users who know the reputation of the penalized web services will feel the system
unfair and insecure. They can consequently decide to stop contributing in the payment
of Cg and get its services.
Truthful Act not Penalized (TN). This is the situation where all the web services
and users are satisﬁed as the system seems secure and working correctly, which brings
more competition for the beneﬁt of the users. Web services and users will then continue
supporting Cg and requesting its services.
Malicious Act Penalized (TP). In this situation, some users and competitors who
know the penalized web services will feel satisﬁed as the system is getting more secure
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and fairly competitive. This will encourage them to increase the Cg’s payment to
counterbalance the system against the loss caused by the penalized web services who
will probably cease participating in the payment of the controller.
The reason behind this payoff assumption is the fact that we consider the interac-
tion between the web service and controller agent as a repeated game. The repeated
game theory brings the concept of learning in detection and penalizing process. Such
a repeated game would rationally help web services to obtain experiences from the
past interactions with Cg and thus, know whether to act maliciously or truthfully. The
objective of the repeated game is to maintain a sound reputation mechanism in which
the controller agent is getting stronger in reputation updates, and the web services are
discouraged to act maliciously.
5.6 Game Theoretic Analysis and Simulation
This section is dedicated to analyze the incentives and equilibria of reputation mech-
anism using the feedback ﬁle. Since the challenge is on the reputation (from web
service’s point of view, either to act maliciously, i.e. fake F or act truthfully, i.e. act
normal N ) and accuracy of the feedback ﬁle (from Cg’s point of view), we model the
problem as a two-player game. The active web services are of type good SG or bad
SB (P [SG] and P [SB] represent the portion of each in the environment, e.g. 0.7 and
0.3). Web services of type good are more reliable and likely to act honestly, while the
bad ones are more likely to act maliciously. The types are labelled with Cg’s opin-
ion imposed by web service’s general reputation in the system. Let Pr[N |SG] (resp.
Pr[N |SB]) be the probability that a web service of type good (resp. bad) acts normal.
In general, Cg’s expected value for normal action from a typical web service is:
Pr[N ] = P [SG]Pr[N |SG] + P [SB]Pr[N |SB] (14)
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where Exp(Ri|Truth) and Exp(Ri|Mal) that are computed in Equations 6 and 7 are
good estimators of Pr[N |SG] and Pr[N |SB] respectively. For instance, the probability
that a web service of type good to act truthfully can be estimated to be the expected
reputation of this web service given that it acts truthfully.
The set of pure strategies for web services is deﬁned as st = {F,N}. This cho-
sen strategy imposes the behavior that the web service shows and thus, the controller
agent observes after the action is occurred. Cg also chooses between two strategies:
penalizing (P ) and not penalizing, which means ignoring (I) the event. We consider a
payment function χ associated to the sequence of actions performed by web services.
The payment mechanism is deﬁned as follows: χ : st × stM−1 → [−ω,+ω], where
M is the number of actions performed during the past and current periods and −ω and
+ω are explained and computed in equations 11 and 13. Thus, χ(Oi, O−i) represents
the assigned payoff to web service i when it selects Oi ∈ st at current moment and
O−i ∈ stM−1 represents its M − 1 previous chosen strategies during M − 1 periods.
There is a similar payoff function for Cg that assigns values in the range [−π,+π]. In
the rest of this section, we start by analyzing the one-shot game, which is then extended
to continuous game.
Proposition 5.1 In one-shot game, penalizing a fake action is the unique Nash equi-
librium.
Proof: Clearly acting fake by web service i, controller agent Cg would have a
best utility if penalizing strategy is chosen rather than ignoring. On the other hand, if
Cg chooses to penalize, i would not change its chosen strategy since in both cases i
will lose −ω. Consequently, penalizing a fake action is a Nash. Adversely, the normal
act by i would let Cg to ignore. However, if the strategy is to ignore (by Cg), the best
strategy for i is to act fake. Therefore, there is no Nash in ignoring the normal act.
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Therefore, the obtained Nash is unique.
In one-shot game, players only consider the present information and they rationally
tend to stay in fake-penalized state. This unique Nash is a good situation for Cg, but
not for i. We need to study a socially better situation for both players when they learn
the best strategies over time. This can be done by considering the repeated game.
If i can estimate the expected payoff with respect to Cg’s response, it might prefer
acting normal. In fact, this issue is how to make agents (i and Cg) converge to a
Pareto-Optimal [5], which is the best situation for both players. We call this situation
Pareto-Optimal Socially Superior.
Deﬁnition 5.2 Pareto-Optimality. A situation in a game is said to be Pareto-Optimal
once there is no other situation that makes at least one player better off without making
any other player worse off.
In the following, we extend the one-shot game to the repeated game over periods
of time. Therefore, following different strategies in time intervals will generate the
corresponding payoffs to the players. At a given moment, Cg would decide whether
to continue or stop investigating. To this end, e0 is referred to as the case of doing no
investigation effort and basically ignoring all actions. Otherwise, the best effort is made
by Cg doing investigation. Cg has to decide about a proper strategy and obviously, if it
chooses e0 and i plays fake, the controller agent would lose right away. For simplicity,
we analyze the game during ﬁx intervals of time and a strategy of acting in each interval
needs to be decided. We apply a weight to each interval to reﬂect the payoff portion
during this interval. For instance, if 2 intervals are considered, μ would be the payoff
coefﬁcient for the acts done in [t0, t1] and 1− μ the payoff coefﬁcient for the acts done
in [t1, t2].
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For simplicity and illustration purposes but without loss of generality, we con-
sider the repeated game with two shots. The general case with n shots (n ≥ 2)
will follow. In such a game, web service i as player 1 has to make two decisions
over over fake F and act normal N , one in the ﬁrst decision time spot (weighted
by μ), and the other in the second decision time spot (weighted by 1 − μ). Since i
is the game starter, and Cg initially decides whether to stop or continue the game,
we consider two continuous actions that reﬂect our game the best. An example of
these actions is faking the ﬁrst time spot (denoted here by F μ) and the second time
spot (F 1−μ), which is denoted by F μF 1−μ. Therefore, i’s set of pure strategies is
Ai = {F μF 1−μ, F μN1−μ, NμF 1−μ, NμN1−μ}. In n-shot game, the set of pure strate-
gies is: Ai = {F μ1 . . . F μn , F μ1 . . . Nμn , . . . , Nμ1 . . . Nμn} where
∑n
i=1 μi = 1. Con-
sidering the choice of efforts, Cg’s set of pure strategies (penalizing P or ignoring I) is
ACg = {e0, P μP 1−μ, P μI1−μ, IμP 1−μ, IμI1−μ}. Table 5.1 represents the payoff table
of the two players over their chosen strategies. We continue our discussions in the rest
of this section on this table.
In this game, the idea is to give the highest possible payoff +ω to the case in
which i decides to fake the most and gets ignored by Cg. The more Cg recognizes the
malicious act of i, the highest assigned negative value weighted by the payoff portion
of the time spot (μ or 1 − μ). For instance, if the web service i decides to fake during
the ﬁrst time spot but gets penalized, i’s payoff would be −μω, and if it decides to
fake again, but gets ignored this time, it will gain (1 − μ)ω, which makes the ﬁnal
payoff χ(Oi, O−i) = (1 − 2μ)ω (see line 3 column 1 of Table 5.1). There is a similar
payoff assignment for Cg in the sense that its accurate detection is under investigation.
For example, a correct detection in the ﬁrst time spot would bring +μπ, and if the
second detection is wrong, this ﬁrst portion will be added to the negative payoff of the
second time spot −(1 − μ)π, which makes the ﬁnal payoff equal to (2μ − 1)π (see
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Table 5.1: Two-shot game between web service i and controller agent Cg with ob-
tained payoffs
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line 3 column 1 of Table 5.1). The crucial key to survive in the environment for both
players is to consider the previous events and moves. In the following, we elaborate on
different cases while web services do or do not consider Cg’s behavior in the game.
Proposition 5.3 In repeated game, if i is not aware of Cg’s previous chosen strategies,
then faking all the time and penalizing all fake actions is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: (We illustrate the proof for two-shot game from which the general case
follows.)
Nash. It is clear from Table 5.1 that in both faking intervals, Cg receives the maximum
payoff by penalizing both cases. In this case, i would not increase its payoff (−ω) and
thus, would not prefer any other strategy. In any other case, by choosing the maximum
received payoff for any player, the other player has a better strategy to increase its
payoff.
Uniqueness. We prove that theis Nash point is the only Nash with respect to the follow-
ing cases. In the ﬁrst row of Table 5.1, there is no Nash because Cg makes no effort,
so the maximum received payoff is zero and thus, it can be increased by changing the
status. In the third and forth rows, still there is no Nash since in these rows there are
choices of P and I in the sense that for any of these choices, i would be better off
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changing to a strategy that maximizes its assigned payoff. In the last row, the payoff
assignment is similar to the ﬁrst one, so that Cg prefers to change its chosen strategy
to apply penalty to fake actions.
We also have the following propositions generalized from the two-shot game. We
motivate the fact that if the penalty assigned by Cg is clear, the strategy chosen by i
would be different. The proofs are straightforward from the two-shot game as shown
in Table 5.1.
Proposition 5.4 In repeated game, if i is not aware of Cg’s previous chosen strategies,
then faking all the time is dominant strategy for i.
Proposition 5.5 In repeated game, if i is not aware of Cg’s accuracy level, then acting
normal by i and ignoring by Cg all the time is Pareto-Optimal Socially Superior .
To analyze the reasons behind encouragement to act truthfully, we need to measure
some expected values. In the repeated game, the probability that exactly n normal acts
out of M acts are done in the past and current moment (Pr[n,M ]) can be computed






Pr[N ]n(1− Pr[N ])M−n (15)
where Pr[N ] is calculated in Equation 14. We use this probability in measuring the
expected cumulative payoff denoted by V (Oi, O−i) for web service i in the sense that
in the chosen strategies (Oi, O−i) n actions were normal as follows:
V (Oi, O−i) =
M∑
n=0
Pr[n,M ]χ(Oi, O−i) (16)
As the objective of a rational web service i is to maximize the expected cumulative
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payoff, it would select the current strategy O∗i that maximizes V (Oi, O−i):
O∗i = argmaxOi∈stV (Oi, O−i) (17)
This would be achieved when the following inequality is satisﬁed:
M∑
n=0
Pr[n,M ]χ(O∗i , O−i) >
M∑
n=0
Pr[n,M ]χ(O∗i , O−i) (18)
where O∗i denotes the opposite strategy of O
∗
i , which means:
V (O∗i , O−i) > V (O
∗
i , O−i) (19)
Recall that q is the probability of correct recognition via Cg that impacts the strat-
egy that i adopts in the repeated game. Therefore, in the repeated game, these proba-
bilities of Cg are labelled as qt0 , . . . , qtM , which reﬂects the evolution of Cg’s accuracy
over time. Indeed, Cg’s accuracy has impact on the expected cumulative payoff that
web service i estimates given the penalty and improvement it makes. Therefore, Cg
applies such penalty that discourages i to act maliciously.
Proposition 5.6 At a given moment tn, If Pni > 1−2q
tn
qtn
Impi, then web service i re-
ceives less cumulative payoff V (Oi, O−i) if it acts maliciously.
Proof: To prove this proposition, we can simply assume that all the previous




is true, then O∗i = N . As V (Oi, O−i) is deﬁned in terms of χ(Oi, O−i) (Equation 16),
which in turn is deﬁned in terms of i’s reputation, we simply need to prove that if the
condition is true, then i will have less reputation value. To do that, we need to prove
that:
Exp(Ri|Nμ1 . . . Nμn−1F μn) < Exp(Ri|Nμ1 . . . Nμn)
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By simple calculation, we expand the expected values to their possible cases together
with their probabilities, so we get:
Exp(Ri|Nμ1 . . . Nμn−1F μn) =
(qtn)(Ri − Impi − Pni)
+(1− qtn)(Ri + Impi)
Exp(Ri|Nμ1 . . . Nμn) = Ri
The ﬁrst equation gives the expected reputation value given that a fake action is made
at the moment tn, and the second one shows the expected reputation value given that
no fake action is made. Assuming that Pni > 1−2q
tn
qtn
Impi, it is easy to see that:
(qtn)(Ri − Impi − Pni) + (1− qtn)(Ri + Impi) < Ri
so we are done.
Theorem 5.7 qtn is increasing with respect to Impi and decreasing with respect to
Pni











As Pni ≥ 0, ∂Bi∂Impi ≥ 0, which means Bi is increasing with respect to Impi. Conse-
quently, qtn is also increasing with respect to Impi.
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Table 5.2: Implemented environment details







Bi is then decreasing with respect to Pni. Consequently, qtn is also decreasing with
respect to Pni.
This theorem is important and very intuitive as it tells us if the improvement in the
web service’s reputation is very high, then the controller should be very cautious as
probably the improvement is a result of some malicious actions. On the other hand, if
the agent is less cautious, then this should be balanced by making the penalty high, so
that web services will be discouraged to act maliciously. This theorem is inline with
the result found in [84] according to which “buying agents will not be harmed inﬁnitely
by dishonest selling agents and therefore will not incur inﬁnite loss, if they are cautious
in setting their penalty factor”.
Theorem 5.8 In n-shot repeated game, if Pn > 1−2q
tn
qtn
Impi, acting normal and being
ignored is both Nash and Pareto-Optimal.
Proof: From Proposition 5.5, we know that ignoring normal acts in all the shots
is Pareto-Optimal. On the other hand, from Proposition 5.6, we deduce that i would
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Figure 5.2: Overall reputation and accuracy assessment regarding different types of
web services
have less cumulative payoff if it fakes given that it is aware of the assigned penalty
Pni and Cg’s accuracy. Therefore, the dominant strategy for i would be acting N . If
i plays N as its dominant strategy, the best response from Cg would be I in all shots
(see Table 5.1). Therefore, if the condition Pn > 1−2q
tn
qtn
Impi holds, then playing N
and I is Nash, where Nμ1 . . . Nμn and Iμ1 . . . Iμn are dominant strategies for i and
Cg, which completes the proof.
This theorem shows that if the web services are aware of the penalties and the
controller’s accuracy, then the system will achieve a secure and healthy state.
5.7 Simulation and Experimental Results
We developed a simulator in a java-based platform hosting different agents having
broad range of characteristics and capabilities. Three types of agents are implemented:
controller agent, web service agents, and consumer agents. During the simulation runs,
web services and consumers might leave or join the network if they wish so. Table
134
5.2 provides detailed information regarding the implemented environment. We cate-
gorized the consumer and web service agents into three classes with respect to their
acting strategies through simulation runs: (1) acting strategies using ﬁxed opinions;
(2) acting strategies using random movements; and (3) acting strategies using environ-
ment observations. Acting using ﬁxed opinions means agent are completely (100%)
truthful (0% tendency to act maliciously) or completely malicious (100% tendency to
act maliciously). Acting using random movements means agents randomly decide to
act truthfully or maliciously and can change their decisions continuously. This type of
agents, which represents 30% of the population with 50% tendency to act maliciously,
makes the environment more realistic with presence of noise. Finally, acting through
observations means agents are strategic and change their behaviors based on their ob-
servations of Cg’s performance and their tendency to act maliciously is function of
previous and current observations p1, . . . , pn. The objective of this simulation is to
analyze the outcome and performance of these agent types in different scenarios.
The ﬁrst group of agents follow their predeﬁned strategies regardless of the envi-
ronment changes. The agents following this strategy fall into two groups of malicious
and truthful. Figure 5.2 plot (a) illustrates two graphs reﬂecting the accumulated rep-
utation of two typical web services (truthful and malicious) over the simulation runs.
The truthful web service (lower graph) gradually maintains its actual reputation value,
which converges to its publicly announced quality of service. This is the normal case
in the implemented environment as the active web service collects the feedback with
respect to the offered quality of service and thus, the accumulated reputation would re-
ﬂect the actual quality value. The malicious web service (upper graph) eventually loses
its accumulated reputation because based on its ﬁxed strategy, it will continuously be
involved in collusion scenarios. The controller agent recognizes the collusion made
by web services following ﬁxed malicious strategies. As consequence, the reputation
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dramatically decreases at a certain time. Figure 5.2 plot (d) illustrates the overall repu-
tation mechanism efﬁciency (i.e. Cg’s accuracy) with respect to all the actions made by
the web services and consumers and the reactions maintained by the controller agent.
As shown by the graph, the controller agent acts accurately. In fact, recognizing the
malicious actions maintained through ﬁxed strategies is easy to learn for the controller.
Therefore, the accuracy obtained by the controller agent is relatively high. We would
carry on illustrating the efﬁciency graph in the rest of this section in order to com-
pare the impacts on the reputation mechanism imposed by diverse parameters in the
environment.
Figure 5.2 plot (b) represents the same results according to the observed reputa-
tion of a typical agent following random behavior as acting strategy. As represented
in Table 5.2, agents of this type are developed with 50% chance of acting maliciously.
Observed in different simulations, the controller agent is capable of recognizing these
agents from time to time and penalizes them as it keeps the information regarding the
past detections and web services with history of being detected are investigated more
carefully. Hence, the web services which do not consider the controller’s existence in
their acting strategies would fail to accumulate a stable reputation value. In this ﬁgure,
plot (e) illustrates the corresponding reputation mechanism efﬁciency with respect to
the maintained actions. In fact, the unpredictable behavior of this type of web services
confuses the controller agent because the agent that has maintained some collusion at-
tempts, might act truthfully at some periods of time, where the controller agent has got
very suspicious about the web service agent (because of a number of detected collu-
sion attempts). The unpredictable and random behavior of this agent would generate a
number of false detections for the controller agent, which brings about an oscillating
efﬁciency.
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Figure 5.2 plot (c) illustrates the results regarding a typical web service that consid-
ers the environment parameters (the controller agent’s accuracy) in its acting strategy.
The behavior of this type of agent is more dynamic compared to the previously dis-
cussed agents. In this plot, the considered web service maintains collusion attempt
twice, which in both, the controller agent recognizes the attempt. Overall, controlling
this type of agents is easy, but takes some time for the controller to completely learn
from their behaviors and as illustrated by plot (f), the corresponding reputation mecha-
nism efﬁciency increases once the behavior is being learnt, which reﬂects the controller
agent’s overall capability to manage the detections. In the rest of this section, we ana-
lyze the reputation assessment and reputation alteration in no collusion, collusion, and
collusion-resistent environments. The exposed graphs are upon observed data from
different experiments to avoid unpredicted randomization effects.
5.7.1 Reputation Assessment with No Collusion
We ran the simulation in a safe environment within which, web services act truthfully
and the accumulated feedback reﬂect the actual reputation of the web services. The ra-
tional behind this experiment is to emphasize the fact that based on truthful actions, the
accumulated reputation of a web service would approach its actual quality of service.
Figure 5.3 illustrates different curves obtained from separated simulation runs re-
garding only one typical web service i holding a quality Qi. As shown by the ﬁgure,
the overall reputation of this web service approaches its actual quality of service QoSi
over different experiments. This fact is analyzed via the reputation assessment proce-
dure that is formalized in Equation 5 in Section 5.4. The reputation value regarding web
service i is computed by aggregating web service’s quality Qi with the web service’s
market share Mi. In the simulations, Mi follows a normal distribution N (Qi, 0.2).
According to a truthful web service i, Qi percent of services are satisfactorily
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Figure 5.3: Reputation assessment with no collusion
offered and thus, web service i expects positive feedback for ”Qi” percent of total
posted feedback. However, there is another parameter that comes to play, which is
the probability of posting unbiased feedback k from a consumer agent upon reception
of a service (Pr(unb(k))). Therefore, the probability of receiving positive feedback
(Pr(k ∈ Pi)) for web service i is computed in Equation 20.
Pr(k ∈ Pi) = Qi × Pr(unb(k)) (20)
The value Pr(unb(k)) would be different in experiments according to the reaction
of the consumers. This value is out of control and is completely based on the dis-
tribution that the consumer uses to produce accurate feedback regarding the received
service. In Figure 5.3, different curves are shown reﬂecting a number of experiments in
which, the consumers use dynamic probabilities of providing unbiased feedback. How-
ever, overall in all of the graphs, the total reputation of the web service approaches its
general quality of service (QoSi) value. This means that, in a honest environment in
which agents do not perform collusion, one’s quality of service overall reﬂects its ac-
cumulated reputation. The reputation mechanism efﬁciency in this case is pretty high
and very similar to the one shown in Figure 5.2 plot (d). The controller agent can eas-
ily manage the system control (as long as there is no collusion and web services act
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Figure 5.4: Reputation assessment through collusion
truthfully) and quickly recognize that the active users do not attempt to collude.
5.7.2 Reputation Assessment Through Collusion
In this simulation, we investigate the collusion impacts on the malicious agents’ repu-
tation values in a scenario where the controller agent imposes no penalty during simu-
lation runs. Figure 5.4 plot (a) illustrates one typical malicious web service’s reputation
value extracted from different experiments. As depicted by the curves, the malicious
web service performs collusion in all of them. This is due to the fact that the web ser-
vice at the earlier collusion experiments recognizes that the controller agent is dormant
and therefore, there would be no penalty applied after a performed collusion. This
results in a dramatic increase of the probability of colluding.
Figure 5.4 plot (b) represents the collusion tendency of the whole network involv-
ing all the web services that are capable of acting maliciously, which represents 80% of
the population (20%+ 30%+ 30%, see Table 5.2). The X-axis of this plot denotes the
elapse time over the simulation runs. The left Y-axis denotes the percentage of collud-
ing web services (obtained from whole active web services in the network). This value
is increasing over time, which expresses the increasing tendency of the web services
to act maliciously. The right Y-axis denotes the number of colluding feedback, which
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reﬂects the amount of increase in faked positive feedback set in the collusion agree-
ment between the colluding web service and consumer. The dots in plot (b) show the
extent to which the colluding web service maintains faked feedback in the collusion
process. It is observed that overall, the amount of faked feedback is increasing over
time when the malicious action is widespread in the environment. In such a chaos sys-
tem, the performance of reputation mechanism (controller agent’s accuracy) decreases
dramatically as shown in Figure 5.4 plot (c)).
5.7.3 One-shot Game and Penalty Impact on Reputation Assess-
ment
In this part, we expose the results obtained after one-shot game between the web ser-
vice and consumer agents. Figure 5.5 plots (a), (b), and (c) represent respectively the
reputation graphs obtained after a series of experiments. We study this result on three
different types of web services (acting upon ﬁxed opinions, acting randomly, and envi-
ronment observers). In plots (a) and (b) typical agents follow strategies within which
the controller agent’s action is not considered. However, plot (c) shows agents which
follow a strategy which considers controller agent’s action. All these agents adopt
malicious actions and get penalized via the controller agent, which conﬁrms the the-
oretical result discussed in Proposition 5.1 that represents the Nash equilibrium. As
shown in plots (d), (e), and (f), the controller agent expresses accurate collusion detec-
tion system and thus, the efﬁciency graph is increasing over time. However, the social
situation depicted by the Nash is not well-accepted since the collusion is maintained
regardless of the controller’s accuracy.
140
Figure 5.5: Reputation assessment and penalty impact in one-shot game
5.7.4 Repeated Game and Penalty Impact on Reputation Assess-
ment
To simulate the repeated game case, we ran the simulation with agents capable of an-
alyzing the history of interactions in order to adopt the most appropriate strategy. The
web services, which belong to categories of ﬁxed and random opinions are not con-
sidered in these experiments as they carry on the same behavior shown in Figure 5.5
plots (a) and (b). The repeated game and history analysis only affect the agents, which
consider the environment characteristics. To this end, we run many experiments con-
sidering these agents with tendency to maintain malicious actions over the time. Figure
5.6 shows different simulations running different web services capable of observing the
environment characteristics and analyzing the history of previous interactions with the
controller agent. In these simulations, the controller agent adopts different detection
and penalty settings, which imposes some impacts on the behavior and convergence
of web services to a truthful reputation mechanism. In these experiments, the involved
web services are all capable of collusion attempts. However, as shown in all the graphs,
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the collusion attempt is being detected and the corresponding penalty is applied, which
results in decreasing the reputation value. As mentioned in Theorems 5.7 and 5.8, the
assigned penalty exceeding the speciﬁed threshold brings about truthful actions made
by malicious web services and affects controller agent’s accuracy to some certain ex-
tent. Obviously for the sake of true detections, the controller agent cannot increase the
assigned penalty with no limit.
The graphs shown in plots (a), (b), and (c) are representative of reputation manage-
ment regarding different penalty settings that the controller agent imposes in a repeated
game to a set of malicious web services. Figure 5.6 plot (d) shows overall reputation
management efﬁciency reﬂected by the accuracy of the controller agent in detecting
malicious actions. The analysis of the reputation management efﬁciency shows that
obtaining high efﬁciency does not necessarily make web service adopt the truthful
strategy as shown in Figure 5.2 Plot (d). However, it is crucial to obtain this efﬁciency
where web services also tend to act truthfully. The results in plots (a), (b), and (c)
show that reputation values are affected through the collusion and penalties assigned
by the controller agent. Figure 5.6 plot (e) shows the overall tendency of malicious
web services to attempt collusion. Over simulation runs, the tendency of these agents
is decreasing, which reﬂects the trustful action as Nash equilibrium.
5.8 Related Work
Reputation is measured in open systems using different methodologies [29]. In the
literature, the reputation of web services have been intensively stressed [41]. In [77],
the authors have developed a framework aiming to select web services based on the
reputation policies expressed by the users. The framework allows the users to select a
web service matching their needs and expectations. In [52], authors have proposed a
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Figure 5.6: Reputation assessment and penalty impact in repeated game
model to compute the reputation of a web service according to the personal evaluation
of the previous users. These proposals have the common characteristic of measuring
the reputation of web services by combining data collected from users. To this end, the
credibility of the user that provides the data is important. In [49], authors have designed
a sound mechanism to address the credibility of the collected data from users. In [57],
a multi-agent framework based on an ontology for QoS has been designed. The users’
ratings according to the different qualities are used to compute the reputation of the web
service. In [35,37], service-level agreements are discussed in order to set the penalties
over the lack of QoS for the web services. In [26], a layered reputation assessment
system is proposed mainly addressing the issue of anonymity. In this work, the focus
is on the layered policies that are applied to measure the reputation of different types
of agents, specially the new comers. Although, the proposed work is interesting in
terms of anonymous reputation assessment, the layered structure does not optimally
organize a community-based environment that gathers web services and users, and
also the computational expenses seem to be relatively high.
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In all the aforementioned frameworks, the service selection is based on the data that
could not be reliable. The main issue we addressed in this model, and which makes it
different from the existing proposals is that web services are selﬁsh agents and utility
maximizers. Thus, if those agents are not provided with an incentive to act truthfully,
they can violate the system to maliciously increase their reputation level. Analyzing
the relationship between the payoffs and systems efﬁciency is another issue that has
not been addressed in related proposals.
5.9 Conclusion
The contribution of this reputation model is the theoretical analysis and simulation over
the reputation-based infrastructure that hosts agent-based web services as providers,
users as consumers, and controller agent as reputation manager of the system. In the
deployed infrastructure, web services can act maliciously to increase self reputation.
Meanwhile, controller agent investigates user feedback and penalizes malicious web
services. Controller agent may fail to accurately function, which is an incentive for
some web services to act maliciously. The discussion is formed in terms of a game
that is analyzed in one-shot and then repeated cases. This analysis is concluded by de-
noting the best social state in which selﬁsh services are discouraged to act maliciously
and increase self reputation. The analysis is accompanied by empirical results that
highlight reputation system’s parameters. In experimental results, malicious services
are observed and their characteristics are measured over time. In general, the Pareto-
Optimality is observed to be a stable state for both web services and the controller
agent.
Our plan for future work is to advance the game theoretic analysis such that web
services that risk the malicious act deploy a learning algorithm that enables them to
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measure their winning chance. To this end, a continuous game can be extended, so that
both players update their selected policies. Similarly, we need to discuss more about
the different false detection cases that distract the reputation management.
Chapter 6
Long-term Performance Mechanism
Applied to Community of Web Services
6.1 Background
In the previous chapter, we investigated situations where agents are encouraged to act
truthfully and the inaccurate information is discarded according to controller agent’s
collusion detection. In this chapter, we propose a model that is based on the infrastruc-
ture proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 and maintains long-term performance for the agents
in interactive multi-agent systems. The contribution of this chapter is the analysis of
long-term interactive strategies that constrain high performances for agents involved
in dynamic environments hosting rational and selﬁsh agents. In the model proposed
in this chapter, we mainly focus on the efﬁciency of rational entities in the form of
single web service agents or communities of web services. Unlike previous chapter,
we do not consider controller agent to impose incentives to interacting agents to main-
tain sound reputation mechanism. Using game theory, we mainly highlight the states
where rational agents obtain high performances while they are active for long-time in
a dynamic multi-agent system.
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6.2 Overview and Motivation
A multi-agent system is composed of multiple intelligent agents that according to their
goals play different roles and follow different strategies of acting. Each agent is in
fact a decision maker that seeks to effectively accomplish its goals. A typical active
agent in a multi-agent system environment is potentially limited due to its own obser-
vations and domain knowledge. This is the main reason behind agent communication
in an environment composed of multiple entities, which are functionally distributed.
As motivated in previous chapters, the network of web services with consumers is one
example of multi-agent system design as it represents distributed cooperation in IT net-
works. A typical web service abstracted as an intelligent agent is capable of providing
some services in some certain domains. Doing this, the web service agent maintains
some interactions and compositions aiming to enhance its productivity in enterprize
networks. A typical service consumer is also an intelligent agent, which is capable of
comparing different service qualities and based on its domain knowledge attempts to
enhance the obtained quality in an enterprize network.
In IT networks with cooperative settings, each web service acts individually, but
it is the resulting joint action that produces the outcome. Cooperation is therefore a
crucial aspect that improves performance, robustness and scalability in such settings.
The goal of cooperation is to result in optimal outcome for the group as a whole. In
multi-agent systems composed of web service agents, the key goal is to maximize
individuals outcome and performance. Considering the service quality as a built-in
individual characteristic, we distinguish the performance from the quality in the sense
that the performance is deﬁned as the extent to which web service agent is success-
ful in accomplishing some of its goals, whereas the quality is the ability of the agent
to provide the required service. Exploring this further, web service agent is success-
ful (highly efﬁcient) when it can effectively use its resources and abilities. Adversely,
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a web service agent is unsuccessful (poorly efﬁcient) when it fails to manage its re-
sources due to either high service demand or no demand. To this end, the key goal of a
rational intelligent web service agent is to maximize its performance (with respect to its
individual capabilities) rather than its service quality. We believe that performance in-
crease is a systematic quality assurance procedure whereas the built-in quality increase
needs fundamental enhancement of web service capabilities.
As discussed in Chapter 4, to address web service cooperation, there have been
efforts attempting to model and analyze collaborations with communities of web ser-
vices [50, 69, 70]. Recall that communities (introduced in Chapter 4) are frameworks
gathering functionally similar web service agents that share a common goal [49]. In
the context of communities, we distinguish web services collaboration from web ser-
vices composition. By collaboration, we mean that the community aggregates web
services capable of interacting with one another to manage allocated tasks, for exam-
ple by allowing a web service to replace another that is incapable of executing a task.
By composition, we mean the extension initiated by a web service to ﬁnalize a spe-
ciﬁc task. In all these proposed frameworks, the objective is to increase performance
in distributed computing. However, in such frameworks, strategies web services can
follow to achieve this goal are just limited to aggregation and different types of col-
laborations. In this context, more sophisticated strategies are yet to be investigated
and analyzed. Such sophisticated strategies can help communities and individual web
services achieve higher performance in using their resources.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate strategies as rational behaviors that web
services and communities can adopt to increase performance. We present a game-
theoretical model in which web services either act alone or cooperate with other web
services within a community. Each entity (single web service or community of web
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services) manages its score rate, market share, capacity, and performance parame-
ters. Using our proposed framework, interactive agents are capable of efﬁcient decision
making mechanism which yields maximum performance in multi-agent environments
with diverse characteristics. A game is deﬁned between typical single web service and
the representative of a typical community (called master web service). Each entity
seeks maximum performance following strategies of joining/leaving a community, ac-
cepting/refusing a request to join a community, and inviting to join a community. In
different scenarios, we investigate the situation that maximizes players’ performances.
Overall contributions of the proposed model are threefold: (1) we provide a distributed
network of web services and consumers where the task allocation problem is regu-
lated by a mechanism taking score rate, market share, and performance into account;
(2) we propose a game-theoretic analysis investigating the stabilized situation within
which, entities achieve high performance; and (3) we identify thresholds allowing the
master web service to identify the optimal number of web services associated to the
community. We also provide experiments that show and uphold the impact of our
game-theoretic analysis on the behavior of rational web services.
6.3 The Model
In terms of notations, in the previous chapter we referred to an agent by letter i. For
instance, Ri represented the reputation associated to agent i. In this chapter, we con-
sider two types of intelligent entities: individual web services and communities of web
services. To this end, here we refer to individual web services by w and communities
of web services by c. Therefore, wi and cj respectively represent single web service i
and community j.
In our multi-agent design, we consider feedback pool where consumer agents post
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their satisfaction ratings regarding their past experiences with a particular service provider.
In this system, we assume every consumer agent provides post-interaction feedback.
Our assumption in rational behavior of the consumer agents does not deviate from our
main contributions and therefore, we skip details regarding consumer agents’ variation
of accuracy.
In our feedback system, posted feedback are accumulated to compute and analyze
service providers’ score rate in multi-agent environment. A typical web service agent’s
reputation (Rwi) could be written as a function of its score rate (Srwi). But we skip
the details of this function as it is discussed in Chapter 5. The rate is simply computed
based on satisfaction rates obtained from other interacting agents. In the proposed
model in this chapter, the score rate of a service provider (Srwi for the web service
wi and Srcj for the community cj) as a value between 0 and 1. Web services and
communities as rational agents aim at increasing this value, which imposes positive
impact on their outcomes. However, increasing the score rate brings more requests
which might impose negative impact if requests are not systematically handled. In this
framework we use a simple and conventional scoring mechanism like the one used in e-
bay with three forms of+1 for satisﬁed experience, 0 for no response to the request, and
−1 for dissatisﬁed experience. This mechanism adds the value of all provided feedback
for particular service provider and divides by their number. In Equation 1, PFwi and
NFwi respectively denote the number of positive and negative feedback posted for
web service wi. NRwi denotes the number of no responded requests associated to web
servicewi. In Equation 1, the score rate of the community cj is computed as the average














The parameters PFwi , NFwi , and NRwi are updated on regular basis that could be
daily (in fact depending on the multi-agent design and how interactive the transaction
system is). Therefore, upon request, the updated score rate value is provided. Similar
to the individual web services, the community of web services also holds updated score
rate value (as an average of score rates of all the involving web services). In service
selection algorithm used by service consumer agents, the score rate of the community is
taken into account, but master web service would decide how to cope with the service
request. This means that the consumer agent cannot select the speciﬁc web service
in the community to be served. However, upon task allocation, the consumer agent
provides the post-interaction feedback regarding the corresponding web service(s) that
provided the service. In this case, active web services in the community still update
their individual score rates and inﬂuence the mean score rate value associated to the
community as a whole.
We continue formalizing the attributes of rational services. In general, all rational
entities, including users and web services, tend to maximize their efﬁciencies. To make
this chapter focussed, we only consider the perspective of web services. Thus, we
propose a heuristic (see Equation 2) for computing the efﬁciency Ex as a function f
of Srx,Mx (market share introduced in Chapter 5) and Cpx (capacity introduced in
Chapter 4) where x ∈ {wi, cj}
Ex = f(Srx,Mx, Cpx) (2)
The function f should satisfy the following properties.
Property 7 f is continuous.
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This property says that at each moment the efﬁciency of a web service or a community
can be evaluated with respect to the current attributes.
Property 8 f is strictly increasing in SrX and MX .
This property says that the efﬁciency of the service increases if it holds high score rate
and market share in the system. Consequently, services and communities will have
incentive to do better to get their overall efﬁciency increased.
Property 9 f is monotonically decreasing in MX − CpX .
This property says that the efﬁciency of a service or a community decreases if it fails
to make a good balance between its capacity and the requests it should handle. Conse-
quently, services and communities will have incentive to analyze their capacities and
manage to have acceptable market share. The idea is that the more service provider
entity succeeds in making balance between its capacity and market share, the higher
the efﬁciency would be.
Equation 3 gives a possible deﬁnition of f .
f =
Srx ×Mx
|Mx − Cpx|+ 1 (3)
Theorem 6.1 The function f satisﬁes Properties 1, 2 and 3.
Proof: Satisfaction of Property 1 is straightforward as all the parameters are
deﬁned at each moment in time, so the function is continuous. Property 2 can be




, which are clearly positive.
Property 3 can be proved by considering |Mx − Cpx| as a variable, say v and compute
the partial derivative ∂f
∂v
, which is manifestly positive, so we are done.
The other attribute that categorizes services is the risk factor SX . This factor is
denoted as how ﬂexible the service is in loosing its efﬁciency. For example, if the risk
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factor associated to wi is %20 (Swi = 0.20), then the web service wi would consider
any situation in its strategy analysis where estimated efﬁciency is more than %80 of its
current efﬁciency. Ewi is deﬁned as the estimated efﬁciency of the web service wi after
taking any strategy for updating its status (Ecj would corresponds to the community
cj). To this end, the web service wi would discard all the strategies (and choices of
updating the current status) that yield to an estimated efﬁciency less than (1−Swi)Ewi .
The reason behind using the provider risk factor is the fact that web services or
communities need to be ﬂexible in choosing strategies. For the rest of this section, we
discuss two different cases where the web service is outside and inside the community.
In each case, we analyze the best strategies that culminate in maximum efﬁciency level
for both the web service and community.
6.3.1 Web Service Out of Community
In this scenario, the single web service wi is facing the community cj with different
strategies that would end in either the single web service wi joins the community cj
or not. This action could be initiated or ceased by the web service or community
representative. Doing so, there are four different cases: (a) wi attempts to join cj
and the attempt is accepted; (b) wi attempts to join, but cj refuses the join request;
(c) cj invites the web service wi but wi refuses the invitation; and (d) there is neither
invitation from cj nor join request from wi. From the outcome perspective, the cases
of “wi attempts to join and cj accepts” and “cj invites and wi accepts” are similar.
However, refusal from any party would lead to different estimating efﬁciencies and
this is why we consider them as two separated cases. In the following, we compute the
estimated efﬁciency of each entity with respect to the taken action.
Case (a) The web service wi that takes the risk of join (Swi) would update its score
rate, market share and capacity parameters respectively in Equations 4 and 5, where n
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denotes the current cardinality of the community set.
Srwi =
n× Srcj + Srwi
n+ 1
(4)




In this case, our assumptions are as follows: (1) the score rate of a web service
would be updated to the average of the community score rate. To this end, each reg-
istered web service in the community holds its individual score rate, but broadcasts
the public score rate of the community; and (2) we consider the capacity as a ﬁxed at-
tribute. Therefore, the capacity of the web service stays unchanged, but the community
accumulates the joined web service’s capacity. When it comes to the market share, the
community simply accumulates the market share of the new web service. However, the
joined web service is going to obtain a share of total market share from the commu-
nity. The corresponding attribute updates regarding the community cj are formulated
in Equations 6 and 7.
Srcj = Srwi (6)
Ccj = Ccj + Cwi Mcj = Mcj +Mwi (7)
In this case, both entities consider the estimated parameters and compute their new
efﬁciency values (see Equation 3). The case would take place when the following
inequalities hold:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (b) In this case, wi requests joining, but the community does not accept the
request. The difference between the cases (a) and (b) is that in case (a) the join takes
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place, which brings actual updated efﬁciency for both entities. However, in case (b)
the join does not take place, which keeps the analysis at the estimation level. The
corresponding estimated efﬁciencies are characterized by the following inequalities:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (c) This case is similar to the case (b), except the fact that the refusal is caused
by the web service. The corresponding estimated efﬁciencies are characterized by the
following inequalities:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (d) In this case, both entities are not encouraged to attempt joining and there-
fore, the join does not take place. In this case, we have:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
6.3.2 The Game Set up for Single Web Service
Upon the discussed cases, we develop a game-theoretic model consisting of the web
service wi as player 1 and community cj as player 2. The player 1 follows the strategy
proﬁle of (join/not join) when is initiating the game (i.e. play ﬁrst), and follows the
strategy proﬁle of (accept join/refuse join) when is reacting to the opponent’s move (i.e.
play second). Since for our analysis it is only important whether the join takes place
or not, the order of playing does not matter when calculating payoffs (represented in
terms of efﬁciency). Table 6.1 shows the assigned payoffs for both players in different
cases. As shown in the table, the values of Jwi,cj and Awi,cj are the generalized form
of “join/accept” or “invite/accept join” cases. These values are actual differences in
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Table 6.1: Payoff regarding 2 players when web service is outside the community.
efﬁciency values after the join (E ′wi and E
′
cj
). The obtained payoffs could be either
positive or negative. The negative payoff denotes the wrong decision the entity regrets.
The payoffs obtained in the other cases are all upon estimations.
The developed game is only a one-stage game between a typical web service and
a typical community. The game could be set up between any other two entities and is
repeated over time when entities are active in the network. Moreover, rational entities
consider the information obtained in one game in their further strategy analysis. We
formalize the results we obtain from the set up game between these entities in the
following.
Proposition 6.2 In one-stage game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: In the set up one-stage game, the payoff of web services regarding ac-
cepted join request (Jwi,cj ) could be either more or less than that of refusing the in-
vitation (as it refers to the actual efﬁciency evaluation). This is also the case for the
master of the community. Consequently, there is no dominant strategy for any player.
Therefore, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium can be found.
As a consequence of this proposition, there is no stable situation rational entities
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can try to achieve by playing the game. Both players should then consider the risk
parameter in their strategy selections. To this end, we deﬁne web service and commu-
nity’s mixed strategy probabilities respectively as wi(Swi , 1−Swi) and cj(Scj , 1−Scj).
Thus, we compute web services expected payoff αwi of join (or accept to join) versus
the mixed strategy proﬁle of the community in Equation 8. Equation 9 computes the
related value regarding the refusal of join.
αwi(join, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = Scj(Jwi,cj) + (1− Scj)(JRcjwi) (8)
αwi(stay, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = Scj(SIcjwi) + (1− Scj)(0) (9)
The web service aims at maximizing its payoff. Therefore, for all adopted strate-
gies, we need to consider the best response (to the other player) and discard the others.
For instance, if the web service obtains a higher expected payoff with the joining strat-
egy, it would change its probability proﬁle to (1, 0), so the join would be the dominant
strategy.
Since each player in each stage game chooses between only two strategies, and
since any of these strategies could be the best response in a particular situation, we
analyze the case where the expected payoffs are equal. By so doing, we can compute a
threshold (μwi), which is used to identify which strategy is dominant. The threshold μwi
is used by the master to control the expected payoff of the web service in the sense that
the web service adopts the master’s desirable strategy as dominant. Thus, the master
would pay the least possible cost to obtain its desirable control on the web services.
This eventually would lead to the control mechanism of the master web service over
cardinality of the community set. The threshold is computed in Equation 10.
αwi(join, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = αwi(stay, cj(Scj , 1− Scj))
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⇒ Scj(Jwi,cj) + (1− Scj)(JRcjwi) = Scj(SIcjwi)





) + Ewi − 3(Swi)(Ewi)
1− 2Swi
(10)
The threshold μwi obtained in Equation 10 is in terms of the estimated efﬁciency
Ewi , which could be changed by the master cj . So if the expected efﬁciency of join is
computed to be more than μwi , the web service wi would adopt the join or accept the
invitation to join strategy. We have then the following result.
Proposition 6.3 In mixed strategy one-stage game, there is a threshold μwi such that
if Ewi > μwi , joining the community would be the goal of the web service. Otherwise,
the web service wi would not join the community.
Corollary 6.4 If the master web service considers the expected efﬁciency value com-
puted by the web service and provides (broadcasts) a score rate that let Ewi exceeds
μwi , the master can control adopting strategy of the web service.
6.3.3 Web Service in the Community
In the previous sections, we analyzed the case where the web service wi was acting
alone outside the community cj . We also set up a game and analyzed the payoffs
regarding different adopting strategies. In this part, we analyze the same system where
the web service wi is already acting in collaboration with other web services inside the
community cj . In this case, the web service chooses its actions from strategy proﬁle of
“leave/accept to leave” or “stay/refuse to leave” (we assume that any action that ends
up in changing the status of the web service is being made upon agreements between
the web service and the master of the community). The community cj also refers to the
strategy proﬁle of “accept of leave/ﬁre” or “refuse the leave/not ﬁre”. Doing so, there
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are four different cases: (a) wi attempts to leave the community cj and the attempt is
accepted; (b) wi attempts to leave, but cj refuses the leaving request; (c) cj encourages
(ﬁres) the web service wi, but wi refuses the invitation; and (d) there is neither ﬁring
from cj nor leaving request from wi. Similar to the case where the web service was
outside the community, we analyze the cases with their parameter updates.
Case (a) The web service wi that takes the risk of leave (Swi) would update its
score rate, market share and capacity parameters respectively in Equation 11
Srwi = Sr”wi Cpwi = Cpwi Mwi = M”wi (11)
In this case, our assumptions are as follows: (1) the score rate of a web service
would be back to its previous individual score rate (Sr”wi). To this end, each registered
web service in the community holds its individual score rate when joining a commu-
nity. However, the community recalculates its average score rate; (2) we consider the
capacity as a ﬁxed attribute. Therefore, the capacity of the web service stays unchanged
but the community reduces the left web service’s capacity. A similar analysis can be
obtained for the market share where M”wi is the previous value. The corresponding
attribute updates regarding the community cj are formulated in Equation 12.
Srcj=
n(Srcj)− Srwj
n− 1 Ccj = Ccj − Cwi Mcj = Mcj −Mwi (12)
In this case, both entities consider the estimated parameters and compute their new
efﬁciency values (see Equation 3). The case would take place when the following
inequalities hold:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (b) In this case, wi attempts to leave, but the community does not accept the
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Table 6.2: Payoff regarding 2 players when web service is inside the community.
leaving request. The difference between the cases (a) and (b) is the same as explained
in the previous section. We have then the following inequalities:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (c) This case is similar to the case (b) except the fact that the refusal is caused
by the web service:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (d) In this case, both entities are not encouraged to attempt leaving:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
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6.3.4 The Game Set up for the Joined Web Service
In this section, we also develop the game-theoretic analysis consisting of the web ser-
vice wi as player 1 and community cj as player 2. The player 1 follows the strategy
proﬁle of (leave/not leave) when is the initiator and follows the strategy proﬁle of (ac-
ceptance ﬁre/refuse ﬁre) otherwise. Table 6.2 shows the assigned payoffs for both
players in different cases. As shown in the table, the values of Lwi,cj and Fwi,cj are the
generalized form of “leave/accept” or “ﬁre/accept join” cases. These values are actual
differences in efﬁciency values after the join (E ′wi andE
′
cj
). The obtained payoffs could
be either positive or negative. We formalize the results we obtain from the set up game
between these entities in the following.
Proposition 6.5 In one-stage game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
The proof is similar to the one given for Proposition 1.
Referring to the obtained payoffs shown in Table 6.2, we would have the same
best response analysis that we did in the case for the single web service. To this, the
obtained threshold μwi is set the same.
Proposition 6.6 In mixed strategy one-stage game, there is a threshold μwi such that
if Ewi > μwi , leaving the community would be the goal of the web service that is
already member of the community. Otherwise, the web service wi would not leave the
community.
Corollary 6.7 If the master web service considers the expected efﬁciency value com-
puted by the web service and provides a market share value that let Ewi exceeds μwi ,
the master can control the strategy of the web service.
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Figure 6.1: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on joining a community.
The market share offered to the web service by the community could cause dissat-
isfaction of the joined web services. Thus, this would generate a low Ewi value, which
would cause the web service to leave considering its previous individual efﬁciency
value.
6.4 Empirical Analysis
We used a realistic multi-agent simulator in a java-based platform and developed many
agents with broad range of characteristics and capabilities. In the multi-agent based
environment, we exposed dynamism in agents’ actions and therefore, we could obtain
results that are based on the performed realistic experiments. In the implemented envi-
ronments, there are three types of agents: (a) user agents; (b) web service agents; and
(c) master web service agents that represent communities. We do not emphasize the
user agents for the sake of simplicity. However, in general, they look for best possible
web service (either from a single or a community of web services). During simulation
runs, web services and users might leave or join the network. Table 6.3 provides the
details regarding the implemented environment. We categorize the web services and
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Table 6.3: Environment Characteristics.
masters based on the risk they take in adopting strategies. There are three classes of
services that obtain different payoffs during the games.
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of the single web services that act
alone outside the community. During the simulation runs, we set up a number of one-
stage games analyzing the strategies that web services take in different situations. We
repeat the same process using three different classes of the web services according to
their risk attribute. Figure 6.3.4 illustrates 6 plots categorizing three different types of
single web services that are involved in the one-stage game regarding joining the com-
munity. In plots (a), (b), and (c) the x-axis denotes community’s public score rate that is
broadcasted by the player 2 (cj) in the game. The y-axis denotes the percentage of the
web services that considered to join the community. In this experiment, the community
is willing to accept joining web services since its market share is not balanced with its
limited capacity (Mcj > Ccj ). As it is shown in plots, there are different joining per-
centages regarding the situation that either encourages or discourages most of the web
services. In Figure 6.3.4, plots (d), (e), and (f) illustrate the average efﬁciency compar-
ison between the case where the web service was acting alone (the dotted curve) and
the case where the web service joined the community (the bold curve). The updates
in efﬁciencies clarify the extent to which the joining strategy is chosen wisely. In this
experiment, the community adopts its strategies according to its individual efﬁciency
analysis regardless of the threshold that could lead the web services to join.
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Figure 6.2: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on joining a community while
threshold being investigated.
We also lunch the experiment with the community representative that is capable
of analyzing the threshold that would enhance the control of the master web service
over the adopting strategies of the single web services willing to join and obtain higher
efﬁciency. Figure 6.4 plots the same group of web services (categorized in plots (a),
(b), and (c)) facing a community whose master web service analyzes the threshold that
could encourage the web services to join. As shown in this Figure, cj is more successful
in games with players that hold relatively high risk attribute. In lower risky web ser-
vices, the community is more successful in absorbing the web services by advertising
higher score rate. This fact is promising according to web services’ desire to increase
self efﬁciency. However, the community facilitates the joining process and meanwhile,
obtains the control on the strategies that the web services adopt. Thus, the master web
service acts better compared to the case where the master web service considers self
parameters in games.
We carry on the experiments with analysis on the efﬁciency updates regarding the
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Figure 6.3: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on leaving a community.
joined web services that are involved in one-stage game facing the community repre-
sentative. Figure 6.4 illustrates 6 plots categorizing three types of web services ac-
cording to their risk attribute class. These plots illustrate the percentage of leaving the
community together with their corresponding efﬁciency update. As it is clear in plots
(a), (b), and (c), the web services with lower risk levels act more or less according
to their satisfaction of joining the community. Therefore, the percentage of leaving is
decreased by increasing the score rate of the community. Note that the public score
rate of the community cannot be faked in this case as long as the web service is already
member of the community. The experiment shows the web services with higher risk
level could adopt leaving strategy with weaker reasoning mechanism. Consequently,
we observe a more chaotic behavior of the joined web service with higher risk level
acting in a community with relatively low score rate value. This chaotic percentage
is regulated while the score rate of the community is increased. In this case, the web
services consider to refuse the leave.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the leaving percentage of the web services in the same exper-
iment but facing a community that manages to recognize the threshold μwi . In these
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Figure 6.4: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on leaving a community while
threshold being investigated.
plots we observe a better handling of the web services, which reﬂects community’s
success in controlling the adopting strategies of the web services.
In Figure 6.4, we compare the total efﬁciency of different communities categorized
based on their efﬁciencies (Scj = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8). In these plots, the bold curves
represent the efﬁciency of the community when the threshold μwi is taken into account
and the dotted ones represent the community when the threshold is not taken into ac-
count. As shown in the plots, the efﬁciency of communities are enhanced when they
consider the computed threshold.
6.5 Related Work
In many frameworks proposed in the literature, service selection and task allocation
are regulated based on the reputation parameter [69, 70]. In [2], the proposed frame-
work regulates the service selection based on the trust policies expressed by the service
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Figure 6.5: Efﬁciency of three categorized communities of web services.
users. In [54], authors propose ontology for quality of service. Users compute the web
services’ reputation using ratings. The frameworks proposed in [41, 57] address effec-
tive reputation mechanism for web services. All these models address the reputation
in environments where Web services function alone. In such models, web service ef-
ﬁciency is not discussed in details and in general, balancing the market share with the
capacity is not considered as an issue for web service besides its reputation.
There have been few work addressing the communities of web service. The ob-
jective is to facilitate and improve the process of web service selection and effectively
regulate the process of request and task allocation [28]. In [49], authors propose a
reputation-based architecture for communities and investigate the collusion scenarios
that might falsely increase communities’ reputation in the network. In [50], the au-
thors mainly address the overall assessed reputation that is used as a main reason for
service selection. The authors do not consider efﬁciency as a parameter that impacts
service selection in future. In general, the recent aforementioned proposals motivate
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the existence of communities rather than single functional web services, but fail to sys-
tematically provide potential beneﬁts and technically compare different scenarios that
increase service providers’ efﬁciency.
6.6 Conclusion
The contribution of this model is the proposition of a game-theoretic based model to
analyze the best efﬁciency characteristics for the active services in open networks. The
proposed framework measures the efﬁciency of the web services considering a number
of involved factors. The proposed game measures the threshold that lead to a control
of strategies adopted by the single web service.
Our model has the advantage of being simple and taking into account four im-
portant factors: (1) rational services seek better efﬁciency in the environment; (2) in
service computing the collaboration concept is well deﬁned if the maximum efﬁciency
is posed as the main goal; (3) rational web services might meet higher performance
either by joining a community (for the sake of collaboration) or acting alone (for man-
aging the task alone); and (4) the community is capable of managing the number of
involving web services. The resulting model shows that the efﬁciency of the commu-
nity is increasing once the game-theoretic analysis is considered to impose parameters
to control the cardinality of the community set.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary
This thesis is about studying and analyzing trust and reputation in systems of au-
tonomous agents. In Chapter 3, we proposed a probabilistic-based trust framework
to secure multi-agent systems in which agents continuously communicate with each
other. The trust assessment procedure is composed of on-line and off-line evaluation
processes. The on-line process is based upon trustworthy and referee agents as well
as several other features. Objectively, this allows enhancing the accuracy for agents to
make use of the information communicated to them by other agents. The off-line pro-
cess considers the communicated information to judge the accuracy of the consulting
agents in the previous on-line trust assessment procedure using a maintenance process
implemented as our optimization protocol.
Our trust model has the advantage of being computationally efﬁcient and of tak-
ing into account four important factors: (1) the trust (from the viewpoint of the trustor
agents) of the trustworthy agents; (2) the trust value assigned to trustee agents accord-
ing to the point of view of trustworthy agents; (3) the number of interactions between
trustworthy and trustee agents; and (4) the timely relevance of information transmitted
by trustworthy agents. Addition process of maintenance enables agents to dynami-
cally adjust their beliefs and their trustworthy community in a more efﬁcient manner.
The resulting model allows us to produce a comprehensive assessment of the agents’
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credibility in a software system even if the environment is very biased. The proposed
mechanism efﬁciency is compared with other related models and discussed in details
to prove the capabilities of our framework. The proposed CRM model in Chapter 3
fulﬁls the ﬁrst objective we had in Chapter 1: CRM is a ﬂexible trust-based framework
that accurately considers the involved factors and provides an optimum trust estimation
process. Moreover, the agile adaptation of agents’ goals and beliefs are considered in
this framework as the system is supposed to be highly dynamic. We extended the CRM
model proposed in [46] to a model that using trust, extends its connectivity in the so-
cial network [47]. In this model, we provide a detailed discussion over the network
formation by taking into account the edge creation factors.
In Chapter 4, we proposed an incentive-based reputation model for open multi-
agent systems modelled as communities of web services gathered to facilitate dynamic
users requests. The reputation of the communities are independently accumulated in
binary feedback reﬂecting the satisfaction of the users being served by the commu-
nities. The model represents a sound logging mechanism maintaining effective repu-
tation assessment for the communities. The controller agent investigates the logging
feedback released by the users to detect the fake feedback as a result of collusion be-
tween a community and a user (or a group of users), which are provided in support of
the community. Upon detection, the controller agent maintains an adjustment in the
logging system, so that the malicious community would be penalized by decreasing its
reputation level.
Our reputation mechanism has the advantage of providing suitable metrics used
to assess the reputation of a community. Moreover, having a sound logging mecha-
nism, the communities would obtain the incentive not to act maliciously. The proposed
mechanism efﬁciency is analyzed through a deﬁned test-bed. The proposed reputation
mechanism in Chapter 4 mainly addresses our general thesis goal which is to develop
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and maintain strong reputation assessment procedures that optimally function in multi-
agent systems with dynamic changes of environment attributes such as agent goals,
credibilities, and population.
In Chapter 5, we continued the discussion on sound reputation mechanism by con-
centrating on agents’ acting strategies and their willingness to obtain highest positive
payoffs. The controller agent as the representative of the reputation system applies dif-
ferent penalties to constrain rational agents to adopt malicious actions as their dominant
acting strategies. In this chapter, we investigated scenarios within which the controller
agent overcomes the malicious activities and discourage agents to act maliciously. We
studied the obtained results and analyzed the impact of the controller agent’s imposed
values on the payoffs associated to the interacting agents. The mechanism proposed in
this chapter fulﬁls another objective of the thesis mentioned in Chapter 1: the sound
reputation mechanism discourages malicious actions of the agents trying to increase
self-reputation level and take advantage of open multi-agent system environment. This
model is also extended to another work where we model and analyze the arrival of
requests and study their impacts on the overall reputation [48]. The web services may
be encouraged to handle the peak loads by joining to a group of web services.
In Chapter 6, we utilized game theory to analyze the best performance character-
istics for active web service agents in open networks. The objective is to measure
thresholds within which the control of adopting strategies by web service agents could
be maintained. The model considers four important assumptions: (1) rational web
service agents seek better performance in the environment; (2) in service computing
the collaboration concept is well-deﬁned if the maximum performance is set as the
main goal; (3) rational web service agents might meet higher performance either by
joining a community (for the sake of collaboration) or acting alone (for managing the
task alone); and (4) the community is capable of managing the number of involving
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web service agents. The resulting model shows that the performance of the commu-
nity is increasing once the game-theoretic analysis is considered to impose parameters
to control the cardinality of the community set. The game-theoretic analysis in this
chapter mainly fulﬁls our last objective mentioned in Chapter 1: the proposed mech-
anism investigates the parameters yielding optimal performance of agents. Using this
mechanism, we study the cases where selﬁsh agents could obtain best payoffs using
their decision making procedure. This model is also extended to another work where
we discuss a mechanism which web services can use to join existing group of web
services [45]. Moreover, we analyze the scenarios where the community is overloaded
with web services that lied about their capabilities before joining.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Trust Framework
Our objective for future work is to advance the assessment procedure to enhance the
model efﬁciency using a comprehensive approach we developed in [44], which con-
siders the trust issue as an optimization problem. We plan to enhance the efﬁciency of
the trust framework in different aspects. The maintenance process is in general a learn-
ing methodology that updates the agents’ beliefs with respect to environment changes.
The information provided by the consulting agents reﬂect their behaviors and honesty
and could be used in learning methodology to update the belief set about the surround-
ing environment. This helps agents quickly adapt with the environment changes and
recognize the honest agents around them.
In the maintenance process, we can use game theory and mechanism design ap-
proaches to analyze the incentives agents can have to encourage them to be more accu-
rate. In this framework, we need to investigate the cases where the consulting agents
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do not accurately provide the information they have. In fact, the agents’ incentives
for truthful action should be analyzed. The purpose of the game theoretic analysis of
this framework is to provide a methodology that agents can use for estimating their
expected beneﬁts of their further actions. This analysis would let agents identify the
best strategies and act accordingly.
7.2.2 Reputation Mechanism
The second plan for future work is to advance the reputation mechanism developed
in [49]. In the logging system, we need to optimize detection process, trying to for-
mulate it in order to be adaptable to diverse situations. In the proposed reputation
mechanism, the detection policy of the controller agent plays an important role, as the
malicious actions are discouraged by accurate detection of the controller agent. We
aim at designing a game with three players in which the consumer is also considered
as a separate player together with the controller and provider agents.
In reputation mechanism, we are mainly aimed at establishing a sound reputation
mechanism. Following this aim, we can extend our work in different directions listed
in the following.
1. Consumer agents could be encouraged to only post truthful feedback and loose
their payoffs in case of collusion or any misleading action that leads to temporary
increase of one’s obtained payoff. This could be maintained by applying game
theory to analyze the behavior of consumer agents during interacting interval.
2. The controller agent could apply different learning methods to use the experi-
ences obtained from previous malicious action detections to decrease the possi-
bility and chance of false detection in future interactions.
3. The reputation control system could be re-deﬁned as a Markov decision process
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to systematically cope with observations and rationally use them to enhance the
reputation system performance.
We can extend our framework to enhance the performance of the web service agents
to obtain best payoffs in interactive networks. Furthermore, we plan to promote the
concept of communities of web services by analyzing the performance of these com-
munities with respect to their handling abilities of service consumers compared to that
of web services that act lonely. In this analysis, we would like to provide a game-
theoretic analysis of the beneﬁt of a single web service that is capable of serving lim-
ited number of consumers and the incentives that encourage the web service to join a
group of web services to increase self-performance. Examples of issues that still need
to be investigated are: when to join, which community to join if more than one choice
is available, which web service to hire/ﬁre, and etc.
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